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1. Introduction
What are emotions? Why do we have emotions? What are
the rules by which emotion operates? What are the brain
mechanisms of emotion, and how can disorders of emotion
be understood? Why does it feel like something to have an
emotion?
What motivates us to work for particular rewards such as
food when we are hungry, or water when we are thirsty?
How do these motivational control systems operate to en-
sure that we eat approximately the correct amount of food
to maintain our body weight or to quench our thirst? What
factors account for the overeating and obesity that some hu-
mans show?
Why is the brain built to have reward and punishment
systems, rather than in some other way? Raising this issue
of brain design and why we have reward and punishment
systems, and emotion and motivation, produces a fascinat-
ing answer based on how genes can direct our behavior to
increase fitness. How does the brain produce behavior by
using reward and punishment mechanisms? These are
some of the questions considered in The brain and emotion
(Rolls 1999a).
The brain mechanisms of both emotion and motivation
are considered together. The examples of motivated be-
havior described are hunger (Ch. 2), thirst (Ch. 7), and sex-
ual behavior (Ch. 8). The reason that both emotion and mo-
tivation are treated is that both involve rewards and
punishments as the fundamental solution of the brain for
interfacing sensory systems to action-selection and -execu-
tion systems. Computing the reward and punishment value
of sensory stimuli and then using selection between differ-
ent rewards and avoidance of punishments in a common re-
ward-based currency appears to be the general solution that
brains use to produce appropriate behavior. The behavior
selected is appropriate in that it is based on the sensory sys-
tems and reward decoding that our genes specify (through
the process of natural selection) in order to maximise fit-
ness (reproductive potential).
The book provides a modern neuroscience-based 
approach to information processing in the brain and deals
especially with the information processing involved in emo-
tion (Ch. 4), hunger, thirst, and sexual behavior (Chs. 2, 7,
and 8), and reward (Chs. 5 and 6). The book though links
this analysis to the wider context of the nature of emotions,
their functions (Ch. 3), how they evolved (Ch. 10), and the
larger issue of why emotional and motivational feelings and
consciousness might arise in a system organised like the
brain (Ch. 9).
The brain and emotion is thus intended to uncover some
of the important principles of brain function and design.
The book is also intended to show that the way in which the
brain functions in motivation and emotion can be seen to
be the result of natural selection operating to select genes
that optimise our behavior by building into us the appro-
priate reward and punishment systems and the appropriate
rules for the operation of these systems.
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A major reason for investigating the actual brain mecha-
nisms that underlie emotion and motivation, and reward
and punishment, is not only to understand how our own
brains work, but also to have a basis for understanding and
treating medical disorders of these systems (such as altered
emotional behavior after brain damage, depression, anxiety,
and addiction). It is because of the intended relevance to
humans that emphasis is placed on research in nonhuman
primates. It turns out that many of the brain systems in-
volved in emotion and motivation have undergone consid-
erable development in primates. For example, the tempo-
ral lobe has undergone great development in primates, and
a number of systems in the temporal lobe are either in-
volved in emotion (e.g., the amygdala), or provide some of
the main sensory inputs to brain systems involved in emo-
tion and motivation. The prefrontal cortex has also under-
gone considerable development in primates: one part of it,
the orbitofrontal cortex, is very little developed in rodents,
yet is one of the major brain areas involved in emotion and
motivation in primates, including humans. The elaboration
of some of these brain areas has been so great in primates
that even evolutionarily old systems such as the taste system
appear to have been reconnected (compared to rodents) to
place much more emphasis on cortical processing, taking
place in areas such as the orbitofrontal cortex (see Ch. 2).
The principle of the stage of sensory processing at which re-
ward value is extracted and made explicit in the represen-
tation may even have changed between rodents and pri-
mates, for example, in the taste system (see Ch. 2). In
primates, there has also been great development of the vi-
sual system, and this itself has had important implications
for the types of sensory stimuli that are processed by brain
systems involved in emotion and motivation. One example
is the importance of facial identity and facial-expression de-
coding, which are both critical in primate emotional be-
havior and provide a central part of the foundation for much
primate social behavior.
2. A theory of emotion, and some definitions
Emotions can usefully be defined as states elicited by re-
wards and punishments, including changes in rewards and
punishments (see also Rolls 1986a; 1986b; 1990). A reward
is anything for which an animal will work. A punishment is
anything that an animal will work to escape or avoid. An ex-
ample of an emotion might thus be happiness produced by
being given a reward, such as a pleasant touch, praise, or
winning a large sum of money. Another example of an emo-
tion might be fear produced by the sound of a rapidly ap-
proaching bus, or the sight of an angry expression on some-
one’s face. We will work to avoid such stimuli, which are
punishing. Another example would be frustration, anger, or
sadness produced by the omission of an expected reward
such as a prize, or the termination of a reward such as the
death of a loved one. Another example would be relief, pro-
duced by the omission or termination of a punishing stim-
ulus such as the removal of a painful stimulus, or sailing out
of danger. These examples indicate how emotions can be
produced by the delivery, omission, or termination of re-
warding or punishing stimuli, and go some way to indicate
how different emotions could be produced and classified in
terms of the rewards and punishments received, omitted,
or terminated. A diagram summarizing some of the emo-
tions associated with the delivery of reward or punishment
or a stimulus associated with them, or with the omission of
a reward or punishment, is shown in Figure 1.
Before accepting this approach, we should consider
whether there are any exceptions to the proposed rule. Are
there any emotions caused by stimuli, events, or remem-
bered events that are not rewarding or punishing? Do any
rewarding or punishing stimuli not cause emotions? We will
consider these questions in more detail below. The point is
that if there are no major exceptions, or if any exceptions
can be clearly encapsulated, then we may have a good work-
ing definition at least of what causes emotions. Moreover,
it is worth pointing out that many approaches to or theories
of emotion (see Strongman 1996) have in common that part
of the process involves “appraisal” (e.g., Frijda 1986; Lazarus
1991; Oatley & Jenkins 1996). In all these theories the con-
cept of appraisal presumably involves assessing whether
something is rewarding or punishing. The description in
terms of reward or punishment adopted here seems more
tightly and operationally specified. I next consider a slightly
more formal definition than rewards or punishments, in
which the concept of reinforcers is introduced, and show
how there has been a considerable history in the develop-
ment of ideas along this line.
The proposal that emotions can be usefully seen as states
produced by instrumental reinforcing stimuli follows ear-
lier work by Millenson (1967), Weiskrantz (1968), Gray
(1975; 1987), and Rolls (1986a; 1986b; 1990). (Instrumen-
tal reinforcers are stimuli that, if their occurrence, termi-
nation, or omission is made contingent upon the making of
a response, alter the probability of the future emission of
that response.) Some stimuli are unlearned reinforcers
(e.g., the taste of food if the animal is hungry, or pain); while
others may become reinforcing by learning, because of
their association with such primary reinforcers, thereby be-
coming “secondary reinforcers.” This type of learning may
thus be called “stimulus-reinforcement association,” and
occurs via a process like classical conditioning. If a rein-
forcer increases the probability of emission of a response on
which it is contingent, it is said to be a “positive reinforcer”
or “reward”; if it decreases the probability of such a re-
sponse it is a “negative reinforcer” or “punisher.” For ex-
ample, fear is an emotional state that might be produced by
a sound (the conditioned stimulus) that has previously been
associated with an electrical shock (the primary reinforcer).
The converse reinforcement contingencies produce the
opposite effects on behavior. The omission or termination
of a positive reinforcer (“extinction” and “time out,” re-
spectively, sometimes described as “punishing”) decreases
the probability of responses. Responses followed by the
omission or termination of a negative reinforcer increase in
probability; this pair of negative reinforcement operations
are therefore termed “active avoidance” and “escape” re-
spectively (see further Gray 1975; Mackintosh 1983). This
foundation has been developed (see also Rolls 1986a;
1986b; 1990) to show how a very wide range of emotions
can be accounted for, as a result of the operation of a num-
ber of factors, including the following:
1. The reinforcement contingency (e.g., whether reward
or punishment is given or withheld; see Fig. 1).
2. The intensity of the reinforcer; see Fig. 1).
3. Any environmental stimulus might have a number of
different reinforcement associations. (For example, a stim-
ulus might be associated both with the presentation of a re-
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ward and of a punisher, allowing states such as conflict and
guilt to arise.)
4. Emotions elicited by stimuli associated with different
primary reinforcers will be different.
5. Emotions elicited by different secondary reinforcing
stimuli will be different from each other (even if the pri-
mary reinforcer is similar).
6. The emotion elicited can depend on whether an ac-
tive or passive behavioral response is possible. (For exam-
ple, if an active behavioral response can occur to the omis-
sion of a positive reinforcer, then anger might be produced;
but if only passive behavior is possible, then sadness, de-
pression, or grief might occur.)
By combining these six factors, it is possible to account
for a very wide range of emotions (for elaboration see Rolls
1990; 1999a). It is also worth noting that emotions can be
produced just as much by the recall of reinforcing events 
as by external reinforcing stimuli. Cognitive processing
(whether conscious or not) is important in many emotions,
for very complex cognitive processing may be required to
determine whether or not environmental events are rein-
forcing. Indeed, emotions normally consist of cognitive
processing, which analyses the stimulus and then deter-
mines its reinforcing valence, and then an elicited mood
change if the valence is positive or negative.Because an
emotion is produced by a stimulus, philosophers say that
emotions have an object in the world and that emotional
states are intentional in that they are about something. We
note that a mood or affective state may occur in the absence
of an external stimulus, as in some types of depression, but
that normally the mood or affective state is produced by an
external stimulus, with the whole process of stimulus rep-
resentation, evaluation in terms of reward or punishment,
and the resulting mood or affect referred to as emotion.
Three issues receive discussion here (see further, Rolls
1999a). One is that rewarding stimuli, such as the taste of
food, are not usually described as producing emotional states
(though there are cultural differences here!). It is useful here
to separate rewards related to internal homeostatic need
states associated with (say) hunger and thirst, and to note that
these rewards are not normally described as producing emo-
tional states. In contrast, the great majority of rewards and
punishers are external stimuli not related to internal need
states such as hunger and thirst, and these stimuli do produce
emotional responses. An example is fear produced by the
sight of a stimulus that is about to produce pain.
A second issue is that philosophers usually categorize
fear in the example as an emotion, but not pain. The dis-
tinction they make may be that primary (unlearned) re-
inforcers do not produce emotions, whereas secondary re-
inforcers (stimuli associated by stimulus-reinforcement
learning with primary reinforcers) do. They describe pain
as a sensation. But neutral stimuli (such as a table) can pro-
duce sensations when touched. It accordingly seems to be
much more useful to categorise stimuli according to
whether they are reinforcing (in which case they produce
emotions), or are not reinforcing (in which case they do not
produce emotions). Clearly there is a difference between
primary reinforcers and learned reinforcers; but this is most
precisely caught by noting that this is the difference, and
that it is whether a stimulus is reinforcing that determines
whether it is related to emotion.
A third issue is that, as we are about to see, emotional states
(i.e., those elicited by reinforcers) have many functions, and
the implementations of only some of these functions by the
brain are associated with emotional feelings (Rolls 1999a).
Indeed there is evidence for interesting dissociations in some
patients with brain damage between actions performed to re-
inforcing stimuli and what is subjectively reported. In this
sense it is biologically and psychologically useful to consider
emotional states as including more than those states associ-
ated with feelings of emotion.
3. The functions of emotion
The functions of emotion also provide insight into the na-
ture of emotion. These functions, described elsewhere
more fully (Rolls 1990; 1999a), can be summarized as fol-
lows:
1. The elicitation of autonomic responses (e.g., a change
in heart rate) and endocrine responses (e.g., the release of
adrenaline). These prepare the body for action.
2. Flexibility of behavioral responses to reinforcing stim-
uli. Emotional (and motivational) states allow a simple in-
terface between sensory inputs and action systems. The
essence of this idea is that goals for behavior are specified
by reward and punishment evaluation. When an environ-
mental stimulus has been decoded as a primary reward or
punishment, or (after previous stimulus-reinforcer associa-
tion learning) a secondary rewarding or punishing stimulus,
then it becomes a goal for action. The animal can then per-
form any action (instrumental response) to obtain the re-
ward, or to avoid the punisher. Thus there is flexibility of ac-
tion, and this is in contrast with stimulus-response, or habit,
learning in which a particular response to a particular stim-
ulus is learned. It also contrasts with the elicitation of
species-typical behavioral responses by sign-releasing stim-
Rolls: The brain and emotion
BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2000) 23:2 179
Figure 1. Some of the emotions associated with different rein-
forcement contingencies are indicated. Intensity increases away
from the centre of the diagram on a continuous scale. The classi-
fication scheme created by the different reinforcement contin-
gencies consists of (1) the presentation of a positive reinforcer
(S1), (2) the presentation of a negative reinforcer (S2), (3) the
omission of a positive reinforcer (S1)or the termination of a pos-
itive reinforcer (S1!), and (4) the omission of a negative reinforcer
(S2) or the termination of a negative reinforcer (S¯2!). (From The
brain and emotion, Fig. 3. 1.)
uli (such as pecking at a spot on the beak of the parent her-
ring gull in order to be fed (Tinbergen 1951), where there
is inflexibility of the stimulus and the response, which can
be seen as a very limited type of brain solution to the elici-
tation of behavior). The emotional route to action is flexi-
ble not only because any action can be performed to obtain
the reward or avoid the punishment, but also because the
animal can learn in as little as one trial that a reward or pun-
ishment is associated with a particular stimulus, in what is
termed “stimulus-reinforcer association learning.”
To summarize and formalize, two processes are involved
in the actions being described. The first is stimulus-rein-
forcer association learning, and the second is instrumental
learning of an operant response made to approach and ob-
tain the reward or to avoid or escape from the punisher. Emo-
tion is an integral part of this, for it is the state elicited in the
first stage, by stimuli that are decoded as rewards or punish-
ers, and this state has the property that it is motivating. The
motivation is to obtain the reward or avoid the punisher, and
animals must be built to obtain certain rewards and avoid cer-
tain punishers. Indeed, primary or unlearned rewards and
punishers are specified by genes that effectively specify the
goals for action. This is the solution that natural selection has
found for how genes can influence behavior to promote fit-
ness (as measured by reproductive success), and for how the
brain could interface sensory systems to action systems.
Selecting between available rewards with their associ-
ated benefits, and avoiding punishers with their associated
costs, is a process that can take place both implicitly (un-
consciously) and explicitly using a language system to en-
able long-term plans to be made (Rolls 1999a). Many dif-
ferent brain systems, some involving implicit evaluation of
rewards and others involving explicit, verbal, and conscious
evaluation of rewards and planned long-term goals, must all
enter into the selector of behavior (see Fig. 2). This selec-
tor is poorly understood, but it might include a process of
competition among all the competing calls on output and
might involve the basal ganglia in the brain (see Fig. 2 and
Rolls 1999a).
3. Emotion is motivating, as just described. For exam-
ple, fear learned by stimulus-reinforcement association
provides the motivation for actions performed to avoid nox-
ious stimuli.
4. Communication. Monkeys, for example, may com-
municate their emotional state to others by making an
open-mouth threat to indicate the extent to which they are
willing to compete for resources, and this may influence the
behavior of other animals. This aspect of emotion was em-
phasized by Darwin (1872), and has been studied more re-
cently by Ekman (1982; 1993). He reviews evidence that
humans can categorize facial expressions into the categories
happy, sad, fearful, angry, surprised, and disgusted, and that
this categorization may operate similarly in different cul-
tures. He also describes how the facial muscles produce dif-
ferent expressions. Further investigations of the degree of
cross-cultural universality of facial expression, its develop-
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Figure 2. Summary of the organisation of some of the brain mechanisms underlying emotion, showing dual routes to the initiation of
action in response to rewarding and punishing, that is, emotion-producing, stimuli. The inputs from different sensory systems to brain
structures such as the orbitofrontal cortex and amygdala allow these brain structures to evaluate the reward- or punishment-related value
of incoming stimuli or of remembered stimuli. The different sensory inputs allow evaluations within the orbitofrontal cortex and amyg-
dala based mainly on the primary (unlearned) reinforcement value for taste, touch, and olfactory stimuli, and on the secondary (learned)
reinforcement value for visual and auditory stimuli. In the case of vision, the “association cortex,” which sends representations of objects
to the amygdala and orbitofrontal cortex, is the inferior temporal visual cortex. One route for the outputs from these evaluative brain
structures is via projections directly to structures such as the basal ganglia (including the striatum and ventral striatum) to allow implicit,
direct behavioral responses based on the reward- or punishment-related evaluation of the stimuli to be made. The second route is via
the language systems of the brain, which allow explicit (verbalisable) decisions involving multistep syntactic planning to be implemented.
(After The brain and emotion, Fig. 9. 4.)
ment in infancy, and its role in social behavior are described
by Izard (1991) and Fridlund (1994). As shown below, there
are neural systems in the amygdala and overlying temporal
cortical visual areas that are specialized for the face-related
aspects of this processing.
5. Social bonding. Examples of this are the emotions as-
sociated with the attachment of the parents to their young
and the attachment of the young to their parents.
6. The current mood state can affect the cognitive eval-
uation of events or memories (see Oatley & Jenkins 1996).
This may facilitate continuity in the interpretation of the re-
inforcing value of events in the environment. A hypothesis
described in The Brain and Emotion states that backpro-
jections from parts of the brain involved in emotion such as
the orbitofrontal cortex and amygdala implement this.
7. Emotion may facilitate the storage of memories. One
way this occurs is that episodic memory (i.e., one’s memory
of particular episodes) is facilitated by emotional states. This
may be advantageous in that storing many details of the pre-
vailing situation when a strong reinforcer is delivered may
be useful in generating appropriate behavior in situations
with some similarities in the future. This function may be
implemented by the relatively nonspecific projecting sys-
tems to the cerebral cortex and hippocampus, including the
cholinergic pathways in the basal forebrain and medial sep-
tum, and the ascending noradrenergic pathways (see Ch. 4
and Rolls & Treves 1998). A second way in which emotion
may affect the storage of memories is that the current emo-
tional state may be stored with episodic memories, provid-
ing a mechanism for the current emotional state to affect
which memories are recalled. A third way emotion may af-
fect the storage of memories is by guiding the cerebral cor-
tex in the representations of the world which are set up. For
example, in the visual system it may be useful for perceptual
representations or analyzers to be built that are different
from each other if they are associated with different rein-
forcers, and for these to be less likely to be built if they have
no association with reinforcement. Ways in which backpro-
jections from parts of the brain important in emotion (such
as the amygdala) to parts of the cerebral cortex could per-
form this function are discussed by Rolls and Treves (1998).
8. Another function of emotion is that by enduring for
minutes or longer after a reinforcing stimulus has occurred,
it may help to produce persistent and continuing motivation
and direction of behavior, to help achieve a goal or goals.
9. Emotion may trigger the recall of memories stored in
neocortical representations. Amygdala backprojections to
the cortex could perform this for emotion in a way analo-
gous to that in which the hippocampus could implement
the retrieval in the neocortex of recent (episodic) memories
(Rolls & Treves 1998).
4. Reward, punishment and emotion in brain
design: An evolutionary approach
The theory of the functions of emotion is further developed
in Chapter 10. Some of the points made help to elaborate
greatly on section 3.2 above. In Chapter 10, the fundamen-
tal question of why we and other animals are built to use re-
wards and punishments to guide or determine our behav-
ior is considered. Why are we built to have emotions as well
as motivational states? Is there any reasonable alternative
around which evolution could have built complex animals?
In this section I outline several types of brain design, with
differing degrees of complexity, and suggest that evolution
can operate to flexibly influence action with only some of
these types of design. 
4.1. Taxes
A simple design principle is to incorporate mechanisms for
taxes into the design of organisms. Taxes consist at their
simplest of orientation towards stimuli in the environ-
ment, for example, the bending of a plant towards light,
which results in maximum light collection by its photo-
synthetic surfaces. (When just turning rather than loco-
motion is possible, such responses are called tropisms.)
With locomotion possible, as in animals, taxes include
movements towards sources of nutrient and movements
away from hazards such as very high temperatures. The
design principle here is that animals have through a
process of natural selection built receptors for certain di-
mensions of the wide range of stimuli in the environment,
and have linked these receptors to mechanisms for partic-
ular responses in such a way that the stimuli are ap-
proached or avoided.
4.2. Reward and punishment
As soon as we have approach towards stimuli at one end of
a dimension (e.g., a source of nutrient) and away from stim-
uli at the other end of the dimension (in this case, lack of
nutrient), we can start to wonder when it is appropriate to
introduce the terms rewards and punishers for the stimuli
at the different ends of the dimension. By convention, if the
response consists of a fixed reaction to obtain the stimulus
(e.g., locomotion up a chemical gradient), we shall call this
a taxis, not a reward. On the other hand, if an arbitrary op-
erant response can be performed by the animal in order to
approach the stimulus, then we will call this rewarded be-
havior, and the stimulus the animal works to obtain is a re-
ward. (The operant response can be thought of as any arbi-
trary action the animal will perform to obtain the stimulus.)
This criterion of an arbitrary operant response is often
tested by bidirectionality. For example, if a rat can be
trained to either raise or lower its tail to obtain a piece of
food then we can be sure that there is no fixed relationship
between the stimulus (e.g., the sight of food) and the re-
sponse, as there is in a taxis.
The role of natural selection in this process is to guide an-
imals to build sensory systems that will respond to dimen-
sions of stimuli in the natural environment, along which ac-
tions can lead to better ability to pass genes on to the next
generation, that is, to increased fitness. The animals must
be built by such natural selection to make responses that
will enable them to obtain more rewards, that is, to work to
obtain stimuli that will increase their fitness. Correspond-
ingly, animals must be built to make responses that will en-
able them to escape from, or learn to avoid, stimuli that will
reduce their fitness. There are likely to be many dimensions
of environmental stimuli along which responses can alter
fitness. Each of these dimensions may be a separate re-
ward-punishment dimension. An example of one of these
dimensions might be food reward. It increases fitness to be
able to sense nutrient need, to have sensors that respond to
the taste of food, and to perform behavioral responses to
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obtain such reward stimuli when in that need or motiva-
tional state. Similarly, another dimension is water reward,
in which the taste of water becomes rewarding when there
is body fluid depletion (see Ch. 7).
With many reward/punishment dimensions for which ac-
tions may be performed (see Table 10.1 of The brain and
emotion for a nonexhaustive list), a selection mechanism for
actions performed is needed. In this sense, rewards and
punishers provide a common currency for inputs to re-
sponse-selection mechanisms. Evolution must set the mag-
nitudes of each different reward system so that each will be
chosen for action in such a way as to maximize overall fit-
ness. Food reward must be chosen as the aim for action if
a nutrient is depleted; but water reward as a target for ac-
tion must be selected if current water depletion poses a
greater threat to fitness than the current food depletion.
This indicates that each reward must be carefully calibrated
by evolution to have the right value in the common cur-
rency for the competitive selection process. Other types of
behavior, such as sexual behavior, must be selected some-
times, but probably less frequently, in order to maximise fit-
ness (as measured by gene transmission into the next gen-
eration). Many processes contribute to increasing the
chances that a wide set of different environmental rewards
will be chosen over a period of time, including not only
need-related satiety mechanisms, which decrease the re-
wards within a dimension, but also sensory-specific satiety
mechanisms, which facilitate switching to another reward
stimulus (sometimes within and sometimes outside the
same main dimension), and attraction to novel stimuli.
Finding novel stimuli rewarding is one way that organisms
are encouraged to explore the multidimensional space in
which their genes are operating.
The above mechanisms can be contrasted with typical
engineering design. In the latter, the engineer defines the
requisite function and then produces special-purpose de-
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Figure 3. Some of the pathways involved in emotion described in the text are shown on this lateral view of the brain of the macaque
monkey. Connections from the primary taste and olfactory cortices to the orbitofrontal cortex and amygdala are shown. Connections are
also shown in the “ventral visual system” from V1 to V2, V4, the inferior temporal visual cortex, and so on, with some connections reach-
ing the amygdala and orbitofrontal cortex. In addition, connections from the somatosensory cortical areas 1, 2, and 3 that reach the or-
bitofrontal cortex directly and via the insular cortex, and that reach the amygdala via the insular cortex, are shown: as, arcuate sulcus; cal,
calcarine sulcus; cs, central sulcus; lf, lateral (or Sylvian) fissure; lun, lunate sulcus; ps, principal sulcus; io, inferior occipital sulcus; ip,
intraparietal sulcus (which has been opened to reveal some of the areas it contains); sts, superior temporal sulcus (which has been opened
to reveal some of the areas it contains); AIT, anterior inferior temporal cortex; FST, visual motion processing area; LIP, lateral intra-
parietal area; MST, visual motion processing area; MT, visual motion processing area (also called V5); PIT, posterior inferior temporal
cortex; STP, superior temporal plane; TA, architectonic area including auditory association cortex; TE, architectonic area including high-
order visual association cortex, and some of its subareas TEa and TEm; TG, architectonic area in the temporal pole; V1–V4, visual ar-
eas 1–4; VIP, ventral intraparietal area; TEO, architectonic area including posterior visual association cortex. The numerals refer to ar-
chitectonic areas and have the following approximate functional equivalence: 1, 2, 3, somatosensory cortex (posterior to the central
sulcus); 4, motor cortex; 5, superior parietal lobule; 7a, inferior parietal lobule, visual part; 7b, inferior parietal lobule, somatosensory
part; 6, lateral premotor cortex; 8, frontal eye field; 12, part of orbitofrontal cortex; 46, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. (From The brain
and emotion, Fig. 4. 1.)
sign features that enable the task to be performed. In the
case of the animal, there is a multidimensional space within
which many optimisations to increase fitness must be per-
formed. The solution is to evolve reward/punishment sys-
tems tuned to each dimension in the environment, which
can increase fitness if the animal performs the appropriate
actions. Natural selection guides evolution to find these di-
mensions. In contrast, in the engineering design of a robot
arm, the robot does not need to tune itself to find the goal
to be performed. The contrast is between design by evolu-
tion, which is “blind” to the purpose of the animal, and de-
sign by a designer who specifies the job to be performed (cf.
Dawkins 1986). Another contrast is that for the animal the
space will be high-dimensional, so that the most appropri-
ate reward for current behavior (taking into account the
costs of obtaining each reward) needs to be selected,
whereas for the robot arm, the function to perform at any
one time is specified by the designer. Another contrast is
that the behavior (the operant response) most appropriate
to obtain the reward must be selected by the animal,
whereas the movement to be made by the robot arm is spec-
ified by the design engineer.
The implication of this comparison is that operation by
animals using reward and punishment systems tuned to di-
mensions of the environment that increase fitness provides
a mode of operation that can work in organisms that evolve
by natural selection. It is clearly a natural outcome of Dar-
winian evolution to operate using reward and punishment
systems tuned to fitness-related dimensions of the environ-
ment, if arbitrary responses are to be made by the animals,
rather than just preprogrammed movements such as tro-
pisms and taxes. Is there any alternative to such a reward/
punishment – based system in this evolution by natural se-
lection situation? It is not clear that there is, if the genes are
efficiently to control behavior. The argument is that genes
can specify actions that will increase fitness if they specify
the goals for action. It would be very difficult for them in
general to specify in advance the particular responses to be
made to each of a myriad of different stimuli. This may be
why we are built to work for rewards, avoid punishers, and
have emotions and needs (motivational states). This view of
brain design in terms of reward and punishment systems
built by genes that gain their adaptive value by being tuned
to a goal for action offers a deep insight into how natural se-
lection has shaped many brain systems and is a fascinating
outcome of Darwinian thought.
This approach leads to an appreciation that, to understand
brain mechanisms of emotion and motivation, it is necessary
to understand how the brain decodes the reinforcement
value of primary reinforcers, how it performs stimulus-rein-
forcement association learning to evaluate whether a previ-
ously neutral stimulus is associated with reward or punish-
ment and is therefore a goal for action, and how the
representations of these neutral sensory stimuli are appro-
priate as an input to such stimulus-reinforcement learning
mechanisms. It is to these fundamental issues, and their rel-
evance to brain design, that much of the book is devoted.
How these processes are performed by the brain is consid-
ered for emotion in Chapter 4, for feeding in Chapter 2, for
drinking in Chapter 7, and for sexual behavior in Chapter 8.
5. The neural bases of emotion
Some of the main brain regions implicated in emotion will
now be considered in the light of this theory of the nature
and functions of emotion. The description here is abbrevi-
ated, focussing on the main conceptual points. More de-
tailed accounts of the evidence and references to the orig-
inal literature are provided by Rolls (1990; 1992b; 1996;
1999a). The brain regions discussed include the amygdala
and orbitofrontal cortex. Some of these are indicated in Fig-
ures 3 and 4. Particular attention is paid to the functions of
these regions in primates, for in primates the neocortex un-
dergoes great development and provides major inputs to
these regions, in some cases to parts of these structures
thought not to be present in nonprimates. An example of
this is the projection from the primate neocortex in the an-
terior part of the temporal lobe to the basal accessory nu-
cleus of the amygdala (see below).
5.1. Overview
A schematic diagram introducing some of the concepts use-
ful for understanding the neural bases of emotion is pro-
vided in Figure 2, and some of the pathways are shown on
a lateral view of a primate brain in Figure 3 and schemati-
cally in Figure 4.
5.1.1. Primary, unlearned rewards and punishers. For
primary reinforcers, the reward decoding may occur only
after several stages of processing, as in the primate taste sys-
tem, in which reward is decoded only after the primary taste
cortex. By decoding I mean making explicit some aspect of
the stimulus or event in the firing of neurons. A decoded
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Figure 4. Diagrammatic representation of some of the connec-
tions described in the text. V1 – striate visual cortex. V2 and V4 –
cortical visual areas. In primates, sensory analysis proceeds as far
as the inferior temporal visual cortex and the primary gustatory
cortex; beyond these areas, for example, in the amygdala and or-
bitofrontal cortex, the hedonic value of the stimuli, and whether
they are reinforcing or are associated with reinforcement, is rep-
resented (see text). The gate function refers to the fact that in the
orbitofrontal cortex and hypothalamus the responses of neurons
to food are modulated by hunger signals. (After The Brain and
Emotion, Fig. 4. 2.)
representation is one in which the information can be read
easily, for example, by taking a sum of the synaptically
weighted firing of a population of neurons. This is de-
scribed in the Appendix, together with the type of learning
important in many learned emotional responses, pattern as-
sociation learning between a previously neutral (e.g., visual)
stimulus and a primary reinforcer such as a pleasant touch.
Processing as far as the primary taste cortex (see Fig. 4) rep-
resents what the taste is, whereas in the secondary taste cor-
tex, the orbitofrontal cortex, the reward value of taste is rep-
resented. This is shown by the fact that when the reward
value of the taste of food is decreased by feeding it to sati-
ety, the responses of neurons in the orbitofrontal cortex, but
not at earlier stages of processing in primates, decrease
their responses as the reward value of the food decreases
(as described in Ch. 2: see also Rolls 1997). The architec-
tural principle for the taste system in primates is that there
is one main taste information-processing stream in the
brain, via the thalamus to the primary taste cortex, and the
information about the identity of the taste in the primary
cortex is not contaminated with modulation by how good
the taste is, produced earlier in sensory processing. This en-
ables the taste representation in the primary cortex to be
used for purposes that are not reward-dependent. One ex-
ample might be learning where a particular taste can be
found in the environment, even when the primate is not
hungry so that the taste is not pleasant.
Another primary reinforcer, the pleasantness of touch, is
represented in another part of the orbitofrontal cortex, as
shown by observations that the orbitofrontal cortex is much
more activated (measured with functional magnetic reso-
nance imaging, fMRI) by pleasant than neutral touch than
is the primary somatosensory cortex (Francis et al. 1999)
(see Fig. 4). Although pain may be decoded early in sensory
processing, in that it utilizes special receptors and path-
ways, some of the affective aspects of this primary negative
reinforcer are represented in the orbitofrontal cortex, in
that damage to this region reduces some of the affective as-
pects of pain in humans.
5.1.2. The representation of potential secondary (learned)
reinforcers. For potential secondary reinforcers (such as
the sight of a particular object or person), analysis goes up
to the stage of invariant object representation (in vision, the
inferior temporal visual cortical areas, see Wallis & Rolls
1997 and Figs. 3 and 4) before reward and punishment as-
sociations are learned. The utility of invariant representa-
tions is to enable correct generalisation to other instances
(e.g., views, sizes) of the same or similar objects, even when
a reward or punishment has been associated with one in-
stance previously. The representation of the object is (ap-
propriately) in a form that is ideal as an input to pattern as-
sociators that allow the reinforcement associations to be
learned. The representations are appropriately encoded in
that they can be decoded in a neuronally plausible way (e.g.,
using a synaptically weighted sum of the firing rates, that is,
inner-product decoding as described in the Appendix); they
are distributed allowing excellent generalisation and grace-
ful degradation. They have relatively independent informa-
tion conveyed by different neurons in the ensemble, pro-
viding very high capacity and allowing the information to be
read off very quickly, in periods of 20–50 msec (see Rolls
& Treves 1998, Ch. 4, and the Appendix). The utility of rep-
resentations of objects that are independent of reward as-
sociations (for vision in the inferior temporal cortex) is that
they can be used for many functions independently of the
motivational or emotional state. These functions include
recognition, recall, forming new memories of objects,
episodic memory (e.g., to learn where a food is located,
even if one is not hungry for the food at present), and short-
term memory (see Rolls & Treves 1998).
An aim of processing in the ventral visual system is to
help select the goals (e.g., objects with reward or punish-
ment associations) for actions. I thus do not concur with
Milner and Goodale (1995) that the dorsal visual system is
for the control of action, and the ventral visual system is for
“perception” (e.g., perceptual and cognitive representa-
tions). The ventral visual system projects via the inferior
temporal visual cortex to the amygdala and orbitofrontal
cortex, which then determine (using pattern association)
the reward or punishment value of the object, as part of the
process of selecting which goal is appropriate for action.
Some of the evidence for this described in Chapter 4 is that
large lesions of the temporal lobe (which damage the ven-
tral visual system and some of its outputs, such as the amyg-
dala) produce the Kluver-Bucy syndrome, in which mon-
keys select objects indiscriminately, independently of their
reward value, and place them in their mouths. The dorsal
visual system helps with executing those actions, for exam-
ple, with grasping the hand appropriately to pick up a se-
lected object. (This type of sensorimotor operation is often
performed implicitly, i.e., without conscious awareness.)
Insofar as explicit planning concerning future goals and ac-
tions requires knowledge of objects and their reward or
punishment associations, it is the ventral visual system that
provides the appropriate visual input.
In nonprimates, including, for example, rodents, the de-
sign principles may involve less sophisticated features be-
cause the stimuli being processed are simpler. For example,
view-invariant object recognition is probably much less de-
veloped in nonprimates: The recognition that is possible is
based more on physical similarity in terms of texture,
colour, simple features, and so on (see Rolls & Treves 1998,
sect. 8.8). It may be because there is less sophisticated cor-
tical processing of visual stimuli in this way that other sen-
sory systems are also organised more simply, for example,
with some (but not total, perhaps only 30%) modulation of
taste processing by hunger early in sensory processing in ro-
dents (see Scott et al. 1995). Moreover, although it is usu-
ally appropriate to have emotional responses to well-
processed objects (e.g., the sight of a particular person),
there are instances, such as a loud noise or a pure tone as-
sociated with punishment, where it may be possible to tap
off a sensory representation early in sensory processing that
can be used to produce emotional responses. This may oc-
cur in rodents, where the subcortical auditory system pro-
vides afferents to the amygdala (see Ch. 4 on emotion).
Especially in primates, the visual processing in emotional
and social behavior requires sophisticated representation of
individuals, and for this there are many neurons devoted to
face processing (see Wallis & Rolls 1997). In macaques,
many of these neurons are found in areas TEa and TEm in
the ventral lip of the anterior part of the superior temporal
sulcus. In addition, there is a separate system that encodes
facial gesture, movement, and view, as all are important in
social behavior for interpreting whether specific individu-
als with their own reinforcement associations are produc-
ing threats or appeasements. In macaques, many of these
Rolls: The brain and emotion
184 BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2000) 23:2
neurons are found in the cortex in the depths of the ante-
rior part of the superior temporal sulcus.
5.1.3. Stimulus-reinforcement association learning. Af-
ter mainly unimodal processing to the object level, sensory
systems then project into convergence zones. Those espe-
cially important for reward, punishment, emotion, and mo-
tivation are the orbitofrontal cortex and amygdala, where
primary reinforcers are represented. These parts of the
brain appear to be especially important in emotion and mo-
tivation not only because they are the parts of the brain
where the primary (unlearned) reinforcing value of stimuli
is represented in primates, but also because they are the 
regions that learn pattern associations between potential
secondary reinforcers and primary reinforcers. They are
therefore the parts of the brain involved in learning the
emotional and motivational value of stimuli.
5.1.4. Output systems. The orbitofrontal cortex and amyg-
dala have connections to output systems through which dif-
ferent types of emotional response can be produced, as il-
lustrated schematically in Figure 2. The outputs of the
reward and punishment systems must be treated by the ac-
tion system as being the goals for action. The action systems
must be built to try to maximise the activation of the repre-
sentations produced by rewarding events and to minimise
the activation of the representations produced by punish-
ers or stimuli associated with punishers. Drug addiction
produced by psychomotor stimulants such as amphetamine
and cocaine can be seen as activating the brain at the stage
where the outputs of the amygdala and orbitofrontal cortex,
which provide representations of whether stimuli are asso-
ciated with rewards or punishers, are fed into the ventral
striatum and other parts of the basal ganglia as goals for the
action system.
After this overview, a summary of some of the points
made about some of the neural systems involved in emotion
discussed in The brain and emotion follows.
5.2. The amygdala
5.2.1. Connections and neurophysiology. Some of the
connections of the primate amygdala are shown in Figures
3 and 4 (see further The brain and emotion, Figs. 4.11 and
4.12). It receives information about primary reinforcers
(such as taste and touch). It also receives inputs about stim-
uli (e.g., visual ones) that can be associated by learning with
primary reinforcers. Such inputs come mainly from the in-
ferior temporal visual cortex, the superior temporal audi-
tory cortex, the cortex of the temporal pole, and the cortex
in the superior temporal sulcus. These inputs in primates
thus come mainly from the higher stages of sensory pro-
cessing in the visual (and auditory) modalities and not from
early cortical processing areas.
Recordings from single neurons in the amygdala of the
monkey have shown that some neurons do respond to vi-
sual stimuli, with latencies somewhat longer than those of
neurons in the temporal cortical visual areas, consistent
with the inputs from the temporal lobe visual cortex; and in
some cases the neurons discriminate between reward-re-
lated and punishment-associated visual objects (see Rolls
1999a). The crucial site of the stimulus-reinforcement as-
sociative learning that underlies the responses of amygdala
neurons to learned reinforcing stimuli is probably within
the amygdala itself and not at earlier stages of processing,
for neurons in the inferior temporal cortical visual areas do
not reflect the reward associations of visual stimuli, but re-
spond to visual stimuli based on their physical characteris-
tics (see Rolls 1990; 1999a). The association learning in the
amygdala may be implemented by associatively modifiable
synapses (see Rolls & Treves 1998) from visual and auditory
neurons onto neurons receiving inputs from taste, olfactory,
or somatosensory primary reinforcers. Consistent with this,
Davis (1992) has found in the rat that at least one type of
associative learning in the amygdala can be blocked by lo-
cal application to the amygdala of a NMDA receptor blocker,
which blocks long-term potentiation (LTP), a model of the
synaptic changes that underlie learning (see Rolls & Treves
1998). Consistently, the learned incentive (conditioned re-
inforcing) effects of previously neutral stimuli paired with
rewards are mediated by the amygdala acting through the
ventral striatum in that amphetamine injections into the
ventral striatum enhanced the effects of a conditioned re-
inforcing stimulus only if the amygdala was intact (see
Everitt & Robbins 1992). The lesion evidence in primates
is also consistent with a function of the amygdala in reward-
and punishment-related learning, for amygdala lesions in
monkeys produce tameness; a lack of emotional respon-
siveness; excessive examination of objects, often with the
mouth; and eating of previously rejected items such as
meat. There is evidence that amygdala neurons are involved
in these processes in primates, for amygdala lesioning with
ibotenic acid impairs the processing of reward-related stim-
uli, in that when the reward value of a set of foods was de-
creased by feeding it to satiety (i.e., sensory-specific sati-
ety), monkeys still chose the visual stimuli associated with
the foods with which they had been satiated (Malkova et al.
1997).
Further evidence that the primate amygdala does pro-
cess visual stimuli derived from high-order cortical areas,
and of importance in emotional and social behavior, is that
a population of amygdala neurons has been described that
responds primarily to faces (Leonard et al. 1985; see also
Rolls 1992a; 1992b; 1999). Each of these neurons responds
to some but not all of a set of faces, and thus across an en-
semble conveys information about the identity of the face.
These neurons are found especially in the basal accessory
nucleus of the amygdala (Leonard et al. 1985), a part of the
amygdala that develops markedly in primates (Amaral et al.
1992). This part of the amygdala receives inputs from the
temporal cortical visual areas in which populations of neu-
rons respond to the identity of faces and to face expression
(see Rolls & Treves 1998; Wallis & Rolls 1997). This is prob-
ably part of a system that has evolved for the rapid and re-
liable identification of individuals from their faces and of fa-
cial expressions because of their importance in primate
social behavior (see Rolls 1992a; 1999a).
Although Le Doux’s (1992; 1994; 1996) model of emo-
tional learning emphasizes subcortical inputs to the amyg-
dala for conditioned reinforcers, this applies to very simple
auditory stimuli (such as pure tones). In contrast, a visual
stimulus will normally need to be analyzed to the object
level (to the level, e.g., of face identity, which requires cor-
tical processing) before the representation is appropriate
for input to a stimulus-reinforcement evaluation system
such as the amygdala or orbitofrontal cortex. Similarly, it is
typically to complex auditory stimuli (such as a particular
person’s voice, perhaps making a particular statement) that
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emotional responses are elicited. The point here is that
emotions are usually elicited to environmental stimuli ana-
lyzed to the object level (including other organisms) and not
to retinal arrays of spots or pure tones. Thus cortical pro-
cessing to the object level is required in most normal emo-
tional situations, and these cortical object representations
are projected to reach multimodal areas such as the amyg-
dala and orbitofrontal cortex where the reinforcement label
is attached using stimulus-reinforcer pattern-association
learning to the primary reinforcers represented in these ar-
eas. Thus while LeDoux’s (1996) approach to emotion fo-
cusses mainly on fear responses to simple stimuli, such as
tones implemented considerably by subcortical processing,
The brain and emotion considers how in primates including
humans most stimuli, which happen to be complex and re-
quire cortical processing, produce a wide range of emo-
tions; and, in doing so, addresses the functions of emotion
of the highly developed temporal and orbitofrontal cortical
areas of primates including humans, areas that are much
less developed in rodents.
When the learned association between a visual stimulus
and reinforcement was altered by reversal (so that the vi-
sual stimulus formerly associated with juice reward became
associated with aversive saline and vice versa), it was found
that 10 of 11 primate amygdala neurons did not reverse
their responses (and for the other neuron the evidence was
not clear; see Rolls 1992b). In contrast, neurons in the or-
bitofrontal cortex do show very rapid reversal of their re-
sponses in visual discrimination reversal. It has accordingly
been proposed that during evolution with the great devel-
opment of the orbitofrontal cortex in primates, it (as a rapid
learning system) is involved especially when repeated re-
learning and reassessment of stimulus-reinforcement asso-
ciations is required, as described below, rather than during
initial learning, in which the amygdala may be involved.
Some amygdala neurons that respond to rewarding visual
stimuli also respond to relatively novel visual stimuli; this
may implement the reward value that novel stimuli have
(see Rolls 1999a).
The outputs of the amygdala (Amaral et al. 1992) include
projections to the hypothalamus and also directly to the au-
tonomic centres in the medulla oblongata, providing one
route for cortically processed signals to reach the brainstem
and produce autonomic responses. A further interesting
output of the amygdala is to the ventral striatum including
the nucleus accumbens, for via this route information
processed in the amygdala could gain access to the basal
ganglia and thus influence motor output (see Fig. 2 and
Everitt & Robbins 1992). In addition, mood states could af-
fect cognitive processing via the amygdala’s direct backpro-
jections to many areas of the temporal, orbitofrontal, and
insular cortices from which it receives inputs.
5.2.2. Human neuropsychology of the amygdala. Extend-
ing the findings on neurons in the macaque amygdala that
responded selectively for faces and social interactions
(Brothers & Ring 1993; Leonard et al. 1985), Young et al.
(1995; 1996) have described a patient with bilateral damage
or disconnection of the amygdala who was impaired in
matching and identifying facial expression but not facial
identity. Adolphs et al. (1994) also found facial expression
but not facial identity impairments in a patient with bilat-
eral damage to the amygdala. Although in studies of the ef-
fects of amygdala damage in humans greater impairments
have been reported with facial or vocal expressions of fear
than with some other expressions (Adolphs et al. 1994;
Scott et al. 1997), and in functional brain imaging studies
greater activation may be found with certain classes of emo-
tion-provoking stimuli (e.g., those that induce fear rather
than happiness, Morris et al. 1996), I suggest in The brain
and emotion that it is most unlikely that the amygdala is spe-
cialised for the decoding of only certain classes of emotional
stimuli, such as fear. This emphasis on fear may be related
to the research in rats on the role of the amygdala in fear
conditioning (LeDoux 1992; 1994). Indeed, it is quite clear
from single neuron studies in nonhuman primates that
some amygdala neurons are activated by rewarding and
others by punishing stimuli (Ono & Nishijo 1992; Rolls
1992a; 1992b; Sanghera et al. 1979; Wilson & Rolls 1993,
and others) by a wide range of different face stimuli
(Leonard et al. 1985). Moreover, lesions of the macaque
amygdala impair the learning of both stimulus-reward and
stimulus-punisher associations. Further, electrical stimula-
tion of the macaque and human amygdala at some sites is
rewarding, and humans report pleasure from stimulation at
such sites (Halgren 1992; Rolls 1975; Rolls et al. 1980; Sem-
Jacobsen 1968; 1976). Thus any differences in the magni-
tude of effects between different classes of emotional stim-
uli which appear in human functional brain imaging studies
(Davidson & Irwin 1999; Morris et al. 1996) or even after
amygdala damage (Adolphs et al. 1994; Scott et al. 1997)
should not be taken to show that the human amygdala is in-
volved in only some emotions. Indeed, in current fMRI
studies we are finding that the human amygdala is activated
perfectly well by the pleasant taste of a sweet (glucose) so-
lution (in the continuation of studies reported by Francis et
al. 1999), showing that reward-related primary reinforcers
do activate the human amygdala.
5.3. The orbitofrontal cortex
5.3.1. Connections and neurophysiology of the orbito-
frontal cortex. In the monkey, the orbitofrontal cortex re-
ceives inputs from the primary taste cortex in the insula and
frontal operculum, the primary olfactory (pyriform) cortex,
and the primary somatosensory cortex (see Figs. 3 and 4).
Neurons in the orbitofrontal cortex, which contains the sec-
ondary and tertiary taste and olfactory cortical areas, re-
spond to the reward value of taste and olfactory stimuli, in
that they respond to the taste and odor of food only when
the monkey is hungry. Moreover, sensory-specific satiety
for the reward of the taste or the odor of food is represented
in the orbitofrontal cortex and is computed here at least for
the taste of food. In addition, some orbitofrontal cortex
neurons combine taste and olfactory inputs to represent fla-
vor, and the principle by which this flavor representation is
formed is by olfactory-to-taste association learning. Inputs
from the oral somatosensory system produce a representa-
tion of the fat content of food in the mouth (Rolls et al.
1999; the activation of these neurons is also decreased by
feeding to satiety) and more generally of food texture, and
also of astringency. FMRI studies in humans show that the
orbitofrontal cortex is also activated more by pleasant touch
than by neutral touch, relative to the somatosensory cortex
(Francis et al. 1999). Thus, there is a rich representation of
primary (unlearned) reinforcers in the orbitofrontal cortex,
including taste and somatosensory primary reinforcers, and
of odor, which is in this case partly secondary (learned). The
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representation is rich in that there is much information that
can be easily read from the neuronal code (see Rolls &
Treves 1998) about exactly which taste, touch, or odor is be-
ing delivered. It is important that reinforcers be repre-
sented in a way that encodes the details of which reinforcer
has been delivered, for it is crucial that organisms work for
the correct reinforcer as appropriate (e.g., for food when
hungry, for water when thirsty), and that they switch ap-
propriately between reinforcers (using, for example, the
principle of sensory-specific satiety, for which a represen-
tation of the sensory details of the reinforcer is needed).
The primate orbitofrontal cortex also receives inputs
from the inferior temporal visual cortex and is involved in
stimulus-reinforcer association learning, in that neurons in
it learn visual stimulus to taste reinforcer associations in as
little as one trial. Moreover, and consistent with the effects
of damage to the orbitofrontal cortex that impair perfor-
mance on visual discrimination reversal, Go/NoGo tasks,
and extinction tasks (in which the lesioned macaques con-
tinue to make behavioral responses to previously rewarded
stimuli), orbitofrontal cortex neurons reverse visual stimu-
lus reinforcer associations in as little as one trial. Moreover,
a separate population of orbitofrontal cortex neurons re-
sponds only on nonreward trials (Thorpe et al. 1983). There
is therefore the basis in the orbitofrontal cortex for rapid
learning and updating by relearning or reversing stimulus-
reinforcer (sensory-sensory, e.g., visual-to-taste) associa-
tions. In the rapidity of its relearning/reversal, the primate
orbitofrontal cortex may effectively replace and perform
better some of the functions performed by the primate
amygdala. In addition, some visual neurons in the primate
orbitofrontal cortex respond to the sight of faces. These
neurons are likely to be involved in learning which emo-
tional responses are currently appropriate to particular in-
dividuals and in making appropriate emotional responses
given the facial expression (see Rolls 1996).
The evidence thus indicates that the primate orbito-
frontal cortex is involved in the evaluation of primary rein-
forcers, implements a mechanism that evaluates whether a
reward is expected, and generates a mismatch (evident as a
firing of the nonreward neurons) if reward is not obtained
when it is expected (Thorpe et al. 1983; Rolls 1990; 1996;
1999a). These neuronal responses provide further evidence
that the orbitofrontal cortex is involved in emotional re-
sponses, particularly when these involve correcting previ-
ously learned reinforcement contingencies, in situations
that include those usually described as involving frustra-
tion.
5.3.2. Human neuropsychology of the orbitofrontal cor-
tex. It is of interest and potential clinical importance that a
number of the symptoms of frontal lobe damage in humans
appear to be related to this type of function, that is, of al-
tering behavior when stimulus-reinforcement associations
alter. Thus, humans with ventral frontal-lobe damage can
show impairments in a number of tasks in which an alter-
ation of behavioral strategy is required in response to a
change in environmental reinforcement contingencies
(Damasio 1994; see Rolls 1990; 1996; 1999a). Some of the
personality changes that can follow frontal lobe damage
may be related to a similar type of dysfunction. For exam-
ple, the euphoria, irresponsibility, lack of affect, and lack of
concern for the present or future that can follow frontal
lobe damage may also be related to a dysfunction in alter-
ing behavior appropriately in response to a change in rein-
forcement contingencies.
Some of the evidence that supports this hypothesis is that
when the reinforcement contingencies were unexpectedly
reversed in a visual discrimination task performed for
points, patients with ventral frontal lesions made more er-
rors in the reversal (or in a similar extinction) task, and com-
pleted fewer reversals, than control patients with damage
elsewhere in the frontal lobes or in other brain regions
(Rolls et al. 1994). The impairment correlated highly with
the socially inappropriate or disinhibited behavior of the
patients and also with their subjective evaluation of the
changes in their emotional state since the brain damage.
The patients were not impaired in other types of memory
task, such as paired associate learning. Bechara and col-
leagues also have findings that are consistent with these in
patients with frontal lobe damage when they perform a
gambling task (Bechara et al. 1994; 1997; 1996; see also
Damasio 1994). The patients could choose cards from dif-
ferent decks. The patients with frontal damage were more
likely to choose cards from decks that gave rewards with a
reasonable probability but also occasionally had very heavy
penalties. The net gains from these decks were lower than
from the other decks. In this sense, the patients were not
affected by the negative consequences of their actions: they
did not switch from the decks of cards that, although pro-
viding significant rewards, also led to large punishments be-
ing incurred.
To investigate the possible significance of face-related in-
puts to the orbitofrontal visual neurons described above,
the responses of the same patients to faces were also tested.
Tests of face-(and also voice-) expression decoding were in-
cluded, because these are ways in which the reinforcing
quality of individuals is often indicated. The identification
of facial and vocal emotional expression were found to be
impaired in a group of patients with ventral frontal lobe
damage who had socially inappropriate behavior (Hornak
et al. 1996). The expression identification impairments
could occur independently of perceptual impairments in fa-
cial recognition, voice discrimination, or environmental
sound recognition. This provides a further basis for under-
standing the functions of the orbitofrontal cortex in emo-
tional and social behavior, in that processing of some of the
signals normally used in emotional and social behavior is
impaired in some of these patients. Imaging studies in hu-
mans show that parts of the prefrontal cortex can be acti-
vated when mood changes are elicited, but it is not estab-
lished that some areas are concerned only with positive or
only with negative mood (Davidson & Irwin 1999). Indeed
this seems unlikely because the neurophysiological studies
show that different individual neurons in the orbitofrontal
cortex respond to either some rewarding or some punish-
ing stimuli, and that these neurons can be intermingled.
5.4. Output systems for emotion
I distinguish three main output systems for emotion, illus-
trated schematically in Figure 2. Consideration of these dif-
ferent output systems helps to elucidate the functions of
emotion. The first system produces autonomic and en-
docrine outputs, important in optimizing the body state for
different types of action, including fight, flight, feeding, and
sex. The pathways include brainstem and hypothalamic
connections for autonomic and endocrine responses to un-
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learned stimuli, and neural systems in the amygdala and or-
bitofrontal cortex for similar responses to learned stimuli.
Operating at the same level as this system are brainstem
pathways for unlearned responses to stimuli, including re-
flexes.
The second and third routes are for actions, that is, arbi-
trary behavioral responses, performed to obtain, avoid, or
escape from reinforcers. The first action route is via the
brain systems that have been present in nonhuman pri-
mates such as monkeys (and to some extent in other mam-
mals) for millions of years and can operate implicitly. These
systems include the amygdala and, particularly well-devel-
oped in primates, the orbitofrontal cortex. They provide in-
formation about the possible goals for action based on their
decoding of primary reinforcers taking into account the
current motivational state, and on their decoding of
whether stimuli have been associated by previous learning
with reinforcement. A factor that affects the computed re-
ward value of the stimulus is whether that reward has been
received recently. If it has been received recently but in
small quantity, this may increase the reward value of the
stimulus. This is known as incentive motivation or the
“salted nut” phenomenon. The adaptive value of such a
process is that this positive feedback or potentiation of re-
ward value in the early stages of working for a particular re-
ward tends to lock the organism onto the behavior being
performed for that reward. This makes action selection
much more efficient in a natural environment, because
constantly switching between different types of behavior
would be very costly if all the different rewards were not
available in the same place at the same time. The amygdala
is one structure that may be involved in this increase in the
reward value of stimuli early on in a series of presentations,
in that lesions of the amygdala (in rats) abolish the expres-
sion of this reward-incrementing process, which is normally
evident in the increasing rate of working for a food reward
early on in a meal (Rolls & Rolls 1982). The converse of in-
centive motivation is sensory-specific satiety, in which re-
ceiving a reward for some longer time decreases the reward
value of that stimulus, which has the adaptive function of
facilitating switching to another reward stimulus.
After the reward value of the stimulus has been assessed
in these ways, behavior is then initiated based on approach
towards or withdrawal from the stimulus. A critical aspect
of the behavior produced by this type of system is that it is
aimed directly towards obtaining a sensed or expected re-
ward, by virtue of connections to brain systems such as the
basal ganglia that are concerned with the initiation of ac-
tions (see Fig. 2). The expectation may of course involve be-
havior to obtain stimuli associated with reward, and the
stimuli might even be present in a chain. The costs (or ex-
pected punishments) of the action must be taken into ac-
count. Indeed, in the field of behavioral ecology, animals
are often thought of as performing optimally on some cost-
benefit curve (see, e.g., Krebs & Kacelnik 1991). Part of the
value of having the computation expressed in this reward-
minus-cost form is that there is then a suitable “currency,”
or net reward value, to enable the animal to select the be-
havior with highest current net reward gain (or minimal
aversive outcome).
The second route for action to emotion-related stimuli in
humans involves a computation with many “if . . . then” state-
ments, to implement a plan to obtain a reward or to avoid a
punisher. In this case, the reward may actually be deferred
as part of the plan, which might involve not obtaining an im-
mediate reward, but instead working to obtain a second,
more highly valued reward, if this is thought to be an opti-
mal overall strategy in terms of resource use (e.g., time). In
this case, syntax is required, because the many symbols
(e.g., names of people) that are part of the plan must be cor-
rectly linked or bound. Such linking might be of the form:
“If A does this, then B is likely to do this, and this will cause
C to do this. . . .” The requirement of syntax for this type of
planning implies that a language system in the brain is in-
volved (see Fig. 2). (A language system is defined here as a
system performing syntactic operations on symbols.) There-
fore the explicit language system in humans may allow
working for deferred rewards by enabling use of an indi-
vidual, one-off (i.e., one-time), plan appropriate for each
situation. Another building block for such planning opera-
tions in the brain may be the type of short-term memory in
which the prefrontal cortex is involved. In nonhuman pri-
mates this short-term memory might be, for example, of
where in space a response has just been made. A develop-
ment of this type of short-term response memory system in
humans to enable multiple short-term memories to be held
active correctly, preferably with the temporal order of the
different items in the short-term memory coded correctly,
may be another building block for the multiple step “if . . .
then” type of computation forming a multiple-step plan.
Such short-term memories are implemented in the (dorso-
lateral and inferior convexity) prefrontal cortex of nonhu-
man primates and humans (see Goldman-Rakic 1996;
Petrides 1996); and the impairment of planning produced
by prefrontal cortex damage (see Shallice & Burgess 1996)
may be due to damage to a system of the type just de-
scribed, founded on short-term or working memory sys-
tems.
While discussing the prefrontal cortex, we should note
that when Damasio (1994) suggests that even though rea-
son and emotion are closely linked as processes because
they may both be impaired in patients with frontal lobe
damage, this could be a chance association because the
brain damage frequently affects both the orbitofrontal and
the more dorsolateral areas of the prefrontal cortex, which
are adjacent. (Indeed, some evidence for a dissociation of
the functions of these areas in some patients with more re-
stricted damage is actually presented by Damasio 1994 on
page 61 and by Bechara et al. 1998). The alternative I pro-
pose in The brain and emotion (and in Rolls & Treves 1998,
Chs. 7 and 10), is that the orbitofrontal cortex, which re-
ceives inputs about what stimuli are present (from the ven-
tral visual system and from the taste and somatosensory sys-
tems) allows the reinforcing value of stimuli to be
evaluated, and is therefore involved in emotion; whereas, in
contrast, the more dorsolateral prefrontal cortex receives
inputs from the “where” parts of the (dorsal) visual system
and is concerned with planning and executing actions based
on modules for which a foundation is provided by neural
networks for short-term, working memory.
These three systems do not necessarily act as an inte-
grated whole. Indeed, insofar as the implicit system may
be for immediate goals, and the explicit system is compu-
tationally appropriate for deferred longer term goals, they
will not always indicate the same action. Similarly, the au-
tonomic system does not use entirely the same neural sys-
tems as those involved in actions, and therefore autonomic
outputs will not always be an excellent guide to the emo-
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tional state of the animal, which the above arguments in
any case indicate is not unitary, but has at least three 
different aspects (autonomic, implicit, and explicit). Also, 
the costs and benefits and therefore the priorities that an-
imals will place on achieving different goals will depend
on the primary reinforcer involved. These arguments sug-
gest that multiple measures are likely to be relevant when 
assessing the impact of different factors on welfare. It is
likely to be important to measure not only autonomic
changes, but also preference rankings among different re-
inforcers, and how hard different reinforcers will be
worked for.
5.5. The role of dopamine in reward, addiction, 
and the initiation of action
The dopamine pathways in the brain arise in the midbrain,
projecting from the A10 cell group in the ventral tegmen-
tal area to the nucleus accumbens, orbitofrontal cortex, and
some other cortical areas and from the A9 cell group to the
striatum (which is part of the basal ganglia; see Cooper et
al. 1996; Rolls 1999a). Dopamine is involved in the reward
produced by stimulation of some brain sites, notably the
ventral tegmental area where the dopamine cell bodies are
located. This self-stimulation depends on dopamine release
in the nucleus accumbens. Self-stimulation at some other
sites does not depend on dopamine. The self-administra-
tion of psychomotor stimulants such as amphetamine and
cocaine depends on the activation of a dopaminergic system
in the nucleus accumbens, which receives inputs from the
amygdala and orbitofrontal cortex.
The dopamine release produced by these behaviors may
be rewarding because it is influencing the activity of an
amygdalo-striatal (and in primates, also possibly an or-
bitofrontal-striatal) system involved in linking the amygdala
and orbitofrontal cortex, which can learn stimulus-rein-
forcement associations, to output systems. In a whole series
of studies, Robbins et al. (1989) showed that conditioned
reinforcers (for food) increase the release of dopamine in
the nucleus accumbens and that dopamine-depleting le-
sions of the nucleus accumbens attenuate the effect of con-
ditioned (learned) incentives on behavior.
Although the majority of the studies have focussed on re-
warded behavior, there is also evidence that dopamine can
be released by stimuli that are aversive. For example, Rada
et al. (1998) showed that dopamine was released in the nu-
cleus accumbens when rats worked to escape from aversive
hypothalamic stimulation (see also Hoebel 1997; Leibowitz
& Hoebel 1998). Also, Gray et al. (1997) (and Abercrombie
et al. 1989; Thierry et al. 1976) describe evidence that
dopamine can be released in the nucleus accumbens dur-
ing stress, unavoidable foot shock, and in response to a light
or tone associated by Pavlovian conditioning with foot
shock that produces fear. Because of these findings, it is
suggested that the release of dopamine is actually more re-
lated to the initiation of active behavioral responses, such as
active avoidance of punishment, or working to obtain food,
than to the delivery of reward per se or of stimuli that sig-
nal reward. Although the most likely process to enhance the
release of dopamine in the ventral striatum is an increase in
the firing of dopamine neurons, an additional possibility is
the release of dopamine by a presynaptic influence on the
dopamine terminals in the nucleus accumbens.
What signals could make dopamine neurons fire? Some
of the inputs to the dopamine neurons in the midbrain
come from the head of the caudate nucleus where a popu-
lation of neurons starts to respond in relation to a tone or
light signalling in a visual discrimination task that a trial is
about to begin, and stops responding after the reward is de-
livered or as soon as a visual stimulus is shown that indicates
that reward cannot be obtained on that trial and that saline
will be obtained if a response is made (Rolls et al. 1983;
Rolls & Johnstone 1992). Similar neurons are also found in
the ventral striatum (Williams et al. 1993). The responses
of midbrain dopamine neurons described by Schultz et al.
(1995) and Schultz (1998) are somewhat similar to these
cue-related striatal neurons, which appear to receive their
input from the overlying prefrontal cortex, and it is sug-
gested that this is because the dopamine neurons are influ-
enced by these striatal neurons with activity related to the
initiation of action.
On the basis of these types of evidence, the hypothesis 
is proposed that the activity of dopamine neurons and
dopamine release is more related to the initiation of action
or general behavioral activation, and the appropriate
threshold setting within the striatum (see Ch. 4, sect. 4, and
Rolls & Treves 1998), than to reward per se, or a teaching
signal about reward (cf. Houk et al. 1995; Schultz et al.
1995). The investigation of Mirenowicz and Schultz (1996)
did not address this issue directly: it was when the monkey
had to disengage from a trial and make no touch response
when a stimulus associated with an aversive air puff was de-
livered that dopamine neurons generally did not respond,
and the task was thus formally very similar to the Go/NoGo
task of Rolls et al. (1983), in which they described similar
neurons in the head of the caudate that responded when
the monkey was engaged in the task. One way to test
whether the release of dopamine in this system means “Go”
rather than “reward” would be to investigate whether the
dopamine neurons fire and dopamine release occurs; and
behavior is necessary such as active avoidance of a strong,
punishing, arousing stimulus. It is noted in any case that if
the release of dopamine does turn out to be related to re-
ward, then it apparently does not represent all the sensory
specificity of a particular reward or goal for action. Indeed,
one of the main themes of The brain and emotion is that
there is clear evidence on how, with exquisite detail, rich
representations of different types of primary reinforcer, in-
cluding taste and somatosensory reinforcers, are decoded
by and present in the orbitofrontal cortex and amygdala,
and the structures to which they project including the lat-
eral hypothalamus and ventral striatum (Williams et al.
1993). Further, the same brain systems implement stimu-
lus-to-primary-reinforcer learning. In contrast, it is doubt-
ful whether reward per se is represented in the firing of
dopamine neurons; and even if it is, they do not carry the
full sensory quality of orbitofrontal cortex neurons; and
must in any case be driven by inputs already decoded for
reward versus punishment in the orbitofrontal cortex and
amygdala.
Given that the ventral striatum has inputs from the or-
bitofrontal cortex as well as the amygdala, and that some
primary rewards are represented in the orbitofrontal cor-
tex, the dopaminergic effects of psychomotor stimulant
drugs (such as amphetamine and cocaine) may produce
their effects in part because they are facilitating transmis-
sion in a primary reward-to-action pathway, which is cur-
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rently biased towards reward by the inputs to the ventral
striatum. In addition, at least part of the reason that such
drugs are addictive may be that they activate the brain at
the stage of processing after the one at which reward or
punishment associations have been learned, where the sig-
nal is normally interpreted by the system as indicating “se-
lect actions to achieve the goal of making these striatal neu-
rons fire” (see Fig. 2 and Rolls 1999a).
6. Role of peripheral factors in emotion
The James-Lange theory postulates that certain stimuli
produce bodily responses, including somatic and auto-
nomic responses, and that it is the sensing of these bodily
changes that gives rise to the feeling of emotion (James
1884; Lange 1885). This theory is encapsulated by the state-
ment: “I feel frightened because I am running away.” This
theory has gradually been weakened by the following evi-
dence: (1) There is not a particular pattern of autonomic re-
sponses that corresponds to every emotion. (2) Disconnec-
tion from the periphery (e.g., after spinal cord damage or
damage to the sympathetic and vagus autonomic nerves)
does not abolish behavioral signs of emotion or emotional
feelings (see Oatley & Jenkins 1996). (3) Emotional inten-
sity can be modulated by peripheral injections of, for ex-
ample, adrenaline (epinephrine), which produce auto-
nomic effects, but it is the cognitive state as induced by
environmental stimuli, and not the autonomic state, that
produces an emotion and determines what the emotion is.
(4) Peripheral autonomic blockade with pharmacological
agents does not prevent emotions from being felt (Reisen-
zein 1983). The James-Lange theory, and theories closely
related to it in supposing that feedback from parts of the pe-
riphery (such as the face or body, as in Damasio’s 1994 so-
matic marker hypothesis) leads to emotional feelings, also
have, however, the major weakness that they do not give an
adequate account of which stimuli produce the peripheral
change that is postulated to eventually lead to emotion.
That is, these theories do not provide an account of the
rules by which only some environmental stimuli produce
emotions, or how neurally only such stimuli produce emo-
tions.
Another problem with such bodily mediation theories is
that introducing bodily responses and then sensing of these
body responses into the chain by which stimuli come to elicit
emotions would introduce noise into the system. Damasio
(1994) may partially circumvent this last problem in his the-
ory by allowing central representations of somatic markers
to become conditioned to bodily somatic markers, so that af-
ter the appropriate learning, a peripheral somatic change
may not be needed. However, this scheme still suffers from
noise inherent in producing bodily responses, in sensing
them, and in conditioning central representations of the so-
matic markers to the bodily states. Even if Damasio were to
argue that the peripheral somatic marker and its feedback
can be bypassed using conditioning of a representation (in,
for example, the somatosensory cortex), he would appar-
ently still wish to argue that the activity in the somatosen-
sory cortex is important for the emotion to be appreciated
or to influence behavior. (Without this, the somatic marker
hypothesis would vanish.) The prediction would apparently
be that if an emotional response or decision were produced
to a visual stimulus, this would necessarily involve activity in
the somatosensory cortex or other brain region in which the
“somatic marker” would be represented. Damasio (1994)
actually sees bodily markers as helping to make emotional
decisions because they perform a bodily integration of all
the complex issues that may be leading to indecision in the
conscious rational processing system of the brain. This pre-
diction could be tested (for example, in patients with so-
matosensory cortex damage), but it seems most unlikely that
an emotion produced by an emotion-provoking visual stim-
ulus would require activity in the somatosensory cortex.
Damasio, in any case, effectively sees computation by the
body of what the emotional response should be as one way
in which emotional decisions are taken. In this sense, Dama-
sio (1994) suggests that we should take it as an error that the
rational self takes decisions, and replace this with a system
in which the body resolves the emotional decision. In con-
trast, the theory developed in The brain and emotion is that
in humans both the implicit and the explicit systems can be
involved in taking emotional decisions; that they do not nec-
essarily agree as these two systems respectively perform
computation of immediate rewards and deferred longer-
term rewards achievable by multistep planning; that pe-
ripheral factors are useful in preparing the body for action
but do not take part in decisions; and that in any case the in-
teresting part of emotional decisions is how the reward or
punishment value of stimuli is decoded by the brain and
routed to action systems, which is what much of The brain
and emotion is about.
7. Conclusions
Although this précis has focussed on the parts of the book
about emotion, and rather little on those parts concerned
with hunger, thirst, brain-stimulation reward, and sexual
behavior, which provide complementary evidence, or on
the issue of subjective feelings and emotion, some of the
conclusions reached in the book are as follows, and com-
ments on all aspects of the book are invited:
1. Emotions can be considered as states elicited by rein-
forcers (rewards and punishers). This approach helps with
understanding the functions of emotion, with classifying
different emotions (Ch. 3), and in understanding what in-
formation-processing systems in the brain are involved in
emotion, and how they are involved (Ch. 4).
2. The hypothesis is developed that brains are designed
around reward- and punishment-evaluation systems, be-
cause this is how genes can build a complex system that will
produce appropriate but flexible behavior to increase fit-
ness (Ch. 10). By specifying goals, rather than particular be-
havioral patterns of responses, genes leave much more
open the possible behavioral strategies that might be re-
quired to increase fitness. This view of the evolutionarily
adaptive value for genes to build organisms using reward
and punishment decoding and action systems in the brain
(leading thereby to brain systems for emotion and motiva-
tion) places this thinking squarely in line with that of Dar-
win.
3. The importance of reward and punishment systems in
brain design helps us to understand the significance and im-
portance not only of emotion, but also of motivational be-
havior, which frequently involves working to obtain goals
that are specified by the current state of internal signals to
achieve homeostasis (see Ch. 2 on hunger and Ch. 7 on
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thirst) or that are influenced by internal hormonal signals
(Ch. 8 on sexual behavior).
4. In Chapters 2 (on hunger) and 4 (on emotion) some
of what may be the fundamental architectural and design
principles of the brain for sensory-, reward-, and punish-
ment-information processing in primates including humans
are outlined. These architectural principles include the fol-
lowing:
For potential secondary reinforcers, cortical analysis is to
the level of invariant object identification before reward
and punishment associations are learned, and the repre-
sentations produced in these sensory systems of objects are
in the appropriate form for stimulus-reinforcer pattern as-
sociation learning. This requirement can be seen as shap-
ing the evolution of some sensory-processing streams. The
potential secondary reinforcers for emotional learning thus
originate mainly from high-order cortical areas, not from
subcortical regions.
For primary reinforcers, the reward decoding may occur
after several stages of processing, as in the primate taste sys-
tem, in which reward is decoded only after the primary taste
cortex.
In both cases, this allows the use of the sensory informa-
tion by a number of different systems, including brain sys-
tems for learning, independently of whether the stimulus is
currently reinforcing, that is, a goal for current behavior.
The reward value of primary and secondary reinforcers
is represented in the orbitofrontal cortex and amygdala,
where there is a detailed and information-rich representa-
tion of taste, olfactory, somatosensory, and visual rewarding
(and punishing) stimuli.
Another design principle is that the outputs of the reward
and punishment systems must be treated by the action sys-
tem as being the goals for action. The action systems must
be built to try to maximise the activation of the representa-
tions produced by rewarding events and to minimise the ac-
tivation of the representations produced by punishers or
stimuli associated with punishers. Drug addiction pro-
duced by psychomotor stimulants such as amphetamine
and cocaine can be seen as activating the brain at the stage
where the outputs of the amygdala and orbitofrontal cortex,
which provide representations of whether stimuli are asso-
ciated with rewards or punishers, are fed into the ventral
striatum as goals for the action system.
5. Especially in primates, the visual processing in emo-
tional and social behavior requires sophisticated represen-
tation of individuals, and for this there are many neurons
devoted to invariant face identity processing. In addition,
there is a separate system that encodes facial gesture, move-
ment, and view. All are important in social behavior, for in-
terpreting whether a particular individual, with his or her
own reinforcement associations, is producing threats or ap-
peasements.
6. After mainly unimodal cortical processing to the ob-
ject level, sensory systems then project into convergence
zones. The orbitofrontal cortex and amygdala are especially
important for reward and punishment, emotion and moti-
vation, not only because they are the parts of the brain
where in primates the primary (unlearned) reinforcing
value of stimuli is represented, but also because they are the
parts of the brain that perform pattern associative learning
between potential secondary reinforcers and primary rein-
forcers.
7. The reward evaluation systems have tendencies to
self-regulate, so that on average they can operate in a com-
mon currency that leads on different occasions, often de-
pending on modulation by internal signals, to the selection
of different rewards.
8. A principle that assists the selection of different be-
haviors is sensory-specific satiety, which builds up when a
reward is repeated for a number of minutes. A principle
that helps behavior to lock on to one goal for at least a use-
ful period is incentive motivation, the process by which
there is potentiation early on in the presentation of a re-
ward. There are probably simple neurophysiological bases
for these time-dependent processes in the reward (as op-
posed to the early sensory) systems that involve neuronal
habituation and facilitation, respectively.
9. With the advances made in the last 30 years in under-
standing the brain mechanisms involved in reward and pun-
ishment, and emotion and motivation, the basis for addic-
tion to drugs is becoming clearer, and it is hoped that there
is now a foundation for improving the understanding of de-
pression and anxiety and their pharmacological and non-
pharmacological treatment in terms of the particular brain
systems that are involved in these emotional states (Ch. 6).
10. Although the architectural design principles of the
brain to the stage of the representation of rewards and pun-
ishments seem apparent, it is much less clear how selection
between the reward and punishment signals is made, how
the costs of actions are taken into account, and how actions
are selected. Some of the putative processes, including the
principles of operation of the basal ganglia and the func-
tions of dopamine, are outlined in Chapters 4 and 6, but
much remains to be understood. The dopamine system may
not code for reward; but instead its activity may be more re-
lated to the initiation of action and feedback from the stria-
tum.
11. In addition to the implicit system for action selec-
tion, there is in humans an explicit system that can use lan-
guage to compute actions to obtain deferred rewards using
a one-time plan. The language system allows one-off mul-
tistep plans, which require the syntactic organisation of
symbols to be formulated in order to obtain rewards and
avoid punishments. There are thus two separate systems for
producing actions to rewarding and punishing stimuli in hu-
mans. These systems may weight different courses of action
differently, in that each can produce behavior for different
goals (immediate versus deferred).
12. It is possible that emotional feelings, part of the
much larger problem of consciousness, arise as part of a
process that involves thoughts about thoughts, which have
the adaptive value of helping to correct multistep plans
where credit assignment for each step is required. This is
the approach described in Chapter 9, but there seems to be
no clear way to choose which theory of consciousness is
moving in the right direction, so caution must be exercised
here.
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Abstract: The brain and emotion treats emotions as states elicited by re-
inforcers (reward or punishment), but it is unclear how this view can do
justice to the diversity of emotions. It is also unclear how such a view dis-
tinguishes emotions from states such as hunger and thirst. A complemen-
tary approach to understanding emotions may begin by considering emo-
tions as aspects of social cognition.
Although Edmund Rolls’s new book, The brain and emotion,
ranges widely, its focus and expertise are centered on the topic that
Rolls himself has pioneered: single-unit neurophysiology of re-
ward mechanisms in the amygdala and orbitofrontal cortex of an-
imals. Much of the book concerns the analysis of responses to a
variety of sensory stimuli that are rewarding or aversive to the an-
imal, and the corresponding question of how the reinforcing prop-
erties of stimuli are represented in the brain is also treated in some
detail. In this BBS commentary, I would like to explore just one of
the important issues that the book raises: How do our concepts 
of reward and punishment, which rely essentially on the notion of
behavioral reinforcement, relate to the concept of an emotion? In
a nutshell, can emotions such as happiness, fear, anger, sadness, as
well as embarrassment, love or awe, be understood from within
the framework of reward and punishment? Rolls evidently be-
lieves that they can, but I am not so sure.
Attempts to produce a taxonomy of emotions have tended to fall
between two extremes. At one extreme are those stimulated by the
classical experiments of Schacter and Singer (1962): all emotions
share in common something like emotional arousal and perhaps
all negative emotions share in common aversion, but what distin-
guishes individual emotions is their cognitive content, which is
presumed to be separate from their motivational content. At the
other extreme are theories like those of Paul Ekman (1992; 1993),
postulating that there are specific neural systems for each specific,
basic emotion – although people vary in what they consider to be
the basic emotions (see, e.g., the scheme proposed by Panksepp
1998a). As expected, most people agree that emotions draw upon
some underlying dimensions, but also acknowledge that different
emotions correspond to different patterns of stimuli, behaviors,
and experience, and will rely on partly distinct neural systems.
Rolls tends towards the former, more reductionist, end of the
spectrum, as illustrated for instance in his Figure 3.1 (p. 63 of the
book and Figure 1, p. 179 of the target article). According to his
scheme, emotions fall on a 2-dimensional space with axes speci-
fied by either presenting or withholding stimuli with positive or
negative reinforcement contingencies. This leads him to put to-
gether on the same axis some emotions one might intuitively con-
sider quite different, for example, frustration, sadness, anger,
grief, and rage.
Although the attempt to find among emotions some simpler,
underlying dimensions is certainly worthwhile, and I do not deny
that there are dimensions that capture a portion of the variance in
measures that assess emotion, there are two major problems with
the whole approach. First, common experience suggests that
there are more emotions than any current scheme of underlying
dimensions would permit. Fear, anger, happiness, love, awe, jeal-
ousy, embarrassment, guilt, disgust, and grief all differ qualita-
tively, so that it is implausible that they should differ only with re-
spect to the magnitude of some shared dimensions. Second, there
is now good evidence from neuroscience to suggest that at least
some of the emotions we would consider distinct do in fact engage
distinct neural structures. Some examples are the disproportion-
ate involvement of the amygdala in fear (Adolphs et al. 1995; Le
Doux 1996) and the disproportionate involvement of the insula in
disgust (Phillips et al. 1997) (see also Panksepp [1998a] for a re-
cent inventory of some specific emotional neural systems). On the
face of it, knowledge of how fear and disgust might be related to
reward and punishment would seem insufficient. They are both
aversive emotional states, but they are also very clearly different
in terms of the sets of stimuli that normally evoke them, in terms
of the sets of behavioral responses engendered, in terms of the
conscious experience of the emotions, and, in fact, in terms of
their neural underpinnings. What is needed is a story that ac-
counts for their differences.
An analogous problem arises in distinguishing bona fide emo-
tional states from states that are also related to reward and pun-
ishment, and that likely share some of the same circuitry as that
which subserves emotion, but that are not emotions. Rolls himself
provides us with the examples, because they are the states whose
neurophysiology he discusses in detail: thirst, hunger, and so on.
It seems to me that one ingredient which distinguishes at least a
large number of those states we normally consider emotions from
those we normally do not – such as thirst, pain, and hunger – is
the former’s relevance to social behavior and key role in social
communication. I would thus like to suggest an exploration of the
neurobiology of emotion that takes a starting point complemen-
tary to the one that Rolls describes: begin with findings from
ethology and from comparative, developmental, and social psy-
chology. There is no shortage of this literature; in fact, most writ-
ings on the topic of emotion, until very recently, came from the
domain of social psychology (I resist citation here, since it would
have to be very incomplete).
Taking the approach I suggest seriously requires detailed
knowledge of ethology, of developmental and social psychology,
and of related fields. Some such syntheses are now emerging; for
instance in books by Brothers (1997), Damasio (1994), Panksepp
(1998a), and Schore (1994), to name a few recent ones. No doubt,
much about our commonsense categories for emotions will need
to be revised (cf. Griffiths 1997), but it seems premature to col-
lapse all emotions into concepts of reward and punishment. This
is not to say that I think the framework Rolls describes is useless;
quite the contrary, I believe that we need to investigate emotion
both from the point of view of reward and punishment, as well as
from the perspective of social cognition. The former is probably
more suited to exploring emotion’s neural underpinnings in non-
primate animals, while only the latter can give us the full richness
of emotion found in humans.
Emotions or emotional feelings?
Murat Aydede
Department of Philosophy, The University of Chicago, Chicago, IL 60637. 
m-aydede@uchicago.edu humanities.uchicago.edu/faculty/aydede/
Abstract: I criticize Rolls’s account of what makes emotional states con-
scious.
It turns out that Rolls’s answer to Nagel’s (1974) question, “What
is it like to be a bat?” is brusque: there is nothing it is like to be a
bat – provided that bats don’t have a linguistically structured in-
ternal representational system that enables them to think about
their first-order thoughts which are also linguistically structured.
For phenomenal consciousness, a properly functioning system of
higher-order linguistic thought (HOLT) is necessary (Rolls 1999a,
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p. 262). By this criterion, not only bats, but also a great portion of
the animal kingdom, perhaps all animal species except humans,
turn out to lack phenomenal consciousness. Indeed, even human
babies, and perhaps infants before the early stages of acquiring
their first language, are likely to lack such consciousness, if one
considers the level of conceptual sophistication required by the
HOLT hypothesis. In order to have a higher-order thought, one
needs to have the concept of a thought in addition to the (linguis-
tically structured) representational resources to articulate the con-
ceptual content of the lower-order thought. Indeed, Rolls believes
(p. 262) that phenomenal consciousness may be quite a late arrival
in the history of evolution of the mind/brain: certainly much later
than the ability to think (in a linguistically structured internal
medium), because it requires the ability to think not only about
one’s physical environment, but also about one’s own thoughts.
Many would take such consequences as a reductio of Rolls’s the-
sis about consciousness; for surely the thesis seems to overintel-
lectualize phenomenal consciousness.
But Rolls does not deny that animals have emotions, only that
they have emotional feelings. The latter are conscious, whereas
the former are not. There is nothing it is like to be in an emotional
state unless one is endowed with a HOLT system. But why does
Rolls feel he must embrace this startling and implausible conclu-
sion? After telling us that emotions are brain states caused by pos-
itively or negatively reinforcing stimuli, including changes in such
stimuli, Rolls offers a fascinating tour of the physiology of reward
and motivation in which he makes quite elaborate and specific
proposals as to where and how in the brain such states are likely
to occur (primarily in the amygdala and orbitofrontal cortex). But
Rolls’s actual “definition” of emotion is only part of the story. Later
(especially in sects. 4.6–4.9, 9.3, 10.3, among others), he implic-
itly supplements this definition by telling us that emotions are also
the indirect causes of certain types of motivated behavior. In par-
ticular, they are (in humans) inputs to two brain systems that de-
cide on the behavioral output by computing the reward value of
each behavioral choice against its odds before outputting to mo-
tor areas. One system, which humans share with other primates,
consists of the basal ganglia and its structures (including, perhaps,
the inferior temporal visual cortex – cf. p. 285). The output of this
system is processed in the premotor cortex and then fed into the
motor system before the actual ensuing behavioral response. Rolls
calls the behavior elicited by this route “implicit behavior.” The
other system, which is perhaps specific to humans, is the language
cortex, which receives the outputs of amygdala and orbitofrontal
cortex, processes them in a syntactically structured symbolic
medium before initiating action through the cortical motor and
planning areas. Behavior from this route is dubbed “explicit be-
havior.” (In addition to these two, there are also reflex circuits be-
tween relatively unprocessed sensory inputs and motor reactions.)
So the core of Rolls’s account is a straightforward functionalist
(in fact, psychofunctionalist – see Block 1980) characterization of
emotional states. Hence we can explicitly rewrite Rolls’s actual de-
finition thus: emotional states are those states (mainly realized in
the amygdala and orbitofrontal cortex) that play the above-speci-
fied type of functional/causal role (to be specified more fully and
explicitly of course) in the central neural economy of the brain.
But then Rolls asks: Why should there be anything it is like to be
in such states? Why should such states feel like anything at all? (I
am of course delighted to see a scientist who thinks that he should
have an answer to this question. So I truly applaud Rolls’s attempt
to give an answer – albeit a tentative and cautious one.) Feeling
that his account of emotions seems to leave out the qualia of emo-
tions, Rolls proposes the HOLT hypothesis.
But I am puzzled by why Rolls thinks that his helps. Before ex-
plaining my misgivings, a few clarifying remarks (or exploratory
speculations) about the hypothesis are in order. As Rolls points
out, the HOLT account closely resembles Rosenthal’s HOT the-
ory of state consciousness, though it adds the requirement that
thoughts are realized in a syntactically structured (language-like)
representational medium, or “mentalese,” as per the Language of
Thought Hypothesis (LOTH – for a presentation of which, see
Aydede 1998). After distinguishing between first- and higher-or-
der thoughts (all realized in mentalese), Rolls insists that second-
order thoughts (i.e., thoughts about first-order thoughts) are re-
quired for emotions to become conscious, that is, to turn them into
emotional feelings. This is a bit puzzling because, as characterized
by Rolls, emotional states are obviously not thoughts realized in
mentalese. Rolls sometimes talks about the firing of a bunch of
(specific) neurons in the orbitofrontal cortex as a representation
of the reward value of, say, a particular taste – intuitively what we
might otherwise call, its pleasantness, or the lack thereof. But, as
far as I can tell, these representations are not privy to the compu-
tations of the explicit linguistic system. (However, see sect. 4.6.3,
where Rolls seems to suggest, somewhat confusingly, that the
computation of reward value in the linguistic system might de-
pend on activity in the orbitofrontal cortex and amygdala, which
are not identified by Rolls as sites of the higher linguistic cortex.)
So it is not clear how these representations are supposed to be
made conscious by shining the light of higher-order thought on
them.
Perhaps all Rolls means to say is this: in order for emotional
states (say, orbitofrontal representations of reward value) to be-
come conscious they must be the target of a first-order thought;
nothing more is required. On this interpretation, all that the or-
ganism needs to do is to think about such representations – per-
haps something like the internal version of “Oh, this is pleasant”
where “pleasant” is represented by a mentalese predicate, and
“this” is a Mentalese quasi-demonstrative referring to – what? It
cannot be the orbitofrontal representation, for that is not pleas-
ant. What is pleasant is presumably the taste, which is processed,
according to Rolls, independently of and prior to its reward value,
in the primary taste cortex. So perhaps, it refers to a purely sen-
sory (i.e., affectively neutral) representation of that particular
taste, say in the primary taste cortex. But this does not seem right
either. How could an affectively neutral sensation be pleasant?
But then what is the first-order thought supposed to be about?
What these questions/reflections seem to indicate is that if a ver-
sion of HOT theory is claimed to account for emotional feelings,
then this account is absent from Rolls’s book.
But suppose that such an account were provided. Surely it
would be a causal/functional one, in that the postulated higher-or-
der states will be brain states causally connected, perhaps in quiet
complicated ways, to the sensory and affective states realized in
the relevant brain sites. So, for instance, suppose whenever I am
in those emotional states, I am causally prompted to have thoughts
(brain states realized up in the linguistic cortex) about my emo-
tional states ( just further brain states down in the orbitofrontal
cortex and amygdala) that – voilà – transform the latter into emo-
tional feelings, full-blown phenomenal states in all their glory.
How is this supposed to be less mysterious? Why should there be
anything it is like to be in a state playing this (more sophisticated)
causal/functional role? Contrary to Rolls, as things stand, I do not
see any advance here.
Nevertheless, I am no pessimist or mysterian about phenome-
nal consciousness. On the contrary, I believe that the mystery can
probably be solved by more or less the same naturalistic or scien-
tific methods that Rolls so skillfully employs throughout the book
in uncovering some of the brain mechanisms of emotions. I even
believe that he is right in thinking that at some point in our analy-
sis of phenomenal consciousness we need to bring in some form
of higher-order mental state theory (this could be a HOT or HO-
Perception account in the way introspection has been traditionally
conceived, i.e., as a kind of inner sense). But to solve the mystery
of affective/emotive qualia will require at least two things. First,
we need to account for such qualia not representationally, but
rather in purely psychofunctional terms, namely as ways of pro-
cessing incoming sensory information en route to setting behav-
ioral parameters. I believe Rolls’s research gives substantial sup-
port to this kind of approach. Second, we need to tell a naturalistic
story about our peculiar first-person epistemic access to them, a
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story which does justice to the subjectivity of the mental. This is
where going higher-order is likely to play an essential role, espe-
cially when we bring in some of the resources and peculiarities of
indexical and reflexive reference to such an account. For explo-
ration of some of these themes, see Dretske (1995), Lycan (1996),
Rey (1997), Tye (1995), and Aydede (in preparation).
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Abstract: Rolls’s book, The brain and emotion is an important and valu-
able contribution to our understanding of the brain mechanisms that un-
derlie emotional processes. Its explanatory value is less obvious when it
comes to psychological and philosophical issues concerning the nature of
emotions.
The nature of emotions. Rolls defines emotion as “states
elicited by rewards and punishers” (p. 60). In one sense, Rolls’s de-
finition is too broad: there are many other states that are elicited
by rewards and punishers and which are not emotions. For exam-
ple, when I decide to clean my car, this decision and the actual
cleaning are states elicited by rewards and punishers but these are
not emotional states. In another sense, Rolls’s definition is too nar-
row: it refers only to the causes of emotions and not to their na-
ture. I would prefer an approach that characterizes typical fea-
tures of emotions rather than defines the “essence” of emotions.
There is always the danger of superficiality in the latter approach.
Rolls’s emphasis on the element of reward and punishment re-
veals, however, an important feature of emotions: the positive or
negative evaluation underlying each emotional state. Emotions
typically occur when we perceive positive or negative significant
changes in our personal situation (Ben-Ze’ev 2000). Spinoza, for
example, claims that when we undergo great change, we pass to a
greater or lesser perfection, and these changes are expressed in
emotions. As we change for the better we are happy and for the
worse unhappy (Spinoza 1677:IIIp6; IIIdef.aff.; Vp39s).
Classifying the emotions. Rolls’s classification of emotions
(sect. 3.1.3) is problematic for various reasons. First, it does not
distinguish between emotions and other affective states. In addi-
tion to emotions, the affective realm includes other phenomena
such as sentiments, moods, affective disorders, and affective traits
(Ben-Ze’ev 2000, Ch. 4). Second, Rolls’s classification is intended
to refer to all different emotions, but actually it refers to only few
emotions and many nonemotional states. Social emotions, such as
envy, pleasure-in-others’-misfortune, regret, pride, and shame,
are not mentioned in the index, and hardly, if at all, in the text.
Third, Rolls considers emotional intensity to be a factor in classi-
fying the emotions. However, emotional intensity is not a useful
tool for this purpose as each emotion can be more or less intense
depending on the different circumstances. Accordingly, I do not
believe – as is implied in the diagram – that anger is always, or
even typically, more intense than sadness, or that it is on the same
level of intensity that grief is.
The functions of emotions. Rolls’s discussion of the functions
of emotions is illuminating – although we may reduce the ten
functions into a more limited number of basic functions. I have
some doubts concerning the ninth function, namely, “to produce
persistent motivation and direction of behaviour” (p. 70). Typical
emotions are essentially transient states. The association of emo-
tional intensity with change causes the intensity to decrease
steadily due to the transient nature of changes. This association is
a natural mechanism enabling the system to return within a rela-
tively short period to normally functioning. In light of these con-
siderations, one may wonder whether we can characterize one
function of emotions as that of producing persistent motivation.
However, if our time-scale is not one of months or years, but of
minutes or hours, then Rolls’s claim makes sense. Moreover, emo-
tional values, or values whose fulfillment or violation will generate
significant emotional intensity, can no doubt produce persistent
motivation and direction of behavior as Rolls suggests.
Subjective feelings. Rolls’s explanation of subjective feelings or
qualia is odd. He argues that such feelings are possible only in
“(linguistically based) higher-order thought processing” (p. 251);
“it is a property of the higher-order thought system that it feels like
something when it is operating” (p. 253). Feelings are even not
part of all thoughts but only those involving thoughts about
thoughts. Hence, non-human animal behavior may be very simi-
lar to human behavior, “but would not imply qualia” (p. 252). It is
hard to understand why Rolls wants to go against the evidence of
evolution and claim that first we have linguistic thought capacities
and only then feelings. Does Rolls really think that neonates, dogs,
and cats do not have feelings of pain and pleasure? When neonates
cry do they not have some disagreeable feelings? This over-intel-
lectualization of the mind is not warranted. I believe that the feel-
ing dimension is a primitive mode of consciousness associated
with our own state. It is the lowest level of consciousness; unlike
higher levels of awareness, such as those found in perception,
memory, and thinking, the feeling dimension has no meaningful
cognitive content. It expresses our own state, but is not in itself di-
rected at this state or at any other object. In light of its importance
in identifying our own state, it is plausible that mental life begins
– from both an evolutionary and personal viewpoint – with states
of feeling; life at this state is a succession of agreeable and dis-
agreeable sensations. Later on, when intentional capacities are de-
veloped, the feeling dimension usually becomes part of a complex
mental state which also includes the intentional dimension (Ben-
Ze’ev 2000, Ch. 3).
Consciousness, higher-order thought, 
and stimulus reinforcement
José Luis Bermúdez
Department of Philosophy, University of Stirling, Stirling FK9 4LA, Scotland.
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Abstract: Rolls defends a higher-order thought theory of phenomenal
consciousness, mapping the distinction between conscious and non-con-
scious states onto a distinction between two types of action and corre-
sponding neural pathways. Only one type of action involves higher-order
thought and consequently consciousness. This account of consciousness
has implausible consequences for the nature of stimulus-reinforcement
learning.
According to higher-order thought (HOT) theories of conscious-
ness, conscious states are representational states upon which
HOTs are (or can be) directed (Rosenthal 1991). It is natural and
common to object to such theories on the grounds that they rule
out the possibility of consciousness for large sections of the animal
kingdom (Dretske 1995). Irrespective of where exactly one draws
the line between those creatures capable of HOT and those not,
consciousness has seemed to many to extend further down the
phylogenetic (and indeed ontogenetic) ladder than HOT (Ber-
múdez 1998a; Dawkins 1998). Although this is often presented as
self-evident, it can be defended on the following grounds. The
most plausible model we possess for explaining the vast majority
of animal behaviour is that provided by conditioning theory (Dick-
enson 1980). The basic principle of conditioning theory is that cer-
tain patterns of behaviour are reinforced by being associated with
primary positive reinforcers, and inhibited by being associated
with primary negative reinforcers. But learning through condi-
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tioning works because primary reinforcers have qualitative as-
pects. It is impossible to divorce pain’s being a negative reinforcer
from its feeling the way it does. It is impossible to divorce sooth-
ing vocalizations being positive reinforcers from their sounding
the way they do. The success of stimulus-reinforcement models of
learning therefore entails the falsity of higher-order thought the-
ories of consciousness.
One of the many reasons Rolls’s The brain and emotion is in-
teresting is that it offers the tools for an empirical response to this
line of objection to HOT theories. His position, briefly outlined,
is the following. He distinguishes two types of reward/punish-
ment-based actions, to each of which there corresponds a distinct
neural pathway. Many actions can be performed relatively auto-
matically. Rolls hypothesises that actions of this type are under the
control of phylogenetically primitive brain systems like the basal
ganglia. These systems “control behaviour in relation to previous
associations of stimuli with reinforcement” (p. 256), yielding di-
rect behavioural responses based on assessment of the reinforce-
ment-related value of the stimulus. Such assessment is carried out
in the amygdala and (for primates) in the orbito-frontal cortex. Al-
ternatively, however, in certain higher animals the outputs of the
amygdala and orbito-frontal cortex can feed into the language ar-
eas of the brain and thence into the cortical motor and planning
areas. The operation of these systems involves HOT (in the form
of the syntactic manipulation of symbols) and conscious control.
It is, on Rolls’s view, only when sensory input is processed in these
areas that it becomes conscious. The consequence, as he readily
admits, is that creatures lacking these processing capabilities will
not be conscious – “Raw sensory feels, and subjective states asso-
ciated with emotional and motivational states, may not necessar-
ily arise first in evolution” (p. 262).
There are two separate questions to be raised for this account.
The first is whether Rolls gives a plausible account of the operation
of stimulus-reinforcement responses in non-linguistic creatures.
The second is whether he gives a plausible account of stimulus-re-
inforcement responses in language-using creatures. I will concen-
trate on the second, but it has clear implications for the first.
Rolls says: “much complex animal, including human, behaviour
can take place using the implicit, non-conscious, route to action”
(p. 261). Given his account of how qualia arise (in the context of
the conscious processing involved in higher-order planning) it
looks as if the sensory causes of such behavior cannot be conscious.
Suppose that as a result of associative learning a certain auditory
stimulus has become a secondary reinforcer, Rolls’s theory ap-
pears to entail that whenever I respond behaviourally, and with-
out HOT, to that secondary reinforcer, the auditory stimulus must
be non-conscious. This is so because in such situations the sensory
input does not go through the cortical motor and planning areas
where HOT might be brought to bear (see Fig. 9.4, for example).
This is highly counter-intuitive. There are many situations every
day in which we all seem to respond to secondary reinforcers in a
way that does not involve HOT and yet in which the secondary re-
inforcers are consciously experienced. Examples range from eating
a meal to listening to music. Is not the existence of this everyday
phenomenon a straightforward counter-example to Rolls’s theory?
Rolls might respond in either of two ways. He might (1) main-
tain that in such situations the relevant sensory information does
input to the motor and planning areas – and that is why it is con-
scious, or (2) suggest that sensory input to direct behavioural re-
sponses can be conscious in creatures capable of HOT, even when
it does not feed into the systems that engage in higher-order
thought. Neither of these strategies seems satisfactory. Strategy
(1) seems to undercut the motivation for identifying the two dis-
tinct types of action and corresponding neural pathways – as well
as being incompatible with the way in which he sets up the dis-
tinction between two types of action in the first place. Strategy (2)
seems to undercut the idea that sensory input becomes conscious
in virtue of featuring in higher-order planning, and in turn to
weaken the idea that phenomenal consciousness cannot emerge
in evolution before the capacity for HOT.
A dispositionalist version of the HOT theory might seem to of-
fer a way of developing strategy (2). That is, a state might become
conscious not in virtue of actually feeding into higher-order plan-
ning, but rather in virtue of its potential for feeding into such plan-
ning. Rolls mentions the possibility of such an approach (p. 248).
This modification of the theory, however, would entail abandon-
ing the account of how qualia emerge. It is also rather implausi-
ble: Why should what might or might not happen to sensory in-
formation further downstream affect whether it is conscious or
not? It is more plausible that the order of explanation is the other
way round, so that it is only if a state is conscious that it can feed
into planning and the deliberate initiation of action. An important
part of the functional role of phenomenal consciousness seems to
be to make information available for higher-order planning and re-
flection. This is consistent with what we know from blindsight pa-
tients and perceptual masking experiments. Certainly it seems
more likely that blindsight patients cannot deliberately plan ac-
tions involving objects in their blindfields because the information
they possess about those objects is non-conscious, than that the in-
formation such patients possess about objects in their blindfield is
non-conscious because they cannot deliberately plan actions in-
volving those objects (Bermúdez 1998b; Van Gulick 1994). If this
is right, then our account of phenomenal consciousness cannot
rest solely upon the operation of higher-order thought.
The upshot of all this, I think, is to cast doubt, not on Rolls’s gen-
eral distinction between two types of action and corresponding
neural pathways, but on his proposal to use that distinction to dis-
tinguish conscious from non-conscious states. This in turn casts
doubt upon his provocative suggestions, first, that phenomenal
consciousness does not emerge in evolution before the capacity
for higher-order thought and, second, that stimulus-reinforce-
ment learning is independent of phenomenal consciousness.
Conceptualizing motivation and emotion
Ross Buck
Department of Communication Sciences, University of Connecticut, Storrs,
CT 06269-1085. buck@uconnvm.uconn.edu
wattlab.coms.uconn.edu/faculty/buck.htm/
Abstract: Motivation and emotion are not clearly defined and differ-
entiated in Rolls’s The brain and emotion, reflecting a widespread prob-
lem in conceptualizing these phenomena. An adequate theory of emotion
cannot be based upon reward and punishment alone. Basic mechanisms
of arousal, agonistic, and prosocial motives-emotions exist in addition to
reward-punishment systems.
Rolls presents a detailed account of brain mechanisms of emotion,
emphasizing those aspects involving reward and punishment, and
exploring mechanisms ranging from those of drug addiction and
sperm competition, to consciousness. My review concentrates on
two points concerning the conceptualization of emotion: the dif-
ferentiation of motivation and emotion, and the feasibility of con-
structing an adequate theory of emotion based upon reward-pun-
ishment alone.
A recurring problem with conceptualizing emotion concerns
the differentiation of motivation from emotion. In this book the
relationship between motivation and emotion is not made entirely
clear, and the reader must search out the author’s assumptions.
Rolls defines “motivated behaviour” as “present when an animal
. . . [performs] an arbitrary operant response to obtain a reward or
to escape from or avoid a punishment” (p. 3). In his definition, mo-
tivation requires learning, either classical conditioning or instru-
mental learning, and behavior reflecting reflexes or instincts
would appear not to qualify as motivated behavior. This definition
is less general than the common definition of motivation in terms
of the arousal and direction of behavior (Kleinginna & Kleinginna
1981). Rolls defines “emotions” as “states elicited by rewards and
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punishers, including changes in rewards and punishers” (p. 60). It
appears from these definitions that motivation would be one of the
states included under the term “emotion.” At another point, Rolls
lists motivation as one of the functions of emotion. He writes,
“emotion affects motivation” (p. 68). That is, “fear learned by stim-
ulus-reinforcer association formation provides the motivation for
actions performed to avoid noxious stimuli . . . [and] positive re-
inforcers elicit motivation, so that we will work to obtain the re-
wards” (p. 68).
In elaborating upon his definition of emotion, Rolls notes that
“there are some rewarding stimuli that some may wish to exclude
from those that cause emotional states” (p. 65), but he does not of-
fer specific exclusion or inclusion criteria. He writes, “when posi-
tively reinforcing stimuli (such as the taste of food or water) are
relevant to a drive state produced by a change in the internal mi-
lieu (such as hunger or thirst), then we do not normally classify
these stimuli as emotional, though they do produce pleasure”
(p. 65). He notes, however, that some may have a greater emo-
tional response to savoring food than others. Elsewhere, he dis-
tinguishes motivational and emotional qualia (defined as “raw sen-
sory feel”), giving the example of hunger for the former and
pleasure induced by touch for the latter (p. 251). Rolls notes that
sex constitutes something of a special case: “such stimuli may be
made to be rewarding . . . partly because of the internal hormonal
state. Does this mean that we wish to exclude such stimuli from
the class that we call emotion-provoking . . . ?” (p. 65). He ac-
knowledges that there is no clear answer to this question, although
unlike many emotion theorists it appears that Rolls’s answer is
clearly “No,” because he includes an excellent chapter on sex.
Rolls’s differentiation of motivation and emotion is generally
consistent with the customary way that these terms are distin-
guished, but it also reflects the fundamental incoherence of this
common view. I suggest it is not possible to distinguish coherently
between motivation and emotion because they are aspects of the
same phenomenon, two sides of the same coin, which by defini-
tion always occur together. I have defined motivation as a poten-
tial inherent in a system of behavior control, and emotion as the
manifestation or “read-out” of motivational potential. An analogy
is the relationship of energy and matter. Energy is a potential that
is not seen; rather, it is manifested in matter: in heat, light, force.
Analogously, motivation is not seen but is manifested in emotion:
in arousal, expression, experience. In this view, instincts and even
simple reflexes qualify as primary motivational-emotional systems
(primes), existing in even the simplest single-celled creatures
(Buck 1985).
My second point concerns the adequacy of reward and punish-
ment alone in accounting for emotional phenomena. Rolls criti-
cizes other approaches to emotion on the grounds that his de-
scription in terms of reward and punishment terminology is “more
precisely and operationally specified” (p. 61). Indeed, his theory
is grounded in the relatively explicit and widely known terminol-
ogy of classical conditioning and instrumental learning as well as
brain research. Also, his explication of reward-punishment sys-
tems in the brain and their implications for emotion may be cor-
rect as far as it goes. However, such an approach cannot alone ac-
count for motivation-emotion. In his book Rolls discounts or
overlooks some sources of contradictory information. For exam-
ple, he disagrees with LeDoux’s (1996) emphasis on the role of
subcortical inputs to the amygdalae in fear conditioning, what
LeDoux termed the “low road.” Instead, Rolls emphasizes the role
of cortical inputs to the amygdalae in associating stimuli with pri-
mary reinforcers, both rewards and punishers, although LeDoux
agreed with the importance of this “high road” as well. Moreover,
Rolls does not consider Panksepp’s (1998a) work on, for example,
attachment emotions.
I suggest that there are three fundamental bases of motivation-
emotion, or primes, which cannot be reduced to reward-punish-
ment. These are arousal, agonistic, and prosocial primes. All crea-
tures manifest approach and avoidance behaviors, but they also
manifest changes in activity-quiescence, agonistic competition, and
prosocial cooperation. There are numerous examples of colonial
microorganisms – even simple prokaryotic myxobacteria – that can
either separate and live “competitively” as single individuals, or “co-
operatively” aggregate with differentiated parts and functions to
form a more complex multicelled organism (Lackie 1986; Losick &
Kaiser 1997). The latter fundamental cooperation – arguably in-
volving emotional communication based upon communicative
genes – has important implications for evolutionary theory regard-
ing empathy and altruism (see Buck & Ginsburg 1991; 1997).
These fundamental motivational-emotional systems or primes
are based upon “informational molecules” evolved thousands of
millions of years before the evolution of the brain. They are, in ef-
fect, cognitive systems – ways of knowing – in their own right. I
suggest that reward-punishment systems are associated most
closely with happiness, sadness, and anxiety; agonistic systems
with fear, anger, and disgust; and prosocial system with a panoply
of attachment-related emotions including love (see Buck 1999).
Roads not taken: The case for multiple
functional-level routes to emotion
Tim Dalgleish
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Abstract: This review focuses on the theory of emotion outlined in Chap-
ter 3 of Rolls’s The brain and emotion. It is proposed that Rolls’s empha-
sis on a relatively simple neurobiologically derived emotion scheme does
not allow him to present a comprehensive account of emotion. Conse-
quently, high-level cognitive processes, such as appraisal, end up being re-
tained in the theory despite Rolls’s skepticism about their utility. An argu-
ment is put forward that the concept of appraisal in the emotion literature
is more than semantic convention and actually allows us to talk about mul-
tiple functional-level routes to the generation of emotion – a characteris-
tic of the latest generation of theories in the cognition-emotion literature.
Rolls offers us a wide-ranging and timely theoretical analysis of the
burgeoning research on affective neuroscience. The book offers a
comprehensive assessment of the basic brain and behaviour liter-
ature associated with emotion, while at the same time offering a
wealth of new ideas in domains as disparate as consciousness,
morality, literature, and neurotransmitters.
A cornerstone of the book is Rolls’s theory of emotion that is
presented in Chapter 3. In this review I confine myself to two sep-
arate but related comments concerning the theory. In brief, Rolls
proposes that emotions can be defined as “states produced by
stimuli which can be shown to be instrumental reinforcers”
(p. 62). Different emotions, he argues, can then be defined and
classified according to whether the reinforcer is negative or posi-
tive and by the reinforcement contingency that presides; that is,
presence of a reinforcer, omission of a reinforcer, or the termina-
tion of a reinforcer. The strength of the reinforcement contin-
gency determines the intensity of the emotion (see Fig. 3.1, p. 63).
So, for example, the omission of a positive reinforcer can lead to
sadness or, more intensely, grief.
This basis of Rolls’s theory has an elegant simplicity and he
favourably contrasts his ideas with the proposals of cognitive ap-
praisal theorists (e.g., Frijda 1986; Oatley & Johnson-Laird 1987)
in which emotions are a function of a cognitive evaluation of the
meaning of a given event in terms of the organism’s goals or cur-
rent concerns. Rolls prefers his own system to the idea of ap-
praisals because it “simply seems much more precisely and oper-
ationally specified” (p. 61). I will try to argue that Rolls does away
with the idea of appraisals only to reintroduce them again by the
back door. Furthermore, I will suggest that appraisal can be use-
fully thought of as a separate functional-level route to the gener-
ation of emotion, contrasting with emotions that are derived from
learned associations.
Commentary/Rolls: The brain and emotion
196 BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2000) 23:2
Rolls justifies his sidestepping of appraisal theory in terms of the
versatility of his own emotion scheme. The crucial question here
is how well any theory of emotion can account for the range of dif-
ferent emotions that is possible. Rolls’s basic classification scheme,
as he emphasises, can account for a wide range of emotions. This
range is further increased by the introduction of other ground
rules for the production of emotions (to augment the simple pa-
rameters described above), namely: (1) any environmental stimu-
lus can have a number of different reinforcement associations; and
(2), emotions can differ as a function of their original primary re-
inforcers, even if the secondary reinforcers are identical.
The taxonomy of emotions accounted for by this basic set of as-
sumptions is indeed impressive. However, as Rolls implicitly ac-
knowledges, it is not complete and so two further rules are in-
cluded to enable a more comprehensive account of the variety of
emotions. First, emotions are proposed to differ as a function of
whether the cognitive evaluations associated with the perceptions
of the eliciting stimuli are different. Second, emotions are pro-
posed to vary as a function of how the environment at the time
constrains the type of behavioural response that can be made
(p. 64).
The latter two ground rules look very familiar to an appraisal
theorist such as myself ! Essentially, the proposal is that for a com-
plete taxonomy of emotions there needs to be scope for an ap-
praisal of the meaning to the individual of the eliciting stimulus
and for an appraisal of the opportunities provided by the environ-
mental milieu. With this analysis, Rolls leaves us with a simple re-
inforcement contingency scheme allied to an appraisal system that
is necessary for certain types of emotion and/or fine tuning of
more primary emotional responses. This is not altogether differ-
ent from appraisal theories that emphasise primary and secondary
levels of appraisal (see Scherer 1999, for a review) and it certainly
begs the question of whether Rolls’s system is “more precisely and
operationally specified” than appraisal-based accounts.
However, it is possible that there is a more interesting issue
lurking in the shadows here. More recent cognitive accounts of
emotion (Johnson & Multhaup 1992; Leventhal & Scherer 1987;
Power & Dalgleish 1997; Teasdale & Barnard 1993) emphasise
the utility of thinking of more than one functional route to the gen-
eration of emotions. For example, in the spaars model of Power
and Dalgleish (1997) an associative route to emotions is proposed
that is based on previously learned contingencies between stimuli
and emotional responses as a function of parameters such as re-
ward and punishment. In addition, an appraisal route to emotions
is outlined that is a function of “on-line” evaluation of the mean-
ing of a current stimulus in terms of the organism’s active goals and
concerns. It seems plausible that Rolls’s scheme for emotions goes
against the flow of recent cognitive theorizing and conflates these
two routes. This requires him to propose a set of ground rules,
some of which concern previously learned/conditioned contin-
gencies and some of which concern aspects of on-line evaluation.
Separating these routes to emotion at a functional-level has neural
plausibility (e.g., Izard 1993; LeDoux 1995), as is clear from the
literature reviewed in the rest of the book, and provides a more
comprehensive account of the generation of mixed feelings and
emotional conflict than is offered by a scheme that articulates a
single functional-level route, however elaborate.
In summary, I have argued in this review that, despite the em-
phasis on a simple neurobiological scheme for emotion, Rolls finds
himself (inevitably in my view) reintroducing the concept of ap-
praisal in order to make his account of emotions a comprehensive
one. I have further tried to suggest that such labeling of something
as an appraisal process might be more than just a semantic pref-
erence and may reveal something fundamental about the way
emotions are elicited in the mind under certain conditions.
Affect programs, intentionality, 
and consciousness
Craig DeLancey
Department of Philosophy, Program of Cognitive Science, Indiana University,
Bloomington, IN 47405. cdelance@alumni.indiana.edu
www.cs.indiana.edu/hyplan/cdelance
Abstract: I express two concerns with the theory of emotion that Rolls
provides: (1) rewards and punishers alone fail to explain the basic emo-
tions; (2) Rolls needs to clarify his notion of the intentionality of emotions.
I also criticize his theory of consciousness, arguing that it fails to explain
qualia, and that ironically it is emotions which make this most evident.
Rolls’s excellent book offers a parsimonious approach to under-
standing emotions and a compelling synthesis of neuroscientific
evidence in defense of this position; it also offers a theory of con-
sciousness. I have two concerns, and some criticisms.
My primary concern is that the characterization of emotions as
“states elicited by rewards and punishers” is so broad that it can
support a view that all emotions are of a generic kind, and that
nothing significant and essentially affective distinguishes emo-
tions like fear or anger from states like pleasure or relief. Many of
us who believe in some version of the affect program theory, for
example, hold that some emotions have as a constituent motor
“programs,” including perhaps facial expressions and other ex-
pressive behaviors but also perhaps relational activities. There are
a number of reasons to believe this. For example, just as there are
primary reinforcers (which need not be learned but arise from our
inherited biological structure), there appear to be primary actions
(like flight, attack, grooming, and so on). Also, this view is part of
a reasonable phylogenetic theory, in which some emotions evolved
from inherited capabilities for particular actions, and furthermore
some of the physiological responses accompanying these emotions
may have evolved to facilitate these actions. Allowing for action
programs can explain the existence and even utility of certain
kinds of emotional behaviors which are irrational and so presum-
ably should not arise, on a simple cost-benefit analysis: expressive
behaviors (e.g., kicking a tree when you are mad at your boss);
post-functional behaviors (e.g., fleeing farther than you know is
necessary from a rattlesnake); and akratic behaviors (e.g., avoid-
ing a medical checkup because you fear the results). Post-func-
tional activities, for example, should be unpredictable if emotions
were guided only by avoiding punishment or getting reward, be-
cause the action should cease when either is accomplished. Frank
(1988) has provided an analysis of how some of these behaviors
can indirectly result in outcomes which are beneficial
The claim that some emotions are in part constituted by motor
programs, or other theories that there are fundamentally distinct
emotions, may be compatible with Rolls’s framework, but Rolls
appears to want to deny such approaches. Thus, for example, he
downplays evidence that the amygdala plays a greater role in fear
than in some other emotions, in support of a more generic frame-
work where the amygdala processes primary reinforcers and some
secondary reinforcers (pp. 102ff).
My second concern is that Rolls needs to clarify his notions
about the intentionality of emotions. Rolls argues that emotions
are normally object-directed intentional states. I believe he is cor-
rect about this, but humans can have emotions not only toward
concrete objects (“Eric is afraid of that snake”) but also toward
events or states of affairs (“Adam fears that he will flunk the
exam”). This means that we need to explain not only how we can
represent and recognize concrete objects invariantly, but also how
we can represent and recognize events or states of affairs. Fur-
thermore, in distinguishing mood from emotion by claiming that
emotions are moods with intentional objects (p. 62), Rolls allows
intentional states toward concrete objects; but elsewhere (p. 261)
he uses “intentional” in a non-standard way, to mean “states with
intentions, beliefs, and desires.” This latter formulation would
make most instances of emotions into moods, so presumably it is
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a mistake; it betrays his very strong emphasis on linguistic forms
of thought. This emphasis is surprising both for a connectionist,
and for an expert on emotion. It may also explain why he down-
plays the role of subcortical pathways for eliciting emotions (e.g.,
p. 104).
My criticisms are of Rolls’s theory of consciousness. It cannot
explain phenomenal experience; ironically, emotions offer the
best evidence for this. Affective experiences can be very different
(happiness is quite different in its experience than is fear) and can
admit of wide degrees of intensity (rage is much more intense than
annoyance). There is no place for either property in the higher or-
der linguistic thought (HOLT) theory of consciousness that Rolls
endorses. If I understand him correctly, qualia come in as first-or-
der thoughts, which are conscious when second-order thoughts
about them occur. This approach offers a reasonable explanation
of some notions of consciousness (e.g., reflective cogitation about
one’s symbolic cognitive states), but not of phenomenal experi-
ence. Rolls recognizes the distinction between phenomenal expe-
rience and other explicitly functional notions of consciousness
(pp. 244–45), but he also fails to respect it (thus, he erroneously
accuses Chalmers of inconsistency by comparing Chalmers’s dis-
cussion of awareness with Chalmers’s discussion of phenomenal
experience; see pp. 248–49 and the footnote on p. 249). His ar-
guments that HOLT accounts for qualia can be read as playing on
this ambiguity; for example, he argues that the HOLT system can
use sensory information to plan, and so sensory qualia should be
conscious (p. 251). But, for such use, sensory states need only be
conscious in that some symbol of them is active in the syntactic
system; this provides no explanation of why they would have the
phenomenal nature they do. Symbols, by definition, are merely to-
kened or not; thus, there is no magnitude for intensity to be had.
Also, prima facie, thinking about 2 and thinking about 3 should be
no different than feeling fear and feeling anger (all of them are
symbols tokened in the system and can act to help shape reflec-
tive cogitation like planning), whereas we know the former are not
significantly distinct experiences and the latter are.
Furthermore, Rolls argues that the symbols of the HOLT sys-
tem must be “grounded” in the world (p. 251) (he is attempting to
avoid the consequence that, say, a C compiler written in C and
compiling its own source code is therefore conscious). But this will
amount to an extraordinary kind of externalism concerning 
phenomenal experience; systems will be conscious not because 
of their individual structure alone but also because of their history
and context. Finally, HOLT is likely inadequate not just as an ac-
count of phenomenal experience, but also of self-awareness; Pan-
ksepp (1998a, p. 308) has observed that the coherent affects, in-
tentions, and activity of split-brain patients strongly counsels
against associating conscious awareness with any lateralized abil-
ity such as language, and rather suggests that the core of such
awareness lies in subcortical affective and motor processes.
Emotional networks: The heart 
of brain design
John C. Fentress
Department of Psychology, University of Oregon, Eugene, OR 97403.
fentress@is.dal.ca
Abstract: The concept of emotion as defined by Rolls is based upon re-
inforcement mechanisms and their underlying neural networks. He shows
how these networks process signals at many levels, through both separate
and convergent pathways essential for adaptive action. While many be-
havioral issues related to emotion are omitted from his review, he succeeds
admirably in summarizing both the “current state of the art” in single unit
analyses and in pointing out how future research directions may be crafted.
My reading of Rolls’s book is that of an ethologist, with a strong in-
terest in the temporal structure of behavior and its underlying
brain and developmental substrates. In ethology, motivation is of-
ten described operationally in terms of changes in responsiveness
to specific environmental stimuli (Hinde 1970). These changes al-
ter the selection and performance properties of individual actions
and their rules of combination in time (Fentress 1990; 1991). In
the present book Rolls reviews a number of underlying brain op-
erations that are highly relevant to these behaviorally defined con-
cerns. He views emotional behavior, with its base in the balance
between rewards and punishments, as being “at the heart of brain
design.” In a broad sense he echoes Darwin’s (1872) concern with
the expression of emotions, but with the analytical tools of mod-
ern techniques for single unit analyses of individual networks and
their combinatorial operations.
The text is not comparative in the ethological sense, but focuses
upon the primate brain as a model for human emotional expres-
sion. Nor is this the place to find a detailed phenomenological ac-
count of rules by which often conflicting action tendencies are in-
tegrated. Rather, Rolls takes the framework of objectively defined
rewards and punishments to demonstrate, for individual classes of
behavior, the various stages of neuronal processing that together
make effective action possible. He does this both in the sense of
action coherence and flexibility in performance. With respect to
the latter, Rolls borrows heavily from classical learning theory in
which associations between sensory and response events are me-
diated through positive and negative reinforcers. In the latter part
of the book (especially Ch. 8 on sexual behavior) he attempts to
anchor these associative and motivational networks into issues of
adaptive value and genetic selection.
Rather than review the whole book (which I admire) I shall con-
centrate upon a few themes and problems that I believe are
broadly relevant. One of the fundamental questions in brain-be-
havior design is how individual events (actions, neural pathways)
are both kept separate and combined in integrated action. A re-
lated question is how these events establish an adaptive balance
between stability and flexibility in performance properties. Each
question can be examined at a number of complementary levels,
and across multiple time frames. Often the answers are both time
frame and level dependent.
In many respects Rolls handles each of these questions ex-
tremely well. By documenting stages of processing for various mo-
tivational systems, such as hunger (Ch. 2) and thirst (Ch. 7), he
skillfully dissects the multidimensional nature of complex behav-
ior, with its separate pathways and converging operations. He
shows how basic (e.g., sensory) processes can remain invariant in
their properties while “higher-order” processing stages can be
modulated reversibly in time, and also demonstrates how associa-
tive mechanisms can lead to long lasting changes in performance.
For the ethologist much of this material may appear to be pre-
sented in a dense form, and I suspect that additional summary di-
agrams would have been helpful. This is particularly true for stu-
dents new to the area. However, the effort in reading produces its
rewards. Rolls demonstrates, through a number of lovely exam-
ples largely based upon work in his laboratory (nearly 100 refer-
ences to Rolls as first author alone!), how integrative dynamics in
the brain relevant to whole organism behavior can be traced in a
systematic manner.
My personal favorite chapter is number six. Here Rolls exam-
ines pharmacological and chemical substrates of reward and its
neural output systems, with particular reference to the basal gan-
glia. It is well worth thinking about these circuits in comparison to
dynamics often seen at the intact, freely behaving, organism level.
Take, for example, the following puzzle: brain circuits, as well as
behaviorally defined operations must on the one hand be isolable
(independent) and on the other hand joined together (integrated).
This means that systems have both self-organizing (intrinsic)
properties and rules of interaction that cross these systems. How
can brains do both of these things? This is not a simple dichotomy.
Rather it is a statement about the relative balance among intrinsi-
cally ordered and interactive processes that individually and col-
lectively are dynamically ordered (change in time) – but in a con-
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strained way! Indeed, it is precisely here, with these two organi-
zational polarities in action, that most ethological and many psy-
chological models of motivation find their fundamental puzzles
(Fentress 1991).
Without neurobiological data behavioral models must remain
abstract (and incompletely satisfying). They can, for example, be
expressed in “information space” terms. One such conceptualiza-
tion is to view integrative systems as consisting of core excitatory
processes and surround inhibitory processes. This means that a
given system tends to block the expression of other systems. Fur-
ther, going back to the early work of Tinbergen (1951) and others,
it is clear that many expressive systems in behavior can be either
broadly or narrowly focused (e.g., appetitive behavior versus con-
summatory acts, respectively). This dynamic focusing provides an
alternative view to static hierarchical models, in that the very
boundaries of a behavioral control system can be modeled in
terms of broadening and narrowing cores, and variably extending
lateral inhibitory pathways. The basic dynamic is that as systems
become more strongly activated, the selectivity in both response
to specific stimuli and details of action performance can become
narrowed (focused), insulated from disruptive inputs, and more
effective in blocking alternative forms of action (Fentress 1990).
Given the overall dynamics, multiply defined systems can either
operate independently, synergistically in combination, or antago-
nistically (via the shifting dimensions of core excitatory processes
and surround inhibitory processes, behaviorally defined).
But do brains actually do this? Certainly it is known that recep-
tive field properties are often of a center-surround nature, and
that these properties can be dynamically ordered (Gilbert 1995).
Through an impressive combination of raw data and modeling (cf.
Rolls & Treves 1998: a valuable companion text on neural model-
ing) Rolls and his colleagues are among those who have shown
how basal ganglia circuits might operate in adaptive action se-
quences. In brief, these circuits are seen to translate motivational
and cognitive processes into action. To do so they both collect con-
verging signals (e.g., from the cortex) and then separate these col-
lections through lateral inhibitory pathways in the process of re-
sponse selection. It would be interesting indeed to know whether
these “core” and “surround” properties have different relative
thresholds, for the behavioral data suggest that many behavioral
systems are broadly focused during early and weak activation, only
to become more tightly and narrowly structured in time, and with
stronger activation (Fentress 1991; 1999).
Obviously the jump between behavioral models of intact or-
ganism actions and neurobiological data on individual circuits re-
mains a large one, often involving at least tentative leaps of faith.
However, careful reading of Rolls’s book shows how the gap is be-
coming narrowed, at least in principle. What is particularly im-
portant is his explicit realization that behavioral and neurobiolog-
ical data are necessary complements. As Hebb pointed out many
years ago (Hebb 1949) it is problems of organization in behavior
that sets the most important questions for brain operations, and
brain operations that mediate the organizational processes seen at
the behavioral level.
We are still left with many basic conceptual as well as analytical
puzzles. For example, most dictionaries and laypeople define
emotion in terms of its affective (consciously experienced) prop-
erties, and this can seem a long way from the mechanics of brain
operation. To his credit Rolls attempts to grapple with issues of
consciousness (Ch. 9), through such linguistic maneuvers as
“thinking about thinking.” Indeed, he links conscious experience
within the linguistic system. I suspect this does injustice to the lay-
ers of conscious experience (e.g., being aware, aware that one is
aware, caring that one is aware, etc.), but one can see where his
arguments are going. I am personally not convinced that he or
other recent authors (e.g., Crick 1994) have succeeded in joining
the phenomenological aspects of awareness with its mechanical
underpinnings, but at the very least they have shown how brain
machinery can mediate the phenomenology of emotion and re-
lated mental states.
While the first chapters of this book are densely neurobiologi-
cal, the latter chapters, beginning with chapter eight on sexual be-
havior, offer a rather abrupt departure in both substance and style.
Indeed, chapter eight is largely sociobiological in its tone, with the
explicit intent to show how genes can code for adaptive perfor-
mance (defined in gene selection terms). Although I believe that
I understand the goal of this review (to link genes to adaptive per-
formance, and thus to emotional behavior) there is no real men-
tion of developmental trajectories that mediate these presumed
gene actions. These trajectories are themselves both isolable and
interactive, with both flexibilities and constraints that we are just
beginning to glimpse (Fentress 1991). It is not enough to say that
genes work, and for the most part work well. I have a personal re-
vulsion to classic separations of “innate” versus “learned,” “pri-
mary” versus “secondary” reinforcers and the like because these
dichotomous constructs completely bypass the puzzle of how
genes and experience join together, starting with the embryo. A
true evolutionary perspective cannot exist without attention to on-
togenetic molding of brain and behavioral events (cf. Hall 1992).
Perhaps my main critique of Rolls’s book is that some of its con-
ceptual underpinnings approach the tautological: animals do some
things more than others, and differential reinforcement can me-
diate these differences (but is also defined by the very behavioral
consequences they are presumed to produce!). Genes are oper-
ated on by natural selection, and in animals genetic differences in-
fluence brain and behavior, in presumably adaptive ways. To say
that animals do what they do because they are responsive to rein-
forcers which in turn have adaptive value, is more of a setting out
of puzzles than a solution to these puzzles. However, neither a sin-
gle author nor a single book can do everything. I suspect that the
present contribution by Rolls will be applauded by many scientists
interested in “the heart of” brain and behavior. It is my hope that
my ethological friends will also work through the book to see how
their interests and those of neuroscientists can converge in the fu-
ture.
Emotion theory?
Nico H. Frijda
Faculty of Psychology, Amsterdam University, 1018 WB Amsterdam, The
Netherlands. pn_frijda@macmail.psy.uva.nl
Abstract: The book contains a masterly review of Rolls’s single-neuron re-
search reflecting rewards. It places that research in the context of the neo-
behaviorist theory of emotions. That theory provides a useful first approx-
imation to emotion-eliciting conditions but has little to tell about emotions
as motivational states or response dispositions: nor does it give a rationale
for what are considered to be primary rewarding stimuli.
The emotion theory that serves as background for neurological ex-
ploration is a version of the neo-behaviorist reinforcement theory
of emotions of Millenson (1967), Mowrer (1960), and Gray (1987).
Emotions are seen as the outcomes of positive and negative re-
wards or reinforcements, primary or secondary. Different emo-
tions depend upon delivery, termination, or omission of these re-
inforcements, their intensity, and upon availability of responses. It
is a sound theory, as far as it goes. In some form or other, the
scheme is fairly generally accepted. In its basic assumptions it re-
sembles cognitive emotion theory, in which “primary appraisal” is
what turns stimuli into primary or secondary reinforcements, and
“secondary appraisal” represents the cognitive processes respon-
sible for detecting the various contingencies. Rolls’s theory also
shares with most current theories the adaptational view: emotions
exist for dealing with major adaptational dilemmas. Pleasure and
pain (or reward and punishment) serve as common currency in
goal priority fixings. Emotions allow goal-oriented, that is, flexible
behavior instigation by relevant events, instead of mere rigid fixed
action patterns.
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The behaviorist scheme has a certain utility for ordering the
data on emotion instigation, as well as for ordering neurobehav-
ioral findings and guiding research. The book, for instance, pro-
vides suggestions for different functions of the establishment of
emotional appraisals (centered around the amygdala) and the cor-
rection of existing appraisals (centered around the orbitofrontal
cortex), with both types of processes showing different parame-
ters. And of course the detailed and careful review of the ad-
mirable research tracing the effects of “rewards” through the cor-
tex, as well as that concerning the processing of facial identity and
facial expression, are fascinating, also for the emotion theorist.
At the same time, there is much that leaves such a theorist puz-
zled and dissatisfied. This applies first of all to the central notion
of reward. Emotions are defined as “states elicited by rewards and
punishments”; rewards and punishments are defined as stimuli
the individual will work to obtain or to avoid. The states thus are
defined in terms of their antecedents and (certain of) their con-
sequents. No consequences are described, either of emotional
states in general or of those corresponding to the different con-
tingencies. No characterizations are given of the states them-
selves. This also applies to “reward.” Neither reward nor the re-
sulting states are defined in terms of process or of functional
properties, other than a possible ultimate learning effect. How can
an effect upon future learning serve as a common currency?
There is thus no indication of what it means to have received a
reward when no response has as yet been evoked. It remains un-
clear how an emotion can be motivating and constitute a goal, af-
ter the eliciting stimulus has disappeared (as, for instance, in sad-
ness); nor is there a discussion of possible neural consequences
given the different reinforcement contingencies, or how and
where they influence response selection.
In part this is due to a basic trait of the neobehaviorist model,
namely, its being focused upon operant learning. No reference is
made to the evidence for innate emotion-specific and species-spe-
cific behavioral programs and “expressive” behaviors, or their un-
derpinnings in the brain. “How does the brain produce behavior?”
remains an unanswered question, both in the emotion theory and
in the review and interpretation of neuropsychological findings.
This extends to the absence of discussion of the mechanisms for
motivation and attention regulation. By “motivation” I here un-
derstand, as does Rolls, the states of latent response readiness, the
orientation towards behavior to come and towards stimuli to ob-
tain or avoid. For that, others developed the notions of tonic readi-
ness for action (Pribram 1981), activation (Gray 1987), seeking
(Panksepp 1998a), or “action readiness” (myself). Such notions
seem indispensible for understanding the persistence in efforts at
reaching goals, as well as for distinguishing the phenomena usu-
ally referred to as “emotions” from those of mere like or dislike (as
evident in preferences or quantities consumed). They are also in-
dispensible for understanding the occurrence of undirected, “ex-
cited” behaviors and unspecific physiological arousal, or the split
between liking and wanting that Berridge (1999) has experimen-
tally demonstrated. It also seems unsatisfactory to subsume all
forms of non-response under the one heading of non-reward, in-
stead of distinguishing, at the basic process level, true non-reward
or extinction, punishment-instigated response suppression, re-
sponse postponement, and response inhibition, which may (or
may not) suggest brain provisions for effort and inhibition.
I also think that identifying “reward” (that is, pleasant events)
as originating in primary reinforcing stimuli is unsatisfactory.
Many rewarding conditions do not fit the notion of “stimuli.” In-
stances include “altruism,” “courtship,” and “solving an intellec-
tual problem” that occur in the (somewhat gratuitous) listing of
primary reinforcers on pp. 272–73. Obviously, conditions for
whatever in those domains corresponds to primary reinforcers are
complex and of unknown neural structure. Moreover, many re-
wards may not come from evolutionary determined stimulus sen-
sitivities, but from the completion of actions; this, too, would seem
to require different sorts of neurological theorizing.
Furthermore, certain emotional states are independent of the
occurrence of rewards or punishments, for instance, many moods
and the joys of young animals that underlie rough-and-tumble
play. Emotions may not just equal the instigations for solving adap-
tational dilemmas. They are, I would say, instigations for main-
taining or changing relationships with the environment, whether
for solving adaptational dilemmas, for fitting in with elementary
social satisfactions, or for answering relational urges that just are
part and parcel of certain biological autonomous systems.
These issues surrounding “reward,” innate forms of behavioral
instigation, and motivational phenomena are essential in under-
standing emotions, but remain mysteries in the emotion theories
that are limited to a reinforcement basis. The lacunae are clear in
the somewhat embarrassing chapter on sexual behaviour, reward,
and brain function. It is for this reason that I think the book’s title
is not well chosen. The title of Rolls’s previous book, The brain and
reward, was both more modest and more appropriate, as it would
have been for this volume.
Structuring an emotional world
Jordan Grafman
Cognitive Neuroscience Section, National Institute of Neurological Disorders
and Stroke, National Institutes of Health MSC 1440, Bethesda, MD 20892-
1440. jgr@box-j.nih.gov intra.ninds.nih.gov/mnb/cns/index.html
Abstract: Rolls emphasizes the role of emotion in behavior. My com-
mentary provides some balance to that position by arguing that stored so-
cial knowledge dominates our behavior and controls emotional states,
thereby reducing emotions to a subservient role in behavior.
Rolls has written a very stimulating book that led me to rethink my
opinion about how emotions interact with behavior. As a result, I
have chosen to focus my comments on a particular interest of mine
– the relationship of emotion to knowledge stored in the human
prefrontal cortex – that is discussed in several places in his book
including Chapters 4, 9, and 10.
I do not take issue with much of Rolls’s description of the role
of emotions in behavior but I do dispute the importance of emo-
tion as conceived by Rolls. Rolls shows that emotions are states,
have adaptive value because of their labeling of appropriate and
inappropriate actions through reinforcement and punishment,
and are a motivational force in obtaining the goals of the organ-
ism. Rewards and punishments are seen as the goals for which the
organism develops action plans. While these claims may hold for
primates, there is room for argument if Rolls wants to extend this
characterization of the role of emotions to humans. In a nutshell,
my point of view is that emotions are prone to instability, given the
multiplicity of cues in our environment eliciting excitation and in-
hibition. The activation of stored social knowledge stabilizes and
structures the world so we may navigate through it without de-
pending on the immediacy of emotional reaction (Grafman 1995;
Partiot et al. 1996). Therefore, while emotion may color the can-
vas, the scene is painted by cognitive knowledge.
The human prefrontal cortex plays an important role in inter-
acting with brain structures concerned with emotion. For exam-
ple, as Rolls points out, there are direct connections between 
orbitofrontal cortex and the amygdala in the primate. Neu-
roanatomical connectivity while specified for the monkey (Barbas
1995) is much less specified for humans, which leaves a “neu-
roanatomical hole” in which a number of speculative inferences
may fall. It is relevant to an understanding of the relationship be-
tween emotion and cognition that the human orbitofrontal cortex
also has many connections to and from dorsolateral prefrontal cor-
tex and other association areas besides limbic structures.
There is evidence from the human cognitive neuroscience lit-
erature that the prefrontal cortex can be subdivided into regions
that are concerned with mechanistic versus social cognition, with
adaptive versus predictive behavior, and with fine versus coarse
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coding of knowledge (Grafman et al. 1995). My own view is that
the prefrontal cortex stores knowledge that is abstracted from on-
going events (such as thematic features) and that this knowledge
would include both semantic information and grammatical rules
(Grafman 1995). Recent research suggests that the right pre-
frontal cortex stores information that needs to be abstracted across
events (i.e., coarse coding) such as themes and morals (Nichelli et
al. 1995). The left prefrontal cortex stores the individual event
(fine coding) characteristics that make up a structured event com-
plex (SEC) and the grammatical structure of events (Nichelli et al.
1995). The ventromedial prefrontal cortex appears concerned
with storing domain specific social knowledge whereas the dorso-
lateral prefrontal cortex is concerned with storing domain specific
non-social knowledge (Partiot et al. 1995). Frontopolar and ante-
rior lateral prefrontal cortex appear particularly important for
storing events occurring in ill-structured environments whereas
medial prefrontal cortex appears particularly important for stor-
ing events in well-structured environments (Koechlin et al. 1999).
It is my contention that these forms of distributed knowledge,
when linked together, make the major contribution in managing
our day to day plans, allowing for conceptual understanding, and
structuring our social behavior.
Individual social experience is unique, although clearly cultur-
ally shaded, which makes the ventromedial prefrontal cortex the
seat of the most individual of knowledge stores. I agree with Rolls
that there is a genetic contribution permitting social knowledge
that is dependent upon a sequence of events to be stored in the
prefrontal cortex (i.e., the ability to abstract knowledge from trains
of events). I would add, however, that the identity of the specific
social memories stored in prefrontal cortex must be driven by ex-
perience and are not constrained by genetics. The encoding, con-
solidation, and retrieval of these social memories are selectively
disrupted by focal lesions in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex
(more on this below). How might this proposed social knowledge
system interact with emotional states?
Emotions are states that are bound to, and modulated by, social
knowledge. Since social knowledge activation quite frequently
may have to be sustained from minutes to hours, this sustained ac-
tivation must provide an inhibitory input to the neural structures
governing emotional states in order to modulate the emotional in-
put that is required to maintain the necessary motivation to attain
a long term goal. The goal I am referring to, however, is an event
that is stored as part of a structured social event complex in the
ventromedial prefrontal cortex (Grafman 1995). It is the activa-
tion of a structured social event complex that inhibits, modulates,
and otherwise dictates the intensity of the emotional states we ex-
perience. This inhibition serves to put off immediate gratification
(that is dependent upon the magnitude and intent of immediate
sensory input) in favor of long-term goals.
Contrary to one of Rolls’s arguments, I believe there is little ev-
idence to suggest that we need a ventral visual system to provide
the appropriate input for planning future actions because, for ex-
ample, blind humans do quite well in developing and executing
social plans stored in ventromedial prefrontal cortex.
What happens when the prefrontal cortex is damaged in hu-
mans and its inhibition of emotional reaction is reduced? The pa-
tient becomes more likely to respond to environmental provoca-
tion from objects or faces or the ramifications of a single (as
opposed to more complex) thought. This dependency on the mo-
ment has negative consequences that are characterized by in-
creased aggression, inappropriate sexual content in social interac-
tions, and a dramatic susceptibility to distraction (Dimitrov et al.
1996; Grafman et al. 1996; Rueckert & Grafman 1996; Sirigu et
al. 1995; 1996). Patients begin to rely on the present because they
have difficulty accessing the social plans and rules that insure that
they remain on-task towards achieving one or more goals. Deficits
in social behavior following frontal lobe lesions are not simply a
response to changes in reinforcement contingencies. Patients with
prefrontal lesions are also impaired in retrieving the stored rules
of behavior which, when activated, provide a counterpoint to the
vicissitudes of emotionally laden reinforcement contingencies.
There is also evidence that some patients whose social behavior is
inappropriate are nevertheless able to use verbal systems to artic-
ulate what the appropriate social behavior would be in a particu-
lar situation. This observation indicates that social behaviors are
made up of a fabric of cognitive processes with each component
process contributing to the whole of the behavior and subject to
selective impairment (Sirigu et al. 1998). So although emotions
can serve to modulate the activity of a structured social event com-
plex, I would argue that emotions are more typically restrained by
the execution of social behavior (which not only represent emo-
tionally arousing activities but also more mundane plans such as
preparing a routine breakfast or taking the bus to work – while
these latter structured social event complexes include goals, they
are hardly the stuff of instant reward and punishment scenarios).
Humans live in environments that vary between their being 
ill-structured and well-structured (Goel et al. 1997). Human
thoughts and ideas likewise may vary between the ill-structured
and the well-structured. Under most circumstances, humans
strive to structure the world around them and their thoughts
through planning and understanding. If emotion merely modu-
lates the structuring of our behavior, have we over-emphasized its
importance in social behavior in contemporary cognitive neuro-
science relative to the role that knowledge stored in ventromedial
prefrontal cortex plays in human social cognition?
As scientists, we often take risks and chances, and challenge the
established point of view in order to evoke change. If the neural
structures governing our emotions are intact, could we still deter-
mine that taking a risk is worthwhile when the structured social
event complex that contains the knowledge that is required to
make that determination is unavailable? My answer is, no. In my
view, emotions are like fire and water, good servants but bad mas-
ters. The ventromedial (and dorsolateral) prefrontal cortex by
storing knowledge based upon the coding of structured social
event complexes insures that social knowledge can dominate our
behavior and control emotional states which reduce emotions to a
subservient but contributing role in civilized behavior.
Adaptive accounts of physiology 
and emotion
Alasdair I. Houstona and John M. McNamarab
aSchool of Biological Sciences, bSchool of Mathematics, Centre for
Behavioural Biology, University of Bristol, Bristol BS8 1VG, United Kingdom.
{a.i.houston; john.mcnamara}@bristol.ac.uk
Abstract: Rolls discusses various adaptive explanations of physiological
processes and the emotions. We give a critical analysis of some of these
from the perspective of behavioural ecology. While agreeing with the ap-
proach adopted by Rolls, we identify topics that could have been better
presented by making use of the existing literature.
Rolls presents a stimulating account of the physiological basis of
emotions within an evolutionary context. A general strength of the
book is a stress on the complexity of the environment on which se-
lection has acted as compared to the environment of the labora-
tory. We believe that an integration of causal and functional ac-
counts of behaviour can only be achieved if this distinction is kept
in mind when constructing models. We cannot expect animals to
behave optimally in any particular environment that we provide for
them. What we might expect is that natural selection will have pro-
duced rules that perform well in the range of environments in
which evolution has occurred (e.g., Houston & McNamara 1989;
McNamara 1996; McNamara & Houston 1980). Such rules may
perform poorly in some environments – the preference for sweet
but non-nutritive substances (Rolls, pp. 69–70) is a well known ex-
ample. As Rolls points out, in a complex environment, relatively
fixed relationships between the world and behaviour are unlikely
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to be adequate. The animal will need some general flexible proce-
dure, and Rolls makes the case for emotional states as a part of this.
Although we agree with Rolls’s general aims, we feel that his dis-
cussion of adaptive explanations is not always as thorough as it might
be. Despite mentioning the danger of plausible stories (p. 219),
there are places where little or no justification is given for an adap-
tive explanation (e.g., Table 10.1). There are also cases in which an
offered explanation may be incorrect. For example, on p. 66, Rolls
mentions sensitivity to a change in the rate or magnitude of rein-
forcers. He suggests that it is adaptive to increase work rate when
the rate of reinforcement is increased. It has been shown, however,
that an increase in the availability of food should not necessarily re-
sult in an increase in the optimal level of foraging effort (Abrams
1991; Houston & McNamara 1989; McNamara & Houston 1994).
The adaptive arguments proposed in the context of emotion
need to be fleshed out before they can be evaluated. On p. 69, it
is suggested that communication is one of the functions of emo-
tion: “Communicating emotional states may have survival value,
for example by reducing fighting.” There is a vast literature on this
issue, none of which is mentioned by Rolls. The application of
game theory to animal contests was originally seen to imply that
animals should not communicate their intentions to their oppo-
nents (e.g., Caryl 1979). This position has been modified by sub-
sequent work. Enquist (1985) demonstrated that the honest com-
munication of intentions during a contest could be evolutionarily
stable. There is now a general theory of honest signalling (Grafen
1990; see Hauser & Nelson 1991; Johnstone 1997, for reviews).
Moving from the specific case of fighting to emotions in general,
is it obvious that animals should accurately signal their emotions?
Trivers (1971) raised the possibility that emotions play an impor-
tant part in promoting and maintaining co-operative behavior.
Frank (1988) develops a general account of emotions as honest in-
dicators; for an example see Frank (1989). We believe that the
time is ripe for the investigation of adaptive physiological mecha-
nisms (see Houston & McNamara 1999 for further discussion).
Rolls provides much of the basic information necessary for such
an enterprise. As a simple example, consider the increase in mo-
tivation following a recently obtained reward. Rolls mentions that
this positive feedback prevents the animal from rapidly switching
between activities. Switching would be costly if it takes time or en-
ergy to change from performing one activity to performing an-
other, so positive feedback can be seen as adaptive given switch-
ing costs. Positive feedback has been analysed from a causal point
of view by McFarland and McFarland (1968) and Houston and
Sumida (1985). A functional analysis of how costs should influence
switching is provided by Larkin and McFarland (1978). The next
step would be to predict the design of a motivational system that
would respond appropriately to a range of environments in which
the costs of switching differed.
Reinforcement, emotion, and consciousness
Carroll Izard1
Department of Psychology, University of Delaware, Newark, DE 19716.
izard@udel.edu
Abstract: Rolls presents a good integrative summary of the neural bases
of emotions, adds new findings and insights, and takes a stance on contro-
versial issues such as separate or distinct brain systems for processing emo-
tion information and for planning and action. This commentary raises
questions about his explanations of emotion activation, response to nov-
elty, the evolution of emotions, and the phenomenal experience of emo-
tions in human consciousness.
Drive, reinforcement, and emotions: What the book is about.
Although Rolls’s book features emotion in the title, it mainly con-
cerns the traditional concepts of reward and reinforcement, and
motivation as it relates to internal homeostatic processes or drives
triggered by internal need-related signals such as glucose concen-
trations in blood plasma. When Rolls does turn to emotion, he still
writes mainly about reinforcement, for he defines emotions as
mental states elicited by reward and punishment. Or more for-
mally (as he sees it), emotions derive from instrumental reinforc-
ing stimuli.
In contrast to Damasio (1994), Rolls offers some evidence and
argument for separate or distinct brain systems for assessing the
reinforcement value of a stimulus or processing emotion informa-
tion (orbitofrontal cortex) and for planning and executing actions
(dorsolateral prefrontal cortex). In contrast to LeDoux (1996), he
argues that the brain has to process stimuli (in neocortical sys-
tems) to the object level to learn reinforcement associations and
generate emotion. Thus, according to Rolls, LeDoux’s subcortical
route (thalamoamygdala, “low road”) to emotion (which some of
us thought might help explain unlabeled emotion feelings) con-
cerns exceptions to the general rule, particularly in humans and
nonhuman primates.
Emotion activation. Appraisal, cognitive-behavioral, and bioso-
cial theorists will likely find problems with Rolls’s definition of
emotions and his explanation of their activation. He explains emo-
tion activation in terms of the valence of the reinforcer and the re-
inforcement contingency. He claims that this principle can explain
many emotions though he provides formulas for only five, if you
disregard synonyms. His explanation certainly seems to have the
advantage of simplicity. Yet it may prove deceptively complex,
considering the six possibilities for sequencing the presentation or
withholding of positive and negative reinforcement and the differ-
ent combinations of these sequences.
Still, these formulas do not comprise exclusive rules for the ac-
tivation of any emotion. For a general example, Rolls’s reinforce-
ment rules do not explain changes in emotion or mood due to pe-
riodic changes in hormone levels. For a specific example, consider
the rule that guilt results from the presentation of a stimulus that
both rewards and punishes. Many challenging endeavors (e.g.,
climbing Mt. Everest) that offer numerous rewards and punish-
ments may have nothing to do with guilt. Reports from those who
succeed in reaching the peak make no mention of guilt experi-
enced along the way. Research on non-egoistic helping behavior
(Batson 1990), also suggests that the stark hedonism of Rolls’s po-
sition may not capture significant components of human behavior.
Moreover, research with children suggests that punishment in re-
sponse to a child’s enjoying something forbidden (e.g., bullying an-
other child) may elicit fear or anger (not guilt) and have a poor
chance of contributing to the development of conscience and
moral behavior. Parental behavior that models empathy for the
victim and directly induces guilt in the child works better (Hoff-
man 1975; Zahn-Waxler et al. 1979).
Rolls’s theory of emotion activation does not address the elicita-
tion of emotion through modeling or contagion. A number of stud-
ies with human children and young nonhuman primates have
shown that parental modeling of an emotion response (e.g., the ex-
pression of fear) provides a means of learning to avoid a dangerous
stimulus (fear) without ever directly experiencing it (Mineka &
Cook 1984; Sorce et al. 1985). In the animal studies, fear condi-
tioning occurred as feral reared macaque mothers modeled fear of
a snake to their laboratory reared juveniles. That the laboratory set-
ting probably provided few previous opportunities for modeling
fear behavior makes it difficult to use reinforcement history to ex-
plain the results. Accepting Sacket’s (1966) evidence of the juve-
niles’ innate ability to decode and respond appropriately to adult
expression of fear is a more parsimonious explanation and coheres
with the concept of the primacy of emotions in evolution and con-
tradicts Rolls’s notion of language primacy (discussed later).
Although Rolls gives rather attractive descriptions of the rein-
forcement conditions that result in emotion activation, we might
wonder why we would need emotion concepts at all if we could
describe affective states of mind more objectively without them.
The case for the more objective route might be stronger were it
not possible to quibble with almost any of Rolls’s formulas for
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emotion activation. For example, it is reasonable, as he proposes,
that anger might result from the omission of a positive reinforce-
ment and the possibility of an active behavioral response. How-
ever, if the positive reinforcement were critical to health or well
being and its accessibility remote, fear might occur. Research with
human participants shows a great flexibility in emotion system re-
sponses to life’s contingencies.
In summary, Rolls’s theory of emotion activation certainly has
the solid behavioristic (s-r) framework that has long served all
those branches of behavioral science that depend on models in-
volving classical and instrumental conditioning and the concepts
of primary and secondary reinforcement. In emotion research, in-
vestigators use these concepts in animal models much more fre-
quently than in work with humans. Yet, Rolls’s hard science model
has the advantage of offering new possibilities for quantifying and
manipulating hypothesized antecedents of emotions (valence and
sequence of reinforcing stimuli) and thus may attract a number of
emotion researchers.
Emotional and non-emotional explanations of response to
novelty. Rolls makes highly attractive as well as puzzling proposi-
tions in his treatment of animals’ (particularly primates’) re-
sponses to novelty. Having a long-standing concern with this sys-
tem, conceived as the emotion of interest, I delighted in Rolls’s
explication of its neural substrates. He found neurons in the amyg-
dala that respond to novel or relatively novel stimuli that have no
association with reward. Whereas I would have rejoiced in having
discovered the neural basis for the innate positive emotion that
drives exploration and much of learning and creativity, Rolls de-
clares that the initial response to novelty does not have the qual-
ity of an emotion because it is a response to a novel stimulus that
has no reinforcement history. He does not consider the more par-
simonious position that novelty serves as an innate activator of in-
terest, which operates as emotion or motivation. Inability to in-
corporate such an important source of motivation into the
conceptual framework for emotions seems a serious limitation of
Rolls’s reward-dependent theory.
Rolls’s explication of response to novelty does not seem as clear
or straightforward as other aspects of his theory. Although his the-
ory dictates that the initial response to a novel stimulus cannot
comprise emotion, the novel stimulus leads the monkey to “reach
out for and explore the objects, and in this respect the novel stim-
uli are reinforcing” (p. 105). These seem like self-contradictory
propositions and they provide no explanation of the critical initial
response to novelty.
Rolls goes on to say that the interest-relevant “amygdala neu-
rons . . . operate as filters which provide an output if a stimulus is
associated with a positive reinforcer, or is positively reinforcing be-
cause of relative unfamiliarity.” Of particular significance to those
of us who define positive response to novelty in terms of an innate
emotion called interest, Rolls goes on to say (p. 106) that “the
functions of this output may be to influence the interest (empha-
sis added) shown in a stimulus.” This is precisely the function
some of us have ascribed to interest operating as an emotion (Izard
1977; Renniger & Wozniak 1985). Rolls makes persuasive argu-
ments for the adaptive advantage of a mechanism that drives in-
terest or exploration.
Meta-cognition, consciousness, and emotion feelings. Rolls
also moves into the middle of a controversy in his theory of con-
sciousness and its application to understanding emotion. He pro-
poses a theory, admittedly speculative and philosophical, which
explains consciousness as a function of higher order thoughts
about lower order thoughts, or meta-cognition. Feelings emerge
because it “feels like something for a machine with higher-order
thoughts to be thinking about its own first- or lower-order
thoughts” (p. 249). He thus makes consciousness and feeling de-
pendent on language, or at least on meta-cognition involving syn-
tactic manipulation of symbols. Rolls’s theory, like a number of
similar ones, may help explain introspective or reflective con-
sciousness or self-consciousness.
However, Rolls’s theory makes assumptions superfluous to the
explanation of consciousness as subjective experience or emotion
feelings. Why should the subjective experience of emotion require
meta-cognition? Obvious adaptive advantages accrue from the
generation of emotion experience as a direct function of sense per-
ception and lower order cognition (e.g., feature detection). For ex-
ample, fear (and avoidance behavior) activated by the mere de-
tection of critical features of a biologically prepared stimulus
(predator, rapidly looming object, dangerous height) might prove
essential to survival.
Rolls’s position implies that my feeling of joy at a long-delayed
reunion with a good friend requires that I think about the thought
(or experience) of seeing my friend. This circuitous route to emo-
tion is imparsimonious. In denying direct awareness of feelings ac-
tivated by the recognition of a friend’s smiling face and requiring
higher order thoughts about lower order thoughts to experience
joy (or any other feeling), Rolls’s theory seems to miss the spon-
taneity of emotional life. Though Rolls declares that the requisite
meta-cognition involves only syntactic manipulations of symbols,
and not necessarily lexical symbols, verbal language seems implied
in his arguments on the necessity of thoughts about thoughts. In
any case, this necessary condition means that all forms of thinking
other than meta-cognition and all sense perception take place out-
side of consciousness as Rolls defines it.
Most philosophers from Husserl forward hold that all con-
sciousness is consciousness of something and always posits or in-
tends an object (McCulloch 1994). Thus, first order nonreflective
thoughts and attentional processes enjoy consciousness (Chalmers
1996). If this were not true, we would have to assume a state other
than consciousness for much cognition and action and for all
things like the highly skilled and rapid actions of those in the per-
forming arts and professional sports. The execution of movements
like those required by a Chopin etude for piano or a Bach con-
certo for violin or striking a 150 kph ball with a bat or the center
of a racquet allows no time for thoughts about the thought of mak-
ing the next move. The intrusion of meta-cognition into such cere-
bellar-dominated and virtually automatic movements would
doubtless disrupt or destroy the performance. So, reflective con-
sciousness does not accompany these acts. Yet, if we do these acts
truly outside of consciousness (“unconsciously”), how come we
can recall aspects or even details of the performance at will?
Do you really have to think about the thought of having stubbed
your toe in the dark (or any unanticipated trauma) before feeling
pain and anger? Human infants express distress and anger to
unanticipated pain long before they demonstrate syntactic ma-
nipulation of symbols (Izard et al. 1987). Children cannot com-
prehend syntactical operations until about 16 months, show them
in speech production until about 18 months, correct their own
speech (rudimentary meta-cognition?) until about 24 months
(Bretherton et al. 1981) or demonstrate genuine meta-cognition
until about age four or five years. Thus according to Rolls’s theory,
the young child has no conscious experiences and hence no feel-
ings. Yet, much research shows that infants and toddlers express
and detect a wide range of emotions and show clear signs of re-
sponding in terms of the motivation inherent in emotion (Izard et
al. 1995; Termine & Izard 1988). Much other behavioral and psy-
chological research makes an even stronger case for inferring
emotional experiences in three- to five-year-old children. The
adaptive advantage of the power of emotion to motivate responses
to challenging contingencies seems to call for a parsimonious
route to its activation and presence in consciousness.
To Rolls’s credit, he repeatedly admits that he engaged in spec-
ulation about “the great mystery” that has puzzled philosophers
for centuries – why and how do certain types of neural processing
come to feel like something (p. 244). Or as others have put it, how
does perceiving, thinking, and acting, or behaving like a cognitive
agent result in consciousness? After studying Rolls’s position and
reviewing some others, one could reach the conclusion, perhaps
implicit in Rolls’s book, that this domain might yield equally as
well, or better, to the methods of philosophy as to those of sci-
ence.
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Emotion, language, and evolution. Given his theory that con-
sciousness and emotion feelings depend on meta-cognition, Rolls
does not surprise us by surmising that the language system may
have evolved before emotions. Two factors make this an unlikely
scenario. First, since Darwin, investigators have continued to find
evidence for the evolution of universal emotion expressions (Ek-
man et al. 1972; Izard 1971; 1994), and it seems quite plausible
that expressive signals (facial and vocal) constituted the first “lan-
guage” system in phylogeny. Rolls, like other theorists, specifies
communication as one of the functions of emotions. The signifi-
cance of emotional communication in mammalian social life and
the importance of emotions as motivation constitute argument for
their primacy in evolution. Both common observation and a con-
siderable body of research show that in ontogeny emotional (ex-
pressive-signal) communication precedes language by as much as
a year (Izard et al. 1995). Expressing emotions as a form of com-
munication probably requires less complex brain systems than
syntactic manipulation of symbols or verbal language. It seems
plausible that selection pressures acted directly on emotions.
Emotions can be considered, in part, as a set of special sensory sys-
tems with a very broad range of sensitivities to environmental con-
tingencies and mechanisms for communicating about them.
Second, a number of other functions assigned to emotions by
Rolls and other theorists (e.g., flexibility of behavioral responses,
social bonding, regulation of perception, learning, and memory)
seem sufficiently pivotal in mammalian life to give emotions pri-
macy in evolution. It would probably be impossible to show, for
example, that social bonding could occur or that the attachment
behavioral systems operate in preverbal children on the basis of
reward systems independent of emotions. Students of these pro-
cesses explain them largely in terms of emotions.
NOTE
1. I am indebted to Carroll Izard II for comments and discussion on
philosophical theories of consciousness and to Thomas R. Scott for a crit-
ical reading of the manuscript and helpful suggestions.
Emotion, representation, and consciousness
Leonard D. Katz
Department of Linguistics and Philosophy, Massachusetts Institute of
Technology E39-245, Cambridge, MA 02139. lkatz@mit.edu
Abstract: Rolls’s preliminary definitions of emotion and speculative re-
striction of consciousness, including emotional sentience, to humans, dis-
play behaviorist prejudice. Reinforcement and causation are not by them-
selves sufficient conceptual resources to define either emotion or the
directedness of thought and motivated action. For any adequate definition
of emotion or delimitation of consciousness, new physiology, such as Rolls
is contributing to, and also the resources of other fields, will be required.
The affects are those [psychobiological states] in-
volving pleasure or distress those affected by which
are changed in ways that affect their judgments and
decisions.
Aristotle, Rhetoric II,1:1378a20–22
I mean by affects [psychobiological states] such as
anger, fear, shame, and appetitive desire, all that
normally involve conscious intrinsic pleasure or dis-
tress.
Aristotle, Eudemian Ethics II,2:1220b12–14
The affects are set apart by pleasure and distress.
Aristotle, Eudemian Ethics II,4:1221b36–37
Rolls, like Aristotle in these passages, casts his net wide, including
in the subject of his book and in his definitions of emotion (ignor-
ing, as he does later, their tentative first refinement excluding 
drives and appetites, p. 65) the full range of affective states that
have also, broadly speaking, cognitive and motivational roles.
After defining emotions roughly as “states elicited by rewards
and punishers,” (p. 61), Rolls shifts to “states produced by instru-
mental reinforcing stimuli” to provide “an operational definition
of what causes an emotion.” (p. 61) There will, however, be many
organic states that rewards or reinforcing stimuli produce in or-
ganisms, such as fluid repletion, that are not themselves emotions.
And, similarly, there are many relatively pure sensory and cogni-
tive states so caused, including some the neural basis of which
Rolls at length describes, that are not emotional, even in Rolls’s
broad intended use, even when they figure in the causation of
states that are. We thus do not have a complete definition or even
a sufficient condition for the intended class, but at most a partial
functional specification of the causal role that the kind of states in
question characteristically have in the psychological economy of
organisms. More is needed to pick out the intended affective
states from the ones that are more purely informative about the
world or not psychological states at all. The cheap and easy way to
do this is to bring in operationally undefined affective or motiva-
tional concepts, such as Aristotle’s pleasure and pain or the related
Aristotle-descended notions of appraisal and evaluation, which
Rolls rejects as imprecise and operationally undefined. But it
seems Rolls’s preferred concepts, those of behaviorist psychology
plus that of causation, are not up to the job.
Rolls’s equation of intentional states’ directedness upon objects
with their being “produced by stimuli or objects” (p. 62) is a re-
lated point at which a facile behavioral-cum-causal analysis of a
behaviorally unreduced psychological notion will not do. A child
may love Father Christmas or fear the bogeyman without these
emotions having been caused by their nonexistent objects (Bren-
tano 1874). And even where the object does exist and plays some
appropriate causal role, mere appeal to causation will not distin-
guish which item in an emotion’s typically long and wide causal
history the object of the emotion is. This must enter its causal his-
tory in just the right way, through a complex chain of processing
and representations of the kind that Rolls’s and related scientific
work is so usefully beginning to explain, to become its intentional
object. Nothing less than a fairly complete account of how this is
done and of what makes a state play the distinctive role of an af-
fective state in it – since just as not everything in the causal his-
tory of an emotion will be its object, not just anything or even any
representational state an object causes will represent it – will al-
low us to dispense, at an advanced stage of the inquiry, with the
unanalyzed notions of emotion, object of thought, and goal of ac-
tion that Rolls apparently believes can be identified in behavioral
and gross causal terms at its very start. Any such account will have
to specify the level of generality at which the relevant representa-
tions function so that not “[t]he emotion-provoking stimulus” but
the attainment of the object or class of rewards it represents can
become “a goal for action” (p. 65) in an affectively motivated way.
The same behaviorist prejudice that lurks in the background of
these definitions seems to infect also the discussion of con-
sciousness in Chapter 9, but it is now restricted to such animals
as do not have the symbolic, syntactic, and thinking-about-
thought capacities that most adult humans do. To be sure, non-
linguistic animals (like infants and many stroke patients) cannot
tell us about their experiences. But that amounts to little without
the concurrence of neurological or developmental evidence, for
which philosophical speculation is a poor substitute. The proces-
sors handling syntax are not the only ones capable of flexibly or-
ganizing complex sequences of behavior (think of those organiz-
ing instrumental motor behavior) or of representing its progress
through time. Indeed, the cognitive maps we share with Tolman’s
rats are likely used to do this in a manner more accessible to our
consciousness than the workings of the processors handling lin-
guistic syntax are. And the indications of right hemisphere ad-
vantages in emotional domains and of emotional blunting and ne-
glect after right but not left hemisphere strokes of right, more
than left, hemisphere involvement in emotion should at least give
one pause before ascribing the consciousness of emotion to the
generally left hemisphere syntactic processors. Neurology should
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provide abundant material for more specific testing of Rolls’s and
related suggestions, if they become specific enough to become
testable – and guidance in making them so – as will comparative
and developmental psychology, on which see Hauser, 1996, pp.
597–608. If we are to progress beyond Aristotle in our overall un-
derstanding of emotion, we must heed his advice that care in psy-
chological-level functional characterization as much as in physi-
ology is necessary to the progress of this science (Aristotle, De
Anima I,1:403a25–b11).
Reinforcement and punishment: Dissociable
systems for action and emotion?
Simon Killcross
Department of Psychology, University of York, Heslington, York, YO10 5DD,
United Kingdom. ask1@york.ac.uk www.york.ac.uk/depts/psych/
Abstract: Rolls presents a theory of emotion based on the premise that
emotions are evoked by events that are capable of being instrumental re-
inforcers and punishers. As support for this theory is drawn almost entirely
from experiments in non-human primates, valuable insights into the rela-
tionship between punishment and reinforcement systems, and the nature
of instrumentality, may have been overlooked.
Rolls’s book presents an impressive battery of information con-
cerning the study of reward processes in animals. When mention-
ing reward processes here I do so with the intention of highlight-
ing what appears to be the central concern of The brain and
emotion. Rolls provides an interesting and informative review of a
large body of recent work examining the nature of brain responses
to rewarding stimuli, much of it derived from his own experiments
examining single-cell responding in primates. This work is with-
out doubt of the highest quality and has produced a wealth of de-
tail concerning the likely systems underlying the responses of var-
ious brain regions to stimuli that are reinforcing.
A central tenet of the book is that events that produce emotions
are those that are reinforcing or punishing (or at least capable of
being shown to be reinforcers or punishers). Whilst there is much
to recommend this stance, it would appear to have several conse-
quences. First, it is immediately apparent that because of the na-
ture of Rolls’s work with primates, much of the argument con-
cerning the role of punishment in emotion must be made by
analogy. With good cause there is little, if any, work on aversive
motivational systems in primates, and notable exceptions (e.g.,
Mirenowicz & Schulz 1996) tend to use aversive treatments that
are extremely mild, such as a puff of air to the hand.
It is a shame then that Rolls’s decision to rely largely on primate
literature means that much work looking at punishment systems
in other laboratory animals receives little discussion. Perhaps
Rolls considers this work to be of lesser importance with respect
to human emotion. But surely in the absence of other information
it is worth taking into account. That is especially important when
one considers the nature of psychological theories examining ap-
petitive and aversive motivational systems.
The tacit assumption of Rolls’s theory is that the two systems
share a more or less common neural substrate involving the or-
bitofrontal cortex, amygdala, and various output routes. Indeed
there is little in Rolls’s own work or in The brain and emotion to
suggest that the two systems might rely in any way on different
processes. However, there are clearly other data at odds with this
position. Work examining the role of the amygdala in fear condi-
tioning in non-primates has shown that lesions of the amygdala
produce, by several measures, a complete abolition of this form of
stimulus-reinforcement (to use Rolls’s term) learning. However,
no such effects are found in the appetitive domain. Lesions of the
amygdala, in non-human primates and rats, appear to produce no
deficits in the formation of simple associations between stimuli
and rewards, but rather in higher-order manifestations of such as-
sociations such as those found in second-order conditioning and
conditioned reinforcement procedures.
This difference is glossed over in sections dealing with the amyg-
dala (Ch. 4) with the conclusion that “there is thus much evidence
that the amygdala is involved in responses made to stimuli that are
associated by learning with primary reinforcers” (p. 101). But per-
haps there is good cause to think that there may be more to the ob-
served differences in empirical findings than meets the eye.
One approach might be to suggest that the findings regarding
amygdala lesions in non-primates is due to their lack of develop-
ment of frontal regions, which in primates allow orbitofrontal
mechanisms to subserve many of the functions perhaps usually de-
volved to the amygdala, that is, there is redundancy in the system
if it is sufficiently well developed. Unfortunately this cannot ac-
count for the differences observed between appetitive and aver-
sive tasks in non-primate species following amygdala damage.
Why might the lack of frontal development manifest itself as
amygdala-dependent deficits in aversive, but not appetitive, tasks?
A second approach might be to say that the current theories of
amygdala function – namely that the amygdala is the site of for-
mation of stimulus reinforcer associations – fails to capture fully
the nuances of changes in emotional processing that result from
damage to this region.
A positive consequence of Rolls’s definition of emotion is that it
brings into sharp relief the difference between feelings and emo-
tions. The operational definition of emotional states as being cre-
ated by events that can act as reinforcers or punishers immediately
removes us from the clouding issues of what, if anything, the phe-
nomenology of these emotional states might be. However, this ap-
proach merits further examination. Rolls considers emotions (as
opposed to mood states) as things that take or have an object, and
are thus intentional states (p. 62). This is consistent with the idea
that emotionally-significant events are those that can act as the ob-
ject of a goal-directed action, but one must here be explicit that
one is then considering theories of instrumental action based on
intentionality. In Tolman’s (1959) terms, a response is the product
of a means-end-readiness (belief or expectation) about an envi-
ronmental contingency and a valence (desire) for a particular out-
come. Hence emotional states come to be evoked by events that
possess such a valence.
Rolls hints throughout his work that he is talking about goal-di-
rected actions, or the product of action-outcome (A-O) associa-
tions rather than stimulus-response (S-R) habits. However, de-
spite a willingness to employ definitions based on reinforcement
contingency there is little explicit attempt to analyse behavioral
tasks employed by primates in this way. What is a discrimination
reversal if not a change in A-O contingencies? Once more there is
an accumulation of evidence that such systems are not unique to
primates (e.g., Balleine & Dickinson 1998) and again work in the
field of emotion would benefit immensely from a greater dis-
course between primate and non-primate research.
The essential roles of emotion in cognitive
architecture
Kevin B. Korb and Ann E. Nicholson
School of Computer Science and Software Engineering, Monash University,
Clayton, VIC 3168 Australia. {korb; annn}@csse.monash.edu.au
www.csse.monash.edu.au/~annn/
Abstract: Rolls’s presentation of emotion as integral to cognition is a wel-
come counter to a long tradition of treating them as antagonists. His educ-
tion of experimental evidence in support of this view is impressive. How-
ever, we find his excursion into the philosophy of consciousness less
successful. Rolls gives syntactical manipulation the central role in con-
sciousness (in stark contrast to Searle, for whom “mere” syntax inevitably
falls short of consciousness), and leaves us wondering about the roles left
for emotion after all.
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Recent thinking has trended against a 2,500 year tradition in West-
ern thought to regard emotion and cognition as antithetical.
Socrates, for one, praised the reflective life of the mind (his 
injunction: “know thyself”) and denigrated the body (and its emo-
tions) as an interference. Christianity further magnified the dis-
tance between reflective cognition (soul) and degenerate emo-
tion, until it was thought nearly axiomatic that emotion and
cognition were related only in being antagonistic. In the last cou-
ple of decades, more and more dissonant voices are being heard
however: in philosophy, Ronald De Sousa (1987) has argued that
emotions are integral to cognition; in neuropsychology, Antonio
Damasio (1994) has argued that a flat affect, caused by neurolog-
ical damage, invariably leads to defective decision making, with
people unable to value their options. And Rosalind Picard’s recent
book Affective Computing (1997) would have been thought ludi-
crously titled by most computer scientists not long ago.
Nevertheless, the traditional dichotomy between cognition and
emotion is clearly reflected in the history of AI and it still remains
dominant. AI paradigms such as “rational agents” (Russell &
Norvig 1995) and connectionism (Rumelhart et al. 1986) make lit-
tle or no use of emotions. Much of the recent AI work on affec-
tive agents has been aimed at building more engaging human-
computer interfaces, rather than developing an underlying
emotional intelligence (Bates 1994; Maes 1995). One of the main
messages of Rolls’s and related research is that emotions are in-
trinsic to intelligence: they are not some “lazy Susan” of spices to
be sprinkled on top after the hard work of cognition has been com-
pleted, as most AI work assumes.
Rolls attempts a comprehensive survey of the neuroscience and
psychology of emotion. His foundation is a neurophysiological
story of how positive and negative reinforcement shape behaviour
through operant conditioning, through association learning of sec-
ondary reinforcers and through such mechanisms as sensory-
specific satiety – a diminution of reinforcement from repeated
sampling of a single type of stimulus. Rolls draws upon a rich ex-
perimental literature, particularly in the study of feeding (Ch. 2)
and drinking (Ch. 7) behaviour, demonstrating strong intercon-
nections between cognition (identification, planning), reward, and
emotions. Furthermore, this story is well balanced by the plausi-
bility of the corresponding evolutionary “why” story, that is, of evo-
lutionary explanations of the functions subserved by these brain
mechanisms. (In passing, we point out that in dealing with sexual
behaviour in Ch. 8 the balance is lost: the stories of evolutionary
psychology and sociobiology dominate and the experimental tra-
dition largely disappears. Perhaps the experimentalists simply find
sexual behaviour unrewarding to study?)
In Chapter 3, “The nature of emotion,” Rolls outlines his the-
ory of emotions and compares it with contending theories. The
key idea is that emotions mediate states bearing utility (e.g., con-
scious states of pain and pleasure) and actions intended to bring
about or avoid such states (p. 60). We believe this is a fundamen-
tal and important point. It explains the defective decision making
in the neurological cases of Damasio: if the target reward state is
not immediately available, and if the mediating emotional state is
absent, then there is no goal for planned actions to be directed to-
wards. From this central role the functions of emotion commonly
mentioned appear to flow naturally. Of the nine functions of emo-
tion Rolls discusses, for example, the central one of enabling flex-
ible behaviour, beyond reaction to immediate rewards, is nearly a
direct consequence. So, too, the role of emotion in initiating de-
cision making and action (motivation, arousal). This is, of course,
connected to the elicitation of autonomic and hormonal responses
that Rolls emphasizes. This is also related to the apparent role of
emotion in rendering some objects salient, and in general in fo-
cusing attention (an aspect of emotion that Rolls oddly overlooks).
The exact relation between these is, however, not clear: how ex-
actly do arousal, attention, and the initiation of decision making
relate? It would have been interesting to see what Rolls would
make of this question; unfortunately, it is not raised.
Although architectural details relating emotional states, plan-
ning, beliefs, and so on, are mostly lacking, Rolls nevertheless pre-
sents a reasonably clear picture of the inter-relation of emotion
and cognition in the first eight chapters. We believe it seriously
undermines Griffiths’ thesis (1997) that the simpler emotions (“af-
fect programs”) are isolated from cognition. This clear picture, un-
fortunately, unravels during Rolls’s subsequent excursion into the
philosophy of consciousness (Ch. 9).
Following Rosenthal’s higher-order thought (HOT) theory
(Rosenthal 1990) Rolls holds that the distinguishing feature of
consciousness is that first-order thoughts (e.g., about the world)
become objects of a higher-order thought (e.g., a belief about the
first-order thought). But Rolls insists that the thoughts and meta-
thoughts must be more than that: they must have an explicit syn-
tax; the correct HOT must be HOLT (higher-order linguistic
thought) in order to account for complex planning and the ability
to correct such plans. In consequence, all of the above emotional
processing, mediating reward and action, must be fundamentally
pre-conscious or unconscious. And, its apparent role in complex
planning is at least greatly vitiated. Emotional feelings are con-
scious, but that is only because the emotional states somehow be-
come the object of linguistic representations. This line of thought
leads Rolls to doubt that nonhuman animals are conscious, except
perhaps primates, whose linguistic capacities are in doubt. It ap-
pears that the sharp duality of emotion and cognition has simply
re-emerged as a duality between emotion and consciousness. It is
ironic that the distinguishing feature for consciousness according
to Rolls – syntactic (meta-)processing – is precisely what Searle
(1980) argued was radically insufficient for consciousness.
We do not believe that HOLT is a well-considered theory of
consciousness. It seems odd that, after arguing for a deeper role
of emotions in planning and decision making than usual, Rolls dis-
misses as evidence of consciousness what are commonly taken as
paradigmatic, such as suffering, joy, and so forth. Regarding emo-
tional processing in nonhumans, Rolls says (p. 257) “animals are
often thought of as performing optimally on some cost-benefit
curve. . . . This does not at all mean that the animal performs a
cost-benefit analysis.” There are after all many possible ways of be-
having as if doing a cost-benefit analysis. Quite right. By the very
same token, however, evolution may well have produced any num-
ber of mechanisms other than an explicit syntax for representing
the world and so also for representing such representations in the
brain. If some nonhuman animal is using such representations to
plan and meta-representations to correct its plans, it is clearly
thinking. Denying then that it is conscious merely because in hu-
mans consciousness is normally accompanied by language appears
unjustifiably anthropocentric.
A sharp duality between emotion and cognition, the implicit
and explicit, non-symbolic and symbolic, and reactive and planned
behaviour appears to be nearly ineluctably seductive, in the end
seducing even Rolls, who set out to contest it. If we accept this
new dualism, it leaves us with the question of what to do with emo-
tions: if syntax is both necessary and sufficient for complex plan-
ning (i.e., emotional processing is not necessary), it must be suffi-
cient also for the simpler planning using emotional processing.
Whence then the need for emotions? What evolutionary story is
left for their development? We prefer to suggest that syntax is nei-
ther necessary nor sufficient for complex planning.
In AI, it has become clear that some hybrid of the two parallel
approaches to planning is necessary; that is, calculating optimal
policies over a complex state space is often too complex, so rely-
ing on heuristic intervention has become of interest. Yet hybrid
systems that handle both normative computations and reactive
needs imposed by a hostile environment have been difficult to de-
sign. Incorporating the functions of emotion identified by Rolls
(prior to Ch. 9) into AI architecture, with their role in the devel-
opment of flexible responses, directing attention, and initiating
decision-making appears to be an important challenge for all AI
researchers, and not just those in the “affective agent” community. 
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A taste of things to come
Jerald D. Kralik and Marc D. Hauser
Department of Psychology and Program in Neurosciences, Harvard
University, Cambridge, MA 02138. {bach; hauser}@wjh.harvard.edu
www.wjh.harvard.edu/~mnkylab
Abstract: Rolls uses evolutionary theory and behavioral learning theory in
his analysis of emotion. We believe that both theories are greatly under-
utilized, leaving an incomplete description of the nature of emotion and
its neural foundation.
Two of the theoretical frameworks used by Rolls are evolutionary
theory and behavioral learning theory. Both of these theories
should play important roles in neuroscience, and Rolls should be
commended for integrating them. We believe, however, that his
use of both theories still falls far short of their potential contribu-
tions to the understanding of emotion and the brain.
Throughout the book, Rolls attempts to provide ultimate ex-
planations for neural mechanisms. Although this use of evolution-
ary theory is important, there is almost no attempt to consider al-
ternative hypotheses, or to propose specific tests that would
enable researchers to assess the explanatory power of each hy-
pothesis. For instance, evolutionary speculations are offered for
many of the proposed functions of emotion (see sect. 3.1.5). It is
suggested, for example, that grief and sadness may be adaptive in
motivating an individual to stop responding to a reinforcer that
may no longer be available (e.g., a lost family member). However,
could the emotions of grief and sadness be adaptive for other rea-
sons, and if so, how would one experimentally test between these
alternatives? Consider, for example, the possibility that grief and
sadness motivate an individual to increase responding to a rein-
forcer whose continued availability is uncertain (e.g., working to
keep a mate from abandoning you or heightening parental care for
a seriously sick infant). Moreover, could such emotions be a 
consequence of some other adaptation such as the affiliative emo-
tional bonds that exist between kin? To test between these alter-
native hypotheses, one could propose comparing the neurophysi-
ology of different species that have different mating systems,
levels of parental care, or kin networks, exploring the ontogeny of
emotional responses of individuals to attachment and loss, and
running experiments to assess the fitness consequences of partic-
ular emotional states.
Rolls’s evolutionary explanations are commonly summoned af-
ter the fact, providing de facto justification for a particular neural
process. However, the power of Darwin’s theory, and its subse-
quent adaptation by behavioral ecologists and evolutionary psy-
chologists, has been to generate, a priori, specific hypotheses
about the functional architecture of the brain in a comparative
context. For example, consider work on the orbitofrontal cortex, a
target structure in Rolls’s analysis. Electrophysiological and lesion
studies suggest that the primate orbitofrontal cortex decodes the
reward value of stimuli, and rapidly learns (and relearns) associa-
tions between stimuli. Because the orbitofrontal cortex is much
more developed in primates, one is then led to explore the so-
cioecological factors that might have contributed to the need for
rapid association learning in primates. Rolls suggests that dynamic
foraging requirements (eating over 100 varieties of fruit) and dy-
namic social relationships may have been two such factors. The
critical issue, though, is whether these socioecological hypotheses
were generated first, helping to uncover the role of the or-
bitofrontal in rapid-learning, or whether these explanations were
provided after the fact. The logical order of these ideas in the book
suggests the latter. Surprisingly, Rolls does not consider, for ex-
ample, research in behavioral ecology conducted over fifteen
years ago that predicted, a priori, that there would be differences
in the brains of frugivores and folivores, nor does he consider the
comparative neuroanatomical findings that have confirmed this
prediction (see Allman 1999; Clutton-Brock & Harvey 1980).
We agree, along with many other scientists, that evolutionary
theory should play a leading role in uncovering the workings of the
brain (for general reviews, see Allman 1999; Deacon 1997; Pinker
1997). Indeed some terrific work has already demonstrated the
powerful influence socioecological factors have on brain structure
and function, and how an understanding of these factors can help
generate predictions about the brain. Such work includes predic-
tions of relative hippocampal volume of voles, parasitic cowbirds,
and cacheing birds, based on these species’ particular mating sys-
tems and foraging strategies (reviewed in Sherry 1997; Hauser
2000). The same approach can also illuminate our understanding
of the emotional systems of the brain. As an example, consider the
functions of the primate orbitofrontal cortex. Because natural se-
lection is most likely to have shaped significant new developments
from already functioning older ones, we need to determine how
the system was built to determine precisely how it is working. For
a complete understanding of the relevant functions of the or-
bitofrontal cortex, then, we need to answer the following evolu-
tionary questions. What part of the emotional system was already
in place before the evolution of the orbitofrontal? Was rapid-
learning conducted in any of these structures before the evolution
of the orbitofrontal? When the orbitofrontal evolved, did it take or
modify components of the original emotional system, or were only
new components added? Which homeotic genes were replicated
and modified to produce the orbitofrontal cortex? What particu-
lar developmental processes increased the size of the orbitofrontal
and modified projections to and from it? Did the orbitofrontal
evolve relatively independently, or did it come with other struc-
tures, such as the dorsolateral prefrontal? Did rapid-learning
evolve in another way in some other species, without the evolu-
tion of the orbitofrontal? To answer these questions, comparative
analyses must be conducted of (1) species with progressively
evolved orbitofrontal cortices, (2) distantly related species with
similar social, mating or foraging demands, and (3) closely related
species with different social, mating or foraging demands.
Rolls appropriately emphasizes the importance of behavioral
learning theory for understanding the neural basis of cognition,
behavior, and emotion. Unfortunately, however, Rolls sometimes
ignores earlier developments in behavioral theory. As an example,
consider some of Rolls’s definitions of operant behavior (see sects.
1.2 and 3.1.2, for instance). Rolls equates punishment, punishers,
and negative reinforcers, and states that “a punishment is some-
thing an animal will work to escape or avoid.” (p. 3). However, over
80 years of behavioral research shows the importance of distin-
guishing between many of such concepts that Rolls equates. Pun-
ishment is the decrease in the likelihood of a response as a result
of the response being followed by an aversive stimulus (i.e., a
“punisher”; see Dickinson 1994; Mazur 1997). In punishment,
one ceases to do something in order to escape or avoid an aversive
stimulus. Negative reinforcement, on the other hand, is the in-
crease in the likelihood of a response as a result of the response
being followed by the termination or omission of an aversive stim-
ulus (in this case termed a “negative reinforcer”). Thus, in nega-
tive reinforcement, one does something to escape or avoid an
aversive stimulus. By not using these well-established definitions
in the book, numerous inaccuracies arise that confuse more than
clarify (e.g., see quotation above). Moreover, distinctions sup-
ported by behavioral research, such as the difference between
punishment and negative reinforcement, may be maintained at
the neural level, and thus should not be abandoned by neuro-
science.
Rolls’s treatment of emotion is clearly important and is leading
us toward a true understanding of the phenomena involved. How-
ever, the description of emotion itself in the book is inconsistent
and vague. Several times emotions are defined as “states elicited
by rewards and punishers” (p. 60), at least twice as “consist[ing] of
cognitive processing which results in a decoded signal that an en-
vironmental event (or remembered event) is reinforcing, together
with the mood state produced as a result” (p. 62), and at least once
as “responses elicited by reinforcing signals” (p. 125), even though
it is said that “response[s] . . . are produced by emotional states”
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(p. 67), and that “there is no necessary link between performing
actions and emotion” (p. 60). Are the reinforcer selection (i.e., the
“decision” of which reinforcer to respond to) and response selec-
tion mechanisms considered to be part of emotion, or are they in-
fluenced by emotion? Autonomic and endocrine responses can-
not be a part of the definition, if Rolls is to avoid a bodily theory
of emotion. Further, what precisely is meant by “cognitive pro-
cessing” in the definition? For example, consider a subordinate
rhesus monkey’s fear response to a conspecific face. The percep-
tual processing of the face would presumably not be part of the
emotion, so does the cognitive processing mechanism(s) corre-
spond to the firing of populations of orbitofrontal and amygdala
neurons to the face? Or is there some further cognitive process-
ing that corresponds to, for instance, activity in the dorsolateral
prefrontal cortex or hippocampus? What precisely, then, is the re-
sulting “mood state”? Given the strong arguments for the exis-
tence of mechanisms for reinforcer decoding, working memory,
reinforcer selection, and response selection, the book has not
made it clear why the concept of “state” need be invoked at all.
Reward: Wanted – a better definition
Irving Kupfermann
Center for Neurobiology and Behavior, Columbia University, New York, NY
10032. ik7@columbia.edu
Abstract: Rolls’s book depends significantly on a definition relating emo-
tion to reward and learning. This definition confuses two separable con-
cepts, and may result in the exclusion of notions of emotion and motiva-
tion from lower animals that may possess limited learning capacities. A
more useful definition might revolve around the notion that emotions are
states that function to optimize the performance of behavior.
The main problem I see with Rolls’s book concerns the definition
of emotion and its relation to reward. In fact, the book might be
more properly entitled “The vertebrate brain and reward.” To un-
derstand the problem of definition, consider the following de-
scription. A food deprived animal has been inactive but now de-
tects chemicals indicating the presence of food. It begins to
locomote, periodically pausing and sampling the environment and
sometimes changing directions. The behavior persists until the
food source is reached. Contact with the food, evokes a complex
autonomic response involving an increase in heart rate, blood
pressure, and other autonomic responses. The food object is ma-
nipulated toward the mouth, at which time a series of bite/swal-
low responses occur. The rate and intensity of the bite/swallow re-
sponses initially increases, reaches an asymptotic value and then
as the animal continues to ingest food, the rate and intensity of the
feeding responses decrease until the animal no longer responds to
food, and becomes inactive. It sounds as if this animal possesses a
motivational state akin to that of hunger, and that the presence of
food, evokes something akin to that of an aroused emotional state.
But by the definitions developed by Rolls, it is inappropriate to an-
alyze this situation in terms of emotions.
The animal I prefer to in the above example, is the mollusc
Aplysia (Kupfermann 1974), an organism that exhibits numerous
forms of behavioral plasticity of feeding behavior (Kupfermann et
al. 1989), but which appears to have a very limited if not totally ab-
sent capacity to learn arbitrary responses when “rewarded” by mo-
tivationally relevant stimuli. Rolls seems to use the notion of re-
ward and reinforcement interchangeably. It would seem to make
more sense to use the term reward in its vaguely anthropomorphic
sense as something “pleasurable or painful” and whose contingent
presentation alters the probability of the occurrence of somewhat
arbitrary responses. (I say somewhat arbitrary, instead of arbitrary,
as used by Rolls, since the responses that can be modified by re-
ward, are not as arbitrary as it might seem, but instead represent
a relatively restricted class of responses. A given reward can alter
the probability of some responses, but not others). The term re-
inforcement can then be reserved for stimuli which evoke behav-
ioral responses that serve to maintain (or terminate) the stimuli,
irrespective of whether the stimuli alter behavioral responses in
the future.
By this definition, food stimuli are reinforcers for food-deprived
Aplysia. Rolls rejects this definition since he wishes to eliminate
taxes, tropisms, and reflexes. By limiting his definition to stimuli
which can mediate learned responses, Rolls confuses emotional
behavior and learning processes. This provides him the opportu-
nity to review his extensive research on reward systems whether
or not they are tied to emotional responses. Are we to believe that
a severely memory and learning impaired individual no longer can
experience emotions? Show this individual a snake and they will
likely exhibit behavioral indices indicating the emotion of fear.
And yet they may be totally incapable of learning and acquiring ar-
bitrary responses to terminate the stimulus (for example pushing
a “help” button).
Studies on invertebrates have clearly shown that elements of
motivational states and/or emotional responses are features of al-
most all complex organisms. What then is the essence of such a
primitive function. To my mind the key to emotion is that it is a
state (not necessarily evoked by a stimulus, since it can occur spon-
taneously) that functions to optimize the performance of ongoing
or likely-to-occur behavior, particularly behavior that is best exe-
cuted quickly or energetically. These preparatory responses are
needed to optimize the nervous system as well as the periphery
(i.e., muscles and sensory apparatus) for the different behavioral
requirements needed for various responses that can occur at var-
ious rates and with different combinations of movements. An in-
tensively studied example is that of food-induced arousal in
Aplysia, which involves the release of diverse modulatory sub-
stances at muscles and at central synapses (Kupfermann et al.
1997; Weiss et al. 1993). The actions of the modulators at central
and peripheral sites serve to alter the dynamics of muscle con-
tractions that occur at different rates for behaviors involving dif-
ferent responses all engaging the same set of muscles in the ani-
mal. This approach towards motivation and emotion is clearly
related to the notions of Frijda (1986) and others who argue that
emotions are related to a change in action-readiness. Rolls rejects
this idea because certain well-learned and routine responses ap-
pear not to be associated with an emotional response. This objec-
tion is readily countered by restricting the action-readiness to
those behaviors that require, or are likely to require, very strong
actions or rapid switching between one type of behavior to another
type.
The advantage of dissociating the concepts of emotion from
those of learning is that it permits the separation of two related
but not necessarily intertwined concepts. It allows the study of
emotional behavior in lower animals and fosters mechanistic evo-
lutionary comparison between all organisms. What Rolls may see
as simple reflexes in lower animals often involves very sophisti-
cated behavior patterns and behavioral “choices,” and the complex
behavior of higher animals conversely can involve some rather
fixed and inflexible responses. Emotions, like other behavioral ca-
pacities, evolved from basic functions performed by very simple
nervous systems.
Aside from the specific problems with the treatment of emo-
tions there are also a number of general (albeit secondary) prob-
lems. Using the classification scheme of the author (Fig. 3.1), my
particular emotional feeling state evoked by reading this book ap-
pears to reside in the quadrant defined along the dimensions of
ecstasy, elation, and pleasure along one dimension, and of rage,
anger, and frustration along the other dimension. On the one hand
the book is a creative, stimulating, and provocative exposition of
data and ideas; but on the other hand it is full of excessive repeti-
tion and has numerous virtually incomprehensible sentences that
appear never to have been read by an editor (with the possible ex-
ception of the chapter on sex, which seems to be a noticeably eas-
ier read than the rest of the book).
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On the behavioural interpretation 
of neurophysiological observation
Donald R. J. Laming
Department of Experimental Psychology, University of Cambridge,
Cambridge, England CB2 3EB. drjl@cus.cam.ac.uk
Abstract: Examples of terror generated by an aircraft disaster, of human
courtship behaviour, and of the application of laboratory techniques to the
commercial training of animals suggest (1) that emotion is simply the sub-
jective counterpart of (objective) motivation (so that separate brain mech-
anisms would be an embarrassment) and (2) the apparent involvement of
reward and punishment is a consequence of the excessively narrow range
of experimental procedures used and has no foundation in the design of
the brain.
In the English language there is “motivation” and “emotion” and
it is widely presumed that these two words categorise two differ-
ent kinds of notion. Rolls (p. 60) proposes “that emotions are
states [of mind] elicited by rewards and punishers” and later “A
third function of emotion is that it is motivating” (p. 68). In this
commentary I outline a much simpler relationship between mo-
tivation and emotion and, at the same time, a more profound
one.
At 7:13 a.m. on Thursday, 22nd August, 1985, British Airtours flight
KT328 to Corfu was just taking off from Ringway Airport, Manchester.
As the aircraft was gathering speed along the runway, seconds before
actual take-off, the port engine exploded, puncturing the fuel pipe, wing
tanks, and fuselage, and setting the aircraft on fire. The take-off was im-
mediately aborted. But the fire spread to the interior of the aircraft
within a matter of seconds, producing dense smoke and panic. Notwith-
standing that the emergency services were alongside the aircraft within
seconds of the explosion, 55 passengers were burnt beyond recognition;
82 escaped. (Davenport et al. 1985)
Testimony from survivors does not mention anything about “re-
wards and punishers” – the survivors were simply terrified. At the
same time, they tried to escape – in fact, they panicked. This
episode suggests this much simpler relationship between motiva-
tion and emotion: the circumstances of the aircraft disaster gen-
erated the motivation to escape, and that motivation was experi-
enced by the passengers as terror. Speaking generally, motivation
is a state that may be inferred from objective observation of a per-
son’s behaviour; emotion is the subjective experience of being mo-
tivated. If I observe an animal searching for food, that animal is
motivated. If I am searching for food myself, I am hungry. The
hunger is my subjective experience of being (objectively) moti-
vated to search for food.
This idea has three immediate implications:
1. We do not need separate brain mechanisms for emotion – in
fact, their discovery would be an embarrassment. The brain mech-
anism for an emotion is the brain mechanism for the correspond-
ing motivation.
2. The question “Why do we have emotions?” needs no answer.
If there be no feeling of emotion, there is no motivation and with-
out motivation (to find food, to nurture the young) the species
ceases to exist.
3. The idea that reward and punishment are mediated by spe-
cific brain mechanisms must also be discarded, but this is far from
obvious and needs another example to put the point:
A pretty fair-haired girl wearing a clinging grey shift dress and Doc
Martens boots is walking down Great Western Road, Paddington, on a
hot summer afternoon. As the camera follows her it repeatedly swings
round to catch the many other people in Great Western Road, mostly
young men, who turn round to watch the girl as she walks by. Two work-
men look out of an upstairs window and one draws the other’s attention
to the girl. Four young men seated at a pavement cafe turn round in
their seats as she passes. Another young man coming the other way
turns round as he passes the girl and visibly says “Wow!” The girl smiles
back. (Bromhall 1994)
This was the title sequence to the first program in a TV series
entitled The Sexual Imperative and it demonstrates two views of
young heterosexual men watching a girl walking down the street.
There is the personal view which each has of his own internal feel-
ings (“She’s a very nice girl. I’d like to date her!” – and the viewer
will also have his personal view) and there is the camera view that
everyone else, especially the camera, has of that young man’s head
turning to watch the girl as she walks by. Two views of the same
behaviour – very different in character – nevertheless, they go to-
gether in point of time and place.
That video sequence generates these further points.
4. The head-turning is almost mechanical, as if the bystanders
were so many rod puppets. There is no reward – just a quasi-me-
chanical response to the image of the girl. When the girl smiles
back, that could be (and often is) the beginning of that long-
drawn-out two-way interaction we call courtship. The notion to be
taken on board is that each adult member of the species (any an-
imal species) is equipped with a repertoire of innate behaviour
patterns sufficient to ensure, by interaction between adults, the
replacement of natural losses through death. Sexual motivation is
the engagement of those behaviour patterns: love, jealousy, frus-
tration, and so on, are the subjective emotional counterparts.
5. Quasi-mechanical behaviour is by no means specific to sex,
nor to humankind. Breland and Breland (1961) reported some no-
table failures of laboratory techniques applied to the training of
animals of some 38 different species for commercial purposes.
They could train a pig to put a (wooden) penny in a piggy bank,
but the behaviour subsequently broke down. A racoon could be
trained likewise, but give him two coins and he would do no more
than rub them together. If the stimulus situation engages some in-
nate behaviour pattern, that is what you get, and rewards prove in-
effective.
6. The idea (Rolls, Ch. 10) that reward and punishment are
built into the structure of the brain is therefore misconceived. Re-
ward and punishment have acquired the status that they have in
this manner.
Suppose you are studying learning in a sub-human species. You
cannot give your subjects a list of paired associates and must there-
fore build the relationship to be learned into a task that the ani-
mals can perform. To make them perform typically requires both
that they be motivated (e.g., hungry) and the provision of some
stimulus of corresponding motivational significance (i.e., food),
obtainable following successful performance of the task. It is not
that the animals do not learn without motivation and reward –
they do (e.g., latent learning, Thistlethwaite 1951) – but that they
will not perform, and without the performance the learning can-
not be observed. The psychological function of reward is there-
fore to create a task of motivational significance which will engage
some instinctive behaviour pattern (e.g., seeking food), a pattern
subject to modification by what the animal has learned.
The question whether performance of the task is, or is not, “re-
warding” is neither here nor there. It happens that nearly all the
tasks used in animal laboratories (i.e., classical and operant condi-
tioning paradigms) fit into a response-reward pattern, but many
other things that animals do in their natural state do not. The func-
tion for which Rolls (Ch. 10) seeks a foundation in brain design is
actually a characteristic of the very narrow range of tasks used in
animal laboratories. The idea that psychologists’ choice of experi-
mental paradigms has representation in the animals’ brains is too,
too much!
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Emotion, cognition, and free representation
Eoghan Mac Aogáin
Linguistics Institute of Ireland, 31 Fitzwilliam Place, Dublin 2, Ireland.
eoghan@ite.ie www.ite.ie
Abstract: The representation of events, in primates at any rate, is a sep-
arate process from their emotional evaluation. The same holds for cog-
nitive evaluation. Here too representation and evaluation are separate 
operations. Acknowledging the symmetry leads to the notion of free rep-
resentation.
Although The brain and emotion (Brain) contains very few direct
criticisms of alternative views, it is one of the most important cri-
tiques of cognitive science yet to appear. With its companion vol-
ume, LeDoux (1996), it gives us a comprehensive account of eval-
uative and emotional states that succeeds in treating them strictly
on a par with cognitive states. It breaks out of the one-dimensional
account of information that generally prevails in cognitive science,
in which the phenomenon of intentionality (aboutness, informa-
tion, representation, reference) is linked primarily, if not exclu-
sively, to belief-forming processes.
Emotions become secondary phenomena in the one-dimen-
sional account, mere primers or consequences of cognition. Now
we have an enlarged notion of information that serves not only
cognition but also a whole family of attitude-forming processes
that have nothing to do with the formation of beliefs but only with
the maximization of reward.
But there is an unresolved conflict in Brain, between extraverted
and introverted treatments of emotion. The extraverted treatment,
based on animal learning paradigms and expected values, shows us
the emotional system locked into the constancies and contingen-
cies of the external environment in order to maximize reward.
Emotion, revealed in the amount of work an animal is prepared to
do to bring about the valued state is a separate process from per-
ception of that state (p. 47). Rolls demonstrates again and again,
particularly in the chapters on hunger and thirst, that evaluation is
delayed to ensure that the eventual emotional states are just as “in-
formed” about the external environment as correct beliefs are.
The introverted view is based on the self-stimulation paradigm,
and brings with it the idea that an animal who wants food may also
be said to want a particular kind of internal event (p. 24, in italic).
The latter may even be called the representation of reward (p. 32)
in the brain. This is entirely consistent with Rolls’s abstract notion
of representation (p. 77), but it is nonetheless problematic. In the
case of hunger, for example, I would prefer to say that the only
thing represented is food. Hunger is the behavioural disposition,
analysed in marvellous chemical and anatomical detail by Rolls, to
seek the food out and eat it. But nothing in the execution of the
disposition is a representation of anything but rather an effect of
representation.
I expected Rolls to treat consciousness as an intentional state,
as he did with emotion (p. 62), and to deal primarily with con-
sciousness of things, the world of perception in particular. But the
introverted paradigm prevails, and Rolls goes inward, virtually
equating consciousness with the abstruse topic of qualia. The
chapter on sex goes to the opposite extreme, outwards and back
into sociohistory, but does so for the same reason, namely that it
largely abandons the extraverted perspective, rooted in the per-
ception of the immediate environment. I was uneasy about the
connectionist appendix also, since it reinstates the one-dimen-
sional, cognitive model that is so effectively challenged in other
parts of the book.
Perhaps Rolls’s necessary preoccupation with emotion has re-
sulted in a reduced notion of perception, expectation, memory
and the other processes that are tuned not to reward but only to
truth or reality. Contrary to what Rolls suggests (e.g., p. 86), ex-
pectations, even in rodent learning, are not keyed to stimuli or to
physical properties of things but to events (see Rozeboom 1960).
And in primates, and possibly other species as well, there is a clear
separation of content-maintaining processes in perception from
those that subsequently fix conviction and lead to behaviour. We
can accept that perception is “impenetrable” to a degree (Pylyshyn
1999), but behaviour is generally tuned not to objects but to highly
penetrable events. Thus we can consider appearances and hold
back assent (Mac Aogáin 1999). This is a capacity likely shared by
all species that show exploratory behaviour and are attracted to
novelty. It is the exact counterpart, in cognition, of the object/re-
ward separation that is central to Rolls’s account of emotion.
By acknowledging the symmetry, both emotion and cognition
appear as attitudes or behavioural dispositions, the one tuned to
the attractiveness of things, the other to their likelihood. We might
even consider belief as a kind of feeling, not unlike emotion. “An
idea assented to,” Hume noted, “feels different from a fictitious
idea, that the fancy alone presents to us” (Hume 1738/1911, p.
99). Indeed it does, and very likely the feeling has its own physi-
ology, although it is truth or likelihood that is now being appraised,
not reward potential.
Nonetheless, a single notion of representation, common to both
attitudes, will suffice. This is because of the separation of refer-
ence and attitude alluded to, equally complete on both dimen-
sions, emotion, and cognition. When representation is “free” or
“view-invariant” (p. 90) in this sense, including independence
from attitudinal bindings, we don’t need separate varieties of rep-
resentation for emotion and cognition. As for the “representation”
of the attitudes, rewards, values, and so on, there is no such event,
only the activation of a behavioural disposition in response to ear-
lier representation. A weaker, non-intentional term such as “bind-
ing,” or “decoding” is sufficient to describe such things.
Intelligence and emotion
Eucaly Mogi
Brain-Operative Expression Team Brainway Group, Brain Science Institute
(BSI), The Institute of Physical and Chemical Research (Riken), Saitama
351-0198, Japan. eucaly@brainway.riken.go.jp
Abstract: The explicit system for action selection integrates emotional in-
formation with the higher-order cognitive processes which culminate in
the language system. Even the basic feels of emotion are what they are be-
cause they are integrated into the higher cognitive processes. The relation
between emotion and intelligence would become increasingly important
as the focus of brain science shifts to the integrative function of the pre-
frontal lobe.
We all know what emotions are. And the laymen’s main concern
usually tends toward the conscious feelings of emotion. As Rolls
writes (presumably from his own experience at Oxford), at the end
of a series of lectures on the brain mechanisms underlying emo-
tion, an undergraduate is quite likely to feel that the most impor-
tant aspect of emotion has not been properly accounted for,
namely the subjective feeling (qualia) of emotions such as sadness,
joy, anger. The problem of qualia, let alone emotional qualia, in-
volves philosophical and epistemological difficulties and it is fit-
ting that Rolls leaves the discussion of conscious emotional feel-
ing until Chapter 9, after having done the more mundane but
important task of discussing in great detail the neural mechanism
underlying emotion, where the main concern is the flexible asso-
ciation of stimuli with their survival value.
In his reserved but bold presentation of a theory of conscious-
ness and its application to understanding emotion (Ch. 9), it is in-
teresting that Rolls puts forward the view that qualia, raw sensory,
and emotional feels arise after having evolved a linguistic and se-
mantically based higher-order thought system. There is a parallel
between this and the view that basic elements of intentionality
(such as a dog being “directed” to the visual image of a bone, or,
in more simple terms, “seeing the bone”) are dependent on the
“original intentionality” which presupposes the higher order abil-
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ities such as to accept responsibility (Haugeland 1999). On first
hearing, Haugeland’s requiring the dog to be morally responsible
in order to see a bone sounds like a fantastic but terribly wrong
idea. However, when one realizes that even the simple act of see-
ing something becomes significant only when it is integrated into
the context and syntax of the higher order cognitive process, which
(along with other things) support our sense of morality, one starts
to appreciate the rather extreme view put forward by Haugeland.
Intentionality (cf. Brentano 1973) and qualia (cf. Chalmers 1996)
are widely considered to be the two major hallmarks of our con-
scious mental activities, and it is interesting that somehow ideas
expressed by a neuroscientist (Rolls) and a philosopher (Hauge-
land) as well as others converge to the thesis that lower-order
properties (such as feels of emotion and visual qualia) are depen-
dent on the higher-order properties of our mental activities (such
as morality and language).
When you think about it, emotions are not such lower-order ba-
sic mental activities after all. Emotions are in fact tightly coupled
with what we call intelligence, including our verbal abilities to
communicate, and facilitate cooperation in human society (Gole-
man 1996; 1998). In this sense, emotional responses provide the
syntax and context for sensory stimuli and motor response, and are
in a continuous spectrum with such intelligent mental activities as
language. One aspect of our emotional ability, namely, the ability
to read others’ emotion, is closely related to the theory of mind
(e.g., Baron-Cohen et al. 1997), which is now considered to be a
key element in human intelligence as we know it.
As Rolls points out in Chapter 2, in brain areas devoted to spe-
cific sensory information processing, the reinforcement associa-
tion of the sensory stimuli in general do not alter the response to
the sensory stimuli. For example, the independence from reward
association seems to be characteristic of neurons right through the
temporal visual areas (e.g., Kobatake & Tanaka 1994). There is in-
creasing evidence that the simple act of “seeing” is actually regu-
lated by the top-down feedback to the visual cortex from the pre-
frontal area (e.g., Lumer et al. 1998), integrating the visual
information into the more general cognitive context. However, at
the visual cortex, the syntax and context when they are relevant are
of such a kind that they naturally extend to language (as is evident
from the fact that pattern recognition is a necessary condition for
the linguistic processing of alphabets), but not necessarily to the
survival value of the stimuli. Such a nature of the information pro-
cessing in higher sensory areas might have contributed to the view
that emotion and intelligence are relatively independent.
It is likely that it is in the frontal lobe that the integration of the
sensory information and their survival value occurs, assisting the
individual in integrating perception and action in such a way that
he or she can survive better, not only in the natural environment,
but also in the sociobiological sense (as Rolls discusses in sect.
10.5). The excellent chapter on the orbitofrontal cortex demon-
strates its importance in the flexible association of reward value
with stimuli. The integration of sensory and motor information
processing is a very exciting topic in the neurophysiology of the
frontal lobe today. In the same area (dorsal premotor cortex of
monkeys) that the “mirror neurons” (Gallese & Goldman 1998)
are found, neurons which possibly code for the “affordance” of ob-
jects are recorded, indicating that here sensory information is in-
tegrated into the processing of the motor information or motor
repertoire. The frontal lobe is clearly the area where the sensory,
motor, and “value” information are integrated, and it is very likely
that exciting findings await us just around the corner.
Human intelligence arose from the biological need for survival.
Emotions exist because they assist the survival of the individual,
and it is only natural that emotion and intelligence are very tightly
coupled. In the near future, much experimental and theoretical
work will be done on the relation between emotion and high-order
cognitive process, especially in the battlefield of the frontal lobe.
Rolls’s book on the brain and emotion is an excellent starter for this
very important issue. This would be only an “Episode I.” I hope
very much that we will be able to read a sequel some time soon.
Is what you feel what you don’t know?
Simon C. Moore and Mike Oaksford
School of Psychology, Cardiff University, Cardiff, CF10 3YG, Wales, United
Kingdom. {mooresc; oaksford}@cardiff.ac.uk
www.cf.ac.uk/uwcc/psych/mooresc
Abstract: Rolls defines emotion as innate reward and punishment. This
could not explain our results showing that people learn faster in a negative
mood. We argue that what people know about their world affects their
emotional state. Negative emotion signals a failure to predict negative re-
ward and hence prompts learning to resolve the ignorance. Thus what you
don’t know affects how you feel.
Rolls argues that emotion can be viewed as the innate product of
reward and punishment reinforcement. In this view, emotion is a
product of the learning process. However, we have evidence that
human emotion, irrespective of its cause, provides an impetus to
learn from the environment in its own right. Consequently, Rolls’s
account of emotion may need to be modified.
We have investigated how emotion modulates the rate at which
people acquire procedural skills and learn probabilistic discrimi-
nations. We first induced an emotional state using standard labo-
ratory procedures. In one experiment, participants then com-
pleted a visual discrimination task (Moore & Oaksford 1999) and
in other experiments they completed a probabilistic classification
task (adapted from Gluck & Bower 1988). In both cases we mea-
sured the rate of learning, either across a single session or over a
series of days. According to Rolls’s definition of emotion one could
not predict that an emotional state would influence the rate of
learning for an emotionally unrelated task. However, we found
that an induced negative emotion enhanced the consolidation of
visual information across a two-week period, whereas positive
emotion does not (Moore & Oaksford 1999). Moreover, within a
single trial block, negative emotion enhanced the rate at which
people learn a probabilistic classification task.
We have sought to understand the causes of these effects at the
functional level, that is, why would it make sense for an organism
to learn more rapidly about its world when in a negative mood?
According to Rolls, emotional response consists of the experience
of primary or secondary reinforcement. Fundamental to this def-
inition is the idea that organisms seek to maximize their likelihood
of survival. Maximizing survival is achieved by the approach and
avoidance behavior associated with rewarding and punishing stim-
uli. Thus there is an inferred relationship between the behavior
and the goal. Approach behavior is initiated when an organism in-
fers a high likelihood of reward, and avoidance behavior is initi-
ated when an organism infers a high likelihood of punishment.
That is, to survive, organisms have to make decisions about
whether to approach or avoid stimuli in their environments based
on the likelihood of experiencing positive or negative reward. This
suggests adopting a decision theoretic approach to emotion in
which a major factor in determining the appropriate emotion is
provided by our prior knowledge of the world.
In any given context, prior knowledge will provide information
about the levels of utility associated with events and actions oc-
curring within that context. It will also provide detailed knowledge
about the probability of events and the likely consequences of our
actions. If the overall goal is to maximize survival, then an organ-
ism must seek to perform actions that will minimize their chances
of negative reinforcement. If the organism is very familiar with a
particular context, then it will be able to avoid negative reinforce-
ment. This suggests that even though two contexts both contain
the possibility of the same level of negative reinforcement, the
context where you known this can be avoided is less likely to en-
gender a negative emotion. For example, smelling smoke in your
own office, where you know where the fire exits are, is likely to
induce less fear than smelling smoke in a colleague’s office in an
unfamiliar building. An important consequence of this decision-
theoretic approach is that, given we wish to minimize the expec-
tation of experiencing negative reinforcement, actually encoun-
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tering a punishing stimulus will usually occur unpredictably. To
avoid such a stimulus in the future the most appropriate behavior
must be to learn about the context in which it occurred, that is, to
make it more predictable. For example, suppose you try to rush
through a door that has always been unlocked only to find it is
locked. From the bump on the head and the ensuing anger, you
will learn to approach the door more cautiously in the future and
perhaps attempt to discover when and why the door is locked or
unlocked. We can now explain why our participants learned faster
when in a negative mood. The experience of negative emotion is
a cue to learn more about the environment so as to minimize the
chances of further negative reinforcement.
Prior knowledge for the causal structure of a context mediates
the emotional response. If you can accurately predict the causal
structure then you can minimize the likelihood of receiving nega-
tive reinforcement. For example, at home, one may not be hun-
gry but still feel happy in the knowledge that there is food avail-
able if it is needed. Conversely, if prior knowledge does not allow
you to predict the causal structure of the context then your ability
to avoid negative reinforcement decreases. The likelihood of find-
ing food if it is required diminishes and the likelihood of running
into danger increases. More generally these considerations sug-
gest that simply the levels of uncertainty someone has about a con-
text may sometimes be related to emotion. Consistent with this
view, in some further experiments we have found that manipulat-
ing the level of uncertainty in a probabilistic classification task al-
ters people’s emotional state. The more uncertain they are, the
more negative their mood state.
In sum, in this commentary we have been concerned with the
etiology of emotion. In Rolls’s book, emotion is the experience of
reinforcing stimuli. We suggest that emotion may also be modu-
lated by knowledge of the environment. The more you know the
inherently safer it is.
Neural behaviorism: From brain evolution 
to human emotion at the speed 
of an action potential
Jaak Panksepp
Department of Psychology, Bowling Green State University, Bowling Green,
OH 43403. jpankse@bgnet.bgsu.edu
Abstract: Rolls shares important data on hunger, thirst, sexuality, and
learned behaviors, but is it pertinent to understanding the fundamental
nature of emotionality? Important as such work is for understanding the
motivated behaviors of animals, Rolls builds a constructivist theory of emo-
tions and primary-process affective consciousness without considering
past evidence on specific types of emotional tendencies and their diverse
neural substrates.
Rolls provides a useful summary of his many important contribu-
tions to understanding motivated behaviors, and discusses their
potential implications for our understanding of emotions and con-
sciousness. Although I substantially disagree with his theoretical
view, the sharing and contrasting of different perspectives is es-
sential for refining ideas and thereby promoting substantive
progress in the field. I shall focus on the relevance of his work and
theoretical perspectives to understanding the basic emotions and
primary-process consciousness.
All emotions and motivations are assisted in their evolutionar-
ily appointed affairs by generalized learning systems, but does a
study of such learning systems address the fundamental nature of
emotions and consciousness? The relevance of many intrinsic sub-
cortical sensory-motor integrative systems in the generation of
emotions is underestimated in Rolls’s analysis. General brain the-
ories of emotion should be based on a thorough analysis of the ba-
sic emotional processes (e.g., fear, anger, separation-distress, and
playful joy). An adequate framework cannot be extrapolated sim-
ply from a study of self-stimulation circuitry and motivations such
as feeding and drinking.
On the one hand, Rolls accepts a reasonable multiplicity of
functions that emotions subserve within the cerebral economy
(p. 67–70), but he provides no adequate empirical or conceptual
analysis of how many of these functions may actually be achieved
within the brain. Evolution surely provided more guidance and or-
ganization to animal emotions than the mere influence of simple
“good-GO” and “bad-DON’T GO” indicator systems, and a mys-
terious reinforcement process that connects these values to world
events. Rolls does not address vast stretches of data regarding the
natural behavioral and affective inclinations of animals and hu-
mans and their neural foundations, which do not fit well into his
neo-behavioristic point of view (e.g., MacLean 1990; Panksepp
1998a). Although Rolls toys with the possibility of multiple reward
and punishment systems, he does not acknowledge the existence
of multiple emotion-affect programs within the brain.
As Skinner repeatedly asserted in his twilight years, the two
vast gaps in a complete behavioral analysis were between “stim-
ulus and response, and between reinforcement and a resulting
change in behavior” – gaps which could only be filled with “the
instruments and techniques of neurology” (see Panksepp 1998a,
p. 12). Of course, there was also a third chasm – the one between
evolutionary processes and the spontaneous psychobehavioral
repertoire of the animals – the psycho-ethological gap that Skin-
ner and most behaviorists have assiduously avoided, in both re-
search and discussion. Although Rolls is now filling the first gap
with impressive studies, the second remains almost as mysteri-
ous as ever, and behaviorists generally continue to ignore the
third. Except for a detailed discussion of self-stimulation cir-
cuitry, Rolls does not deal with a host of other emotion-relevant
circuitries, including the many neuropeptides that appear to be
able to provide coordination for a variety of distinct emotional
and motivational tendencies (Panksepp 1993; 1998a). Also,
within the research program he details, he has yet to study ani-
mals extensively in profoundly emotional circumstances. Be-
cause of the restricted data base he has chosen to cover, we must
wonder how well his observations and admittedly parsimonious
theorizing can illuminate the diversity of spontaneous emotional
inclinations that ethologists and psychologists have long recog-
nized as the natural emotional repertoire of animals and humans
(see Darwin 1872/1998).
Rolls is at his best when he is documenting the way discrimina-
tive reward and secondary reinforcement processes may emerge
within the brain. He provides compelling data on those issues.
However, his analysis of the “lateral-hypothalamic variety” of self-
stimulation seems unconvincing considering what we know these
days. Rolls still regards the fundamental nature of self-stimulation
along the trajectory of the A-10 dopamine systems to reflect the
presence of a reasonably straightforward reward/reinforcement
process (Chs. 5 and 6), but much recent evidence (as alluded to
by Rolls, p. 176), suggests that this system is better conceptualized
ethologically as one mediating generalized anticipatory-investiga-
tory phases of appetitive behavior rather than the consummatory-
reward components (Ikemoto & Panksepp 2000; Panksepp 1981;
1986; Robinson & Berridge 1993; Schultz 1998). How such con-
cepts as reinforcement and pleasure link up to this fundamental
emotional system remains an open question, but most likely, it
shall be a smaller part of the overall story than Rolls and most un-
dergraduate texts make it out to be. The psychological effect 
may be more akin to an appetitive mood of eager anticipation that
is clearly expressed in the spontaneous interest and investigatory
behaviors of animals. Indeed, contrary to his distinction between
emotions and moods (p. 62), it seems likely, from my point of 
view, that both emerge from essentially the same brain substrates
(Panksepp 1994).
Although life events and the resulting appraisals obviously pro-
mote emotional episodes, how accurate is the claim that emotions
emerge from the reinforcement contingencies of the environ-
ment? Although such events surely trigger and sculpt emotional
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responses, there is no robust line of evidence that such contin-
gencies causally integrate emotions in any deeper sense. Might it
not be wiser to turn the issue around, and to seek an understand-
ing of reinforcement mechanisms through the operations of the
diverse emotional operating systems that exist within the brain
(Panksepp 1990)? Even in Rolls’s refined behaviorist view, the re-
inforcement process remains the phlogiston of learning theory.
From a developmental systems perspective, the intrinsic emo-
tional-affective processes of young animals appear to be essential
mechanisms via which their worldviews are created via interac-
tions with a diversity of world events (Buck 1999), but I am not
aware of convincing data that a substantive “reinforcement”
process is the main mechanism that elaborates such change. Be-
havioral change may well emerge from a variety of other plastici-
ties within the nervous system. Thus, it seems unrealistic to re-
strict the term emotion to the cognitive decoding of the
reinforcing characteristics of environmental stimuli (p. 62). It
must also be related to careful analyses of “instinctive” psychobe-
havioral states. In short, Rolls’s conceptual and evidential bases
are not broad enough to handle the richness of emotional phe-
nomena that is evident in the animate world. Rolls does not dis-
cuss the possibility that emotional systems operate as global state
variables within organisms: In their fundamental form the basic
emotions are generalized alerting and behavior organizing pro-
cesses, capable of arousing several distinct forms of affective ex-
perience with no propositional contents. We now know from
modern proto-oncogene studies that massive swaths of the brain
are aroused during practically all emotional states (Beck & Fibiger
1995; Campeau et al. 1997; Kollack-Walker et al. 1997). These
global states shift the whole intentional and attentional demeanor
(psychobehavioral set) of organisms and thereby prepare them to
deal with major types of life challenges.
Rolls does not emphasize that our emotional lives, and those of
other animals, are developed more in relation to social situations
than other dimensions of existence. A monkey in a restraining
chair is not in much of a position to pursue such activities. Al-
though, Rolls mentions in passing the diversity of social processes
(e.g., Table 10.1), he ignores such essential topics as playfulness,
social-bonding, separation-distress, and maternal nurturance –
processes which appear to have dedicated brain systems/pro-
cesses for achieving those social ends. Rolls does discuss sexuality
at some length, but focuses more on evolutionary speculations
concerning sperm warfare and genital dynamics than core emo-
tional issues – mate selection, sexual bonding, jealousy, and the
passionate nature of lust.
And then there is Rolls’s top-down discussion of consciousness.
He casts his lot with those who believe that consciousness is con-
structed from the higher symbolic capacities of the brain/mind. I
admire Rolls for taking up the issue of emotional feelings, so com-
monly ignored by neuroscientists, but I was disappointed by his
solution, which is not impressively consistent with a great deal of
available evidence. One of many troublesome lines of work for his
view is the rewarding effects of drugs (e.g., opioids, psychostimu-
lants, and now others) as evaluated by intracranial self-injection
(McBride et al. 1999) and conditioned place preference proce-
dures (e.g., Olmstead & Franklin 1997). Deep subcortical struc-
tures are necessary, and perhaps sufficient, for both effects. To en-
vision these influences as information, like any other type, within
the higher cognitive reaches of the brain seems categorically in-
correct. Emotions have very big brain effects, and all external
signs that we have (except for propositional language), including
abundant neural evidence, suggest that remarkable homologies
and predictive validities exist in the subcortical affective substrates
of the basic human and animal emotions (Panksepp 1998a).
There are ways to conceptualize the nature of affective con-
sciousness in the lower reaches of the brain, as long as we respect
the complexity and power of genetically ingrained emotional cir-
cuits and the body’s motor systems in establishing a coherent “cen-
ter of gravity” for the organism (Panksepp 1998b). To simply have
a top-down cognitive view of consciousness which denies simple
felt emotional and motivational states to other mammals strikes
me not only as an improbable, but an ethically troublesome,
proposition. It reflects a sensory-focussed worldview where the
body, its various brain representations, and instinctual motor ac-
tion tendencies are relegated to an undeserved secondary status
in emotion and consciousness studies. Surely all would agree with
Rolls that much of the higher brain was designed to guide the body
sensorially and cognitively in space and time toward important in-
ternal and external goals, but the evidence suggests that the basic
means to achieve those goals, in the form of affectively tinged ac-
tion tendencies, were firmed up in primitive integrative systems
of the brain long before organisms like us existed at the top of the
food chain with aspirations to be closer to angels than the other
animals.
Who would deny that our higher thoughts are important deter-
minants for the subtle texture of our sophisticated cognitive con-
sciousness? Also, reinforcement contingencies obviously mold
behavioral tendencies. But Rolls’s attempt to embed effective ex-
perience within those higher networks, even as he takes pains to
clarify that his language “does not necessarily imply verbal lan-
guage” (p. 262), strikes me as unrealistic. Were he simply fo-
cussing on cognitive issues, I would have found his overall ap-
proach congenial, but to envision global affective experience as
reflections of cognitive-associative-reinforcement processes, ex-
perientially elaborated largely within higher sensory-associative
regions of the brain, seems inconsistent with an extensive corpus
of evidence (Panksepp 1998a; 1999). Just consider one of many
difficulties: Children, who are much less able than adults to “think
linguistically about” their “own linguistic thoughts” (p. 263), typi-
cally have stronger and more frequent (but mercifully shorter)
emotional episodes than adults. Either Rolls should claim that our
kids really do not have the strong feelings they seem to have, or he
needs to deal with the paradox (at least for his viewpoint) in some
more humane way.
In the long run, I anticipate that core emotional processes will
be considerably more difficult to model computationally than cog-
nitive processes. I doubt if primary-process affective conscious-
ness can be instantiated in the ways Rolls envisions. If it could, ma-
jor psychiatric/emotional disorders should have been more prone
to alleviation through the application of learning principles than
has yet been possible. I am glad Rolls emphasized that for any ma-
chine to be propositionally conscious, it must partake of “linguis-
tic thoughts with symbols grounded in the real world” (p. 262).
However, I suspect such “organismic” creatures would be zombies
unless one were also able to give them substantive and well-
crafted central motor and emotional processes of the kind found
subcortically in living organisms (Panksepp 1998b). That is a task
no one has yet come close to accomplishing (Picard 1997). Indeed,
as Freud (1923) suspected (see Solms & Nersessian 1999 for an
updating), an understanding of how the higher reaches of the
brain achieved subtle propositional types of consciousness, may
require a much clearer understanding of how the lower, affective
forms are created from “embodied” brain processes that we share
with the other animals.
The amygdala – responsible for memories 
of reward as well as punishment?
Amanda Parker
School of Psychology, University of Nottingham, Nottingham NG7 2RD,
United Kingdom. aep@psychology.nottingham.ac.uk
Abstract: Rolls’s proposal that the amygdala is critical for the association
of visual objects with reward is not consistent with recent ablation evi-
dence. Stimulus-reward association learning is more likely to depend on
basal forebrain efferents to the inferior temporal cortex, some of which
pass through the amygdala. It is more likely that the amygdala is involved
in rapid modulation of stimulus reward value.
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Rolls reviews the substantial body of evidence, much of it from his
own laboratory, on the neuroanatomy of emotion. Although the
coverage of this area in the book is somewhat idiosyncratic (e.g.,
much of it might better be described as dealing with motivation),
many important issues in the field are discussed in an accessible
manner. A particular strength of the book is its message that we
can define emotions in terms of the reaction of the animal to re-
wards and punishments. This is a convincing argument for mon-
keys and rats, and is a useful starting point for extending our un-
derstanding of emotion generally. In this commentary, I will
concentrate on one aspect of the book, the role of the amygdala in
emotion. More specifically, I will argue that Rolls’s proposal that
the amygdala is critical for the association of visual objects with re-
ward is not consistent with recent experimental evidence from ab-
lation studies.
Rolls’s proposal is that the ventral visual system projects via the
inferior temporal visual cortex to the amygdala and orbitofrontal
cortex, which together determine the reward or punishment value
of the object, as part of the process of selecting which goal is ap-
propriate. He states that “Lesions of the macaque amygdala im-
pair the learning of both stimulus-reward and stimulus-punisher
associations.” (Précis, sect. 5.2.2). This statement is not supported
by current evidence from lesion studies. A series of elegant and
thorough experiments in rat by LeDoux and colleagues have con-
vincingly established the importance of the amygdala in stimulus-
punisher learning (for review, see LeDoux 1996), in agreement
with Rolls’s proposal that “the crucial site of the stimulus-rein-
forcement associative learning that underlies the responses of
amygdala neurons to learned reinforcing stimuli is probably
within the amygdala itself” (Précis, sect. 5.2.1). However, the
same cannot be said for the importance of the amygdala in stimu-
lus-reward association learning (SRAL). Whilst early evidence
from aspiration ablation studies suggested a role for the amygdala
in SRAL (see Gaffan 1992, for a review), a very different consen-
sus has now been reached on the basis of two recent sets of find-
ings.
First, the recent work of Murray and colleagues has established
that many of the functions previously ascribed to the amygdala are
in fact functions performed by the adjacent rhinal cortex (for re-
views see Baxter & Murray, in press; Murray 1992), and that the
amygdala itself has little or no role in stimulus-reward memory.
However, the amygdala does have a role in reinforcer devaluation.
In this experimental paradigm the monkey has previously learned
that one set of positive objects are rewarded with one type of food
and the remaining objects rewarded with a second, equally palat-
able food. After a selective satiation with one of the foods, normal
monkeys will choose far more of the other food than is their nor-
mal preference. This effect is abolished in monkeys with excitoxic
amygdala lesions (Malkova et al. 1997). The conclusion that can
be taken from this is that the amygdala itself is important to re-
ward association memory only on occasions when an abrupt
change in the current value of a reinforcer that has an already-es-
tablished value is required, in order to produce an adaptive re-
sponse. This conclusion can also be applied to the functional rela-
tionship between the amygdala and the orbital prefrontal cortex
(Parker et al. 1999).
Second, recent work of Gaffan and colleagues has established
that bilateral transection of the amygdala and anterior temporal
stem disconnects inferior temporal cortex from its afferent con-
nections in the basal forebrain (Gaffan et al. 1998; submitted).
This disconnection severely impairs SRAL, an effect that was pre-
viously ascribed to amygdala damage (see Gaffan 1992; Easton &
Gaffan 2000, for reviews), and now can be ascribed to interrup-
tion of fibres of passage through the amygdala. This conclusion has
been strengthened by experiments which use crossed unilateral
lesions, in which a heat lesion in the basal forebrain in one hemi-
sphere is combined with a lesion of contralateral inferior tempo-
ral cortex. A very similar deficit in SRAL is observed in monkeys
with this pattern of lesions to the animals with bilateral amygdala
plus anterior temporal stem transection (Easton & Gaffan 1997;
submitted), and a similar equivalence between surgical groups in
recognition memory deficits can also be seen (Gaffan et al. 1998;
submitted; Easton et al., submitted). We can therefore conclude
that the basal forebrain, rather than the amygdala, is the crucial
structure which modulates memory storage in inferior temporal
cortex in SRAL.
Novelty assessment is often proposed to be an important pre-
cursor of memory formation, and Rolls and his colleagues have
found cells in several key areas of the brain that respond prefer-
entially to novelty. As with the discussion of SRAL above, however,
evidence from single cell recording studies alone do not provide a
convincing explanation of the relationship of novelty-related pro-
cessing to memory formation. Rolls, citing the research of Wilson
and Rolls (2000), proposes that the amygdala is filtering informa-
tion about whether visual stimuli are either novel or reward-re-
lated, and making decisions about output based on these evalua-
tions (Rolls 1999a, p. 105). In support of this, he states that lesions
of the amygdala in macaque negatively affect this process (specific
experiments unspecified). This lesion effect is more likely to be
due to the effect of damage to the rhinal cortex than to damage to
the amygdala itself. Using a series of memory tasks which manip-
ulate the relative novelty of visual stimuli, we have found that as-
piration lesions of the amygdala which do not damage rhinal cor-
tex do not abolish the advantage for novel visual stimuli seen in
normal monkeys (Parker et al. 1998). In contrast, crossed unilat-
eral lesions of perirhinal cortex and prefrontal cortex do abolish
this novelty advantage (Parker et al. 1998), as do bilateral ablations
of the perirhinal cortex (Buckley et al. 1999). It therefore seems
unlikely that the amygdala is crucial for the novelty-related pro-
cessing that precedes visual object-reward associations.
Awareness may be existence as well as
(higher-order) thought
Jordan B. Peterson
Department of Psychology, University of Toronto, Toronto, Ontario, Canada
M5S 3G3. peterson@psych.utoronto.ca
psych.utoronto.ca/~peterson/welcome.htm
Abstract: Rolls attributes to consciousness the functions of reflection,
planning, and error-correction. Neuropsychologically grounded cyber-
netic theory provides an analogous, broader conceptualization: conscious-
ness constructs goals (and plans), alters the valence of goal-related phe-
nomena, registers error-signals, and explores unexpected circumstances
(reconfiguring goals and plans as necessary). Consciousness plays a fun-
damental unrecognized ontological role, as well, conferring the status of
“discriminable object” on select aspects of otherwise indeterminate “be-
ing.”
Rolls identifies consciousness particularly with higher-order
thought, describing it as “the state which arises in a system that
can think about . . . thoughts” (p. 248). He believes consciousness
has two primary functions. The first, potential for reflection on
past events, has a corollary, planning for future events. The sec-
ond, integrally related to the first, is correction of error made by
lower-order processes.
Rolls suggests that higher-order thoughts intervene when lower-
order-thought-predicated plans fail (p. 250). Higher-order thoughts
perform this operation (linguistically) by analyzing the structure of
lower-order plans, identifying specific weak links, and replacing
those with potentially better alternatives. Rolls’s theoretical model
can therefore be assimilated to the cybernetic viewpoint (Wiener
1948) (and psychological elaborations thereof). Such assimilation is
advantageous because it unites Rolls’s work with a well-developed
alternative body of theory, and allows his ideas regarding con-
sciousness further integration with current theories of emotion (not
excluding his own).
The plans that organisms formulate include goals, from the cy-
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bernetic perspective (Wiener 1948). Goals are hypothetical future
world-states similar to those currently obtaining, but modified in a
manner both attainable and beneficial. The desired future state
may be viewed as an (imaginal) template, against which current in-
sufficient states of the world are compared, as behavior is under-
taken (Peterson 1999). A “plan,” in this scheme, is that sequence
of behavioral steps posited as necessary to produce the desired fu-
ture condition (Carver & Scheier 1998). Plan-formulation may be
the responsibility of the higher-order thought system described by
Rolls – but so (explicitly) must be abstract goal-formulation.
Higher-order thought systems performing this latter function may
modulate emotional valences directly (may affect the “reinforcing
value” of stimuli) as well as formulating or altering plans (Peterson
1999). This valence-modulating capacity constitutes a major ex-
tension of the role of consciousness, even when defined in a man-
ner otherwise similar in all regards to that proposed by Rolls.
Rolls (p. 61) presumes that emotions are states produced by “in-
strumental reinforcing stimuli,” and suggests that this presump-
tion allows for “operational definition of what causes an emotion.”
However, what might be instrumentally reinforcing in one situa-
tion (whether “subjective” or “objective”) may not be in another.
This implies that Rolls’s definition is less than optimally “opera-
tional.” All sophisticated behaviorists recognize that the current
status of an animal in part determines the reinforcing nature of a
given “stimulus” (Rolls in fact admirably details the mechanisms
by which such determination occurs, when he describes brain con-
trol of feeding and reward). But there is a cognitive component of
“current status,” analogous to higher-order control and modifica-
tion of current plans. Formulation of an abstract goal (a future
“desired state”) instantaneously transforms that goal into some-
thing equivalent in all essential features to a consummatory reward
(Peterson 1999). It is in this manner that higher-order cognition
and emotion meet. A cognitively constructed “consummatory re-
ward” may be something as abstracted away from instinctive sig-
nificance as a goal scored during a soccer game (an occurrence for
which individuals will work, and one whose possibility also colors
all other game-events: opposing players and their maneuvers be-
come “threats” or even “punishments,” assuming they interfere
with scoring chances or score themselves; scoring opportunities
are “incentive rewards,” indicating progress towards a consum-
matory goal – and all this in the absence of conditioning!) This
means that emotions may be more operationally considered
“states produced by stimuli whose reinforcing properties derive
from their relationship to some explicitly formulated goal”; and
means further that the notion of stimulus-valence is not meaning-
ful, unless current organismal goals are explicitly specified (al-
though sometimes valence evaluation may indeed take place in
the absence of higher-order thought; see LeDoux 1996, pp. 161–
69).
Consideration of the role played by higher-order thought in
goal-specification and consequent valence-determination also al-
lows for a more comprehensive view of error detection and cor-
rection. Sokolov (1969) suggested that the orienting reflex (a com-
plex psychophysiological response, associated with initiation of
exploratory behavior) emerges automatically when the goal-di-
rected nervous system detects an unexpected “stimulus.” “Unex-
pected” in this context means “deviant from plan (the behavior
manifested did not produce the result desired).” Orienting and
more complex exploratory behavior garners new information,
used either to modify the ongoing plan or, if necessary (and much
more problematically), to eradicate and reconstruct the current
goal (Peterson 1999). Vinogradova (1975) suggested that the com-
parator designed to detect such deviation/novelty resided in the
hippocampus. Gray (1982; Gray & McNaughton 1996) associated
the function of this novelty detection system with the emergence
of behavioral inhibition and anxiety. LeDoux (1996) and others,
including Rolls, associate anxiety more particularly with amygdalic
function, so the relationship between hippocampal novelty-detec-
tion and behavioral inhibition/anxiety appears as of yet unclear.
However, the notion that novelty is a primary source of anxiety
(and knowledge) should take center stage in any discussion of the
relationship between cognition, emotion and consciousness (Pe-
terson 1999), as initial caution (and then exploration) is so clearly
appropriate, when unexpected relations emerge between desire
and world.
Consciousness therefore appears as higher-order (linguistically
mediated) correction of lower-order plans, as Rolls suggests, and
more. Consciousness also establishes explicit goals (while in-
formed by other brain processes indicating biological necessity);
formulates plans designed to attain those goals (or arranges al-
ready automatized plans to the same end); re-evaluates the signif-
icance of ongoing events (as a consequence of establishing goals
and plans); registers signals indicating emergence of unexpected
events (feeling not only anxiety but “hope” and “curiosity” while
doing so; Peterson 1999); and explores, gathering new information
and reconstructing goals and plans in the face of failure.
One more radical attribute of consciousness may also be pos-
ited, as a consequence of operation within this expanded concep-
tual framework. Rolls notes that inputs from sensory systems must
be registered within consciousness, for the purposes of planning
(p. 251). However, the sensory plenum as such is too complicated
to constitute an object (or even many objects) of consciousness
(Medin & Aguilar 1999). This means that sensory awareness is se-
lective: the world is necessarily parsed up into the limited set of
“objects” functionally relevant to the operations of current goal-
directed operations, and the necessarily co-existent category of
“all things presently irrelevant” (and therefore “ignored” or “un-
conscious”).
Only functionally relevant objects “exist” at any given moment
– constituting figure, so to speak, instead of ground. So the very
fact of discriminable things appears as something dependent upon
consciousness. This makes consciousness something far more fun-
damental than generally supposed (makes it something far from
epiphenomenal) (Peterson 1999), and helps account at least by in-
ference for its continuing incomprehensibility.
The causal status of emotions 
in consciousness
Jason T. Ramsay and Marc D. Lewis
Human Development and Applied Psychology, University of Toronto, Toronto,
Canada M5S 1V6. { jramsay; mlewis}@oise.utoronto.ca
Abstract: Rolls demonstrates how reward/punishment systems are key
mediators of cognitive appraisal, and this suggests a fundamental, causal
role for emotion in thought and behaviour. However, this causal role for
emotion seems to drop out of Rolls’s model of consciousness, to be re-
placed by the old idea that emotion is essentially epiphenomenal. We sug-
gest a modification to Rolls’s model in which cognition and emotion acti-
vate each other reciprocally, both in appraisal and consciousness, thus
allowing emotion to maintain its causal status where it matters most.
Although Rolls covers a wide area of neuroscience research, there
are two themes that come to the fore. First is the review and in-
tegration of a large amount of basic research on the structure and
organization of the brain systems that are central to the produc-
tion of emotional behaviour. The second theme is the thesis that
all emotions are caused by reward/punishment contingencies and
that this formulation is consonant with appraisal theories of emo-
tion.
We will argue that Rolls’s version of appraisal theory places the
two themes, one integrative, and one reductive, at odds. This be-
comes most evident in Rolls’s consideration of the nature of con-
sciousness, where the causal role of emotions is blurred. Finally,
we will sketch a solution to the dilemma that is predicated on the
idea that emotions inform appraisals even while they are initiated
and constrained by those appraisals.
Rolls situates his definition of emotion within the existing frame-
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work of appraisal theory (Smith & Ellsworth 1985). He argues that
emotions are the result of cognitions about specific events. He
simplifies this proposition further by arguing that it is the evalua-
tion of whether an event is rewarding or punishing that elicits an
emotion. Rolls emphasizes a causal role for emotion by enumer-
ating its functions. Emotion instigates autonomic changes in the
body, is a prime motivator, and allows for behavioural flexibility.
Other functions include the triggering of memory retrieval pro-
cesses and the consistency of motivation and behaviour across
time. Thus, in Rolls’s scheme, emotion is the end result of cogni-
tions about reward, but it still has a causal role in determining the
contents of thought, memory, and behaviour. So far, Rolls’s theory
of emotion is consonant with traditional cognitive theories of ap-
praisal. Rolls musters a detailed review of neuroanatomical and
neurophysiological research in support of this argument. His main
conclusion from this review is that the amygdala and the or-
bitofrontal cortex are especially important in the production of
emotion. This is where Rolls could consolidate his model of cog-
nition-emotion relations. However, whereas Rolls maps the
anatomical connections in detail, he is significantly less elaborate
on the dynamic interplay between them. For example, lesions or
injuries to either the amygdala or the orbitofrontal cortex can pro-
duce strikingly similar behavioural sequelae. But there is little dis-
cussion of the interconnections between these structures that
might account for this parallel. As a result of this underdeveloped
account of brain structure and function, Rolls seems to reduce his
appraisal theory to a strictly sequential model which in turn limits
brain evidence he is willing to consider. At one point, Rolls dis-
misses evidence of direct connections from the thalamus to the
amygdala (LeDoux 1992) on the a priori notion that such connec-
tions are meaningless because no emotion can be generated with-
out cortical intervention.
After proposing his model of appraisal-emotion relations, Rolls
turns his attention to developing a model of consciousness. Up to
this point, emotion and cognition have both been key players in
goal-related thoughts and behaviours. In Rolls’s model of con-
sciousness, however, emotion falls by the wayside. Cognitions
about cognitions (second-order thoughts) are viewed as the basis
for consciousness, with emotions relegated to qualia or “raw
feels.” Consciousness seems to arise from higher-order reflections
on a variety of cognitive events. These events would have to in-
clude not only initial appraisals but also ongoing goal-directed
thoughts such as retrieved memories. Earlier in the book, emo-
tions were argued to be causal antecedents to a variety of mental
and behavioural events, including retrieved memories. Yet no
functional role is allotted to emotion in consciousness, and its
causal status now verges on epiphenomenalism. Rolls asserts that
consciousness is the result of lower-order constituent components
and processes, such as basic conditioned learning and appraisal
processes. Why is emotion not among these constituent pro-
cesses? It does not seem surprising that consciousness affects
emotions, but it does seem surprising that emotions do not affect
consciousness. One means of getting around this dilemma would
be to renovate Rolls’s model of appraisal according to the dynam-
ics of the neural structures that he describes in such detail. Rolls
ends his summation by highlighting the importance of the outputs
from emotional systems, such as those from the amygdala to the
orbitofrontal cortex. Thus, Rolls’s appraisal theory already allows
for a dynamic, reciprocal interplay between cognition and emo-
tion. Whereas traditional appraisal theories favour a lock-step se-
quence from cognitive appraisal to emotion, a new generation of
models allows emotions both to cause and result from appraisal
(Frijda 1993; Lewis 1996). Reciprocal causation between emotion
and appraisal permits appraisals to grow – literally to self-organize
– in a brain which is highly susceptible to self-amplifying interac-
tions across cortical and limbic subsystems (Freeman 1995). It is
no great leap to view consciousness in the same light, as an emer-
gent process whose causal constituents include emotion as well as
cognition. The neural evidence points to dynamic, rapidly fluctu-
ating, highly interconnected pathways among all subsystems in-
volved in cognition, perception, and emotion. Most important,
feedback is the hallmark of this activity, with each brain structure
returning the majority of its outputs to the structure from which
it receives most of its inputs (Freeman, in press). In such a system
it is entirely possible for emotion to maintain its causal status, not
only with respect to appraisal but with respect to consciousness as
well, inhibiting certain cognitions while initiating and perpetuat-
ing others. This take on emotional causation is not inconsistent
with Rolls’s punishment/reward model, yet it captures what is
known about the reciprocal interconnectedness of the limbic and
prefrontal systems.
In conclusion, Rolls’s model of the role of emotion in cognition
and behaviour does not fully jibe with his model of consciousness
nor does it sit well with the neurodynamics of brain function.
Modifying Rolls’s view of appraisal to include mutual causation be-
tween cognitions and emotions could develop a more integrated
theory.
Affect systems and neural systems
Eric A. Salzen
Department of Psychology, Aberdeen University, King’s College, Aberdeen
AB24 2VUB, Scotland. e.salzen@abdn.ac.uk
Abstract: The “reward” systems described by Rolls are systems for drive-
reinforced associations of contact and distant stimuli and not for emotional
behaviours. The neural systems delineated may be associated with distinct
categories of “affect,” namely “hedonic feelings,” “moods,” and “emo-
tions.” Awareness of these affects requires external perceptual as well as
internal feedback. Levels of feedback in evolution and development sug-
gest sensory qualia may not require language.
Rolls’s chapters on feeding and drinking are the core of his book
and they show the neuronal basis of the association of learned sec-
ondary reinforcing stimuli with innately effective primary rein-
forcing stimuli. In ethological terms primary reinforcers are prox-
imal stimuli acting on contact receptors, touch and taste, and elicit
innately organised consummatory behaviour, while secondary re-
inforcer/incentive stimuli are distant stimuli acting on distance re-
ceptors, sight, sound, and smell, to elicit variable responses of 
approach-withdrawal adjustments or appetitive behaviour that
achieves or removes contact stimulation. This association takes
place in neurones in the amygdala and in the orbitofrontal cortex
but is operative only according to the relevant drive state which,
for both feeding and drinking, is the homeostatic balance/imbal-
ance relayed by hypothalamic neurones. Homeostatic balances
are the ultimate reinforcers as is clear from the older physiologi-
cal experiments on motivational systems so that, as ethologists
once debated, consummatory stimuli and/or consummatory re-
sponses may be immediate goals and reinforcers that terminate
behaviour but they are short-term. Rolls comes to the same con-
clusion. His reviews of brain-stimulation and pharmacology of re-
ward are consistent with this since the effects of “artificial” direct
stimulation of the reinforcing neural sites are still drive depen-
dant.
Consequently Rolls’s critical neurones in the amygdala and or-
bitofrontal cortex are association neurones rather than reinforc-
ing. But their association is weighted by drive state so that the out-
put is a call for action which goes to action systems, motor and
autonomic. Rolls gives an excellent account of the basal ganglia
where the different drive action-cells compete for appetitive ac-
tions which can interact with cortical motor and somatosensory in-
puts representing learned appetitive action-patterns so that both
stimuli and responses can become learned incentives to action.
But what happens when these action calls are in balance, that is,
conflict? This is the core of ethological analyses of agonistic, court-
ship, parental, and other social displays that are comparable with
human behaviours that we would all label as emotional (and
Commentary/Rolls: The brain and emotion
216 BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2000) 23:2
which, apart from sociobiological speculations on sexual behavior,
are hardly featured by Rolls). These conflict displays are the basis
of my thwarted action state signalling (TASS) theory of emotion
(Salzen 1991), which gives a restricted (and literal) meaning to the
term “emotion.”
When considering the neurology of emotion, William James
(1890) argued that “either separate and special centres, affected
to them alone, are their brain-seat, or else they correspond to pro-
cesses occurring in the motor and sensory centres already as-
signed, or in others like them not yet known.” His own theory of
emotion led him to conclude that there should be “no special
brain-centres for emotion.” Most studies assume that there are
special centres and describe mid-brain and hypothalamic auto-
nomic systems, the limbic system, and related neocortical cogni-
tive systems (cf. LeDoux 1987; 1996). Since these structures are
also involved in non-emotional behaviours the result is uncom-
fortably like James’s view. Much depends on what is meant by the
term “emotion” and, as Smith and DeVito (1984) have noted, the
concept of emotion has to be properly specified before its neural
basis can be elucidated. TASS theory makes clear distinctions be-
tween “emotions” and other “affective states” and in 1993 (Salzen
1993) I delineated neural systems that correspond with these af-
fective states as follows:
1. Hedonic feelings are the sensations and associations of ap-
petitive and aversive consummatory behaviours (pleasure and
pain) involving the inferotemporal-amygdala-hypothalamic-mid-
brain axis, with a lateral appetitive and a mid-line aversive division
(Gray 1987; Olds 1976).
2. Moods are the states of endocrine and hypothalamic drive
systems which share a general dopaminergic appetitive motor ac-
tivation system, the nigro-striatal-accumbens pathway, giving a
general level of “get-up-and-go” (mania and depression).
3. Emotions are aroused motivated action states with increased
appetitive orientation behaviour and incipient consummatory
postures and movements that are blocked or in conflict (unpleas-
ant emotions) and so form displays which induce behaviours in so-
cial partners that may end the thwarting state (pleasant emotions).
The septo-hippocampal system with serotonergic “stop” and nor-
adrenergic arousal described by Gray (1982) fits this pattern of
arrest of specific actions with sustained perceptual scanning for
cortical detection, learning, and recall of the thwarting circum-
stances.
4. Sentiments are affectively biased attitudes and beliefs (cog-
nitive states). They might be expected to involve the posterior as-
sociation and prefrontal cortices for perception and emission of af-
fective signals as knowledge and language, and for the downward
control (cf. Szentagothai 1984), that is, self-control of the affective
action systems.
Using these definitions it is apparent that Rolls’s book is really
about hedonic feelings and their association neurone correlates.
His amygdala- and orbitofrontal- hypothalamic- system corre-
sponds with “feelings” (pleasure and pain) rather than emotions.
His treatment of the nigro-striatal-accumbens-, orbitofrontal and
amygdala dopamine system corresponds with “moods” and the
“go” system. His excellent account of the basal ganglia provides a
neural correlate that is needed by TASS theory to account for the
conflicts of incipient motivational actions that form emotional dis-
plays. Gray’s septo-hippocampal “stop” system may still be in-
volved when behaviours are blocked by inappropriate or inade-
quate external stimuli.
I conclude, therefore, that Rolls is dealing with feelings rather
than emotions. He is aware that the feeling experience “qualia” of
these drive-reinforced (i.e., reward) associations requires “back-
projections” for further neocortical processing and specifically by
a language system. TASS theory proposed additional feedback by
external perceptions of the individual’s own bodily behavioural ac-
tions and stimulus interactions as crucial at all levels of this in-
teraction (sensorimotor, feeling, emotional, and cognitive) for the
experience of affects and suggested corresponding levels of
awareness in evolution and in development. In developing this
view (Salzen 1998) I have indicated how language can have arisen
from emotional vocalisations that are perceived just like those of
another person so that one can talk to oneself as if to another per-
son. Thus, unlike Rolls, I think that language may be necessary
only at the cognitive level of consciousness.
Emotions and reward – but no arousal?
Holger Ursin
Department of Biological and Medical Psychology, Division of Physiological
Psychology, University of Bergen, N-5009 Bergen, Norway.
holger.ursin@psych.uib.no
Abstract: This commentary argues for the inclusion of the neurophysio-
logical arousal concept to help understanding the brain mechanisms of
emotions and reward and the cognitive mechanisms involved.
In the excellent review of emotions and reward systems by Rolls,
I miss a discussion of a few items crucial to my own understand-
ing, at least, of how the brain works. For me, it is hard to concep-
tualise relationships between needs, drives, emotions, and the
brain without discussion or referring to any form of arousal-
concept and arousal-theory. Rolls has a few references to brain
“arousal,” but this concept never attains any meaningful role in his
theoretical framework.
In particular, I miss a discussion of the relationship between af-
fective and instrumental aspects of emotional behaviour (Ursin
1985). Two factor-theory is discussed, but within a very limited
learning-theory scope (Gray 1975). This is discussed as a transi-
tion from classical to instrumental conditioning, but without any
apparent consequences for the internal state of the animal, in par-
ticular the level of arousal, evident as overt behaviour, or brain
arousal, or observable psychophysiological, psychoendocrine, and
psychoimmune changes. There is no mention or discussion – as
far as I can see – of the dramatic shift from a highly aroused sub-
ject in the early phases of avoidance-learning, to the relaxed and
nonchalant behaviour of the late phases during this learning. Like-
wise, I see very little emphasis on the distinction between affec-
tive and instrumental aspects of emotional behaviour – in animals
or in humans. There seems to be a considerable consensus for this
distinction for aggressive behaviour in humans since Festinger
(1957), and it has also been used for fear behaviour and in stress
theory (Levine & Ursin 1991). Aggressive or fear motivated be-
haviour may be executed at high levels of perfection and intensity,
but with a low level of arousal.
Another cognitive dimension I miss, related to the changes
from affective to instrumental behaviour – is the ability of all
brains to store and consider the expected results of behaviour. The
expectancy concept has been a part of cognitive formulations of
learning theory since Tolman (Bolles 1972). In my opinion, this
makes learning theory more useful for those of us who want to pre-
dict somatic changes due to psychological factors, both physiolog-
ical and pathophysiological. For me, it is difficult or impossible to
handle stress and stress related illness, complaints, and disease
without referring to an expectancy theory. Rolls, on the other
hand, does not help in making these relationships, as far as I can
see. He sticks to an almost extreme S-R tradition. I am reminded
of the famous cartoon found in many learning laboratories, also
our own, demonstrating a rat contemplating a learning theory psy-
chologist: “S-R, S-R, don’t these guys ever think?”
All the impressive, albeit sometimes incomprehensible, net-
work models seem to be S-R models with little or no emphasis on
feedback, or with any openings for a cost-benefit evaluation of
possible action, based on acquired expectancy of results. The
model must at least consider changes from one motivational sys-
tem to another. A hungry rat or a thirsty rat does not necessarily
remain in a state of high arousal. The arousal level depends not on
the level of thirst, but the probability of obtaining water. Uncer-
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tainty is associated with high levels of arousal. Certainty of water,
or no water, is associated with low levels of arousal (Coover et al.
1984).
Finally, as an old amygdala hand, I appreciate the survival of
Rolls and the Oxford group through the hardships of the molecu-
lar period of neuroscience. However, when more and more scien-
tists realise – and get funded for – radical notions of the brain ac-
tually being involved in behaviour, rather than just pushing
sodium and calcium around, we may end up with excessively mo-
lar concepts. The amygdala complex remains a complex, and the
level of resolution of modern imaging techniques is too low to con-
tribute to localisation studies. Passage of one synapse is a mean-
ingful event, and the concept of systems that jump from one large
population of nerve cells to another may be awfully wrong. In an
old study with Jim Olds, Reidun Ursin and I demonstrated that
the reward properties of neurones in the dentate area differed
from those of hippocampal pyramid cells (R. Ursin et al. 1966).
To me, the really exciting thing in contemporary neuroscience
is the confirmation of the fruitfulness of a conceptual nervous sys-
tem. The brain may not only store consequences of behaviour; it
may also consider them before further action is to be taken. I am
extremely impressed by the reward system of the Rolls brain, but
I still think there are good reasons for a rat to be “lost in thought”
at any choice point in life. There are not only a lot of stimuli, but
also a lot of consequences of behaviour to be considered before
further action.
Is the higher order of linguistic thought
model of feeling adequate?
Robert Van Gulick
Department of Philosophy, Syracuse University, Syracuse, NY 13244.
rnvangul@syr.edu
Abstract: Despite its explanatory value, the “higher order linguistic
thought” model comes up short as an account of the felt aspect of motiva-
tional states.
Rolls offers a tentative explanation of the felt experiential aspects
of conscious states (Ch. 9). On his model, consciousness arises
from higher order linguistic thoughts (HOLTs). A mental state M
is conscious just if it is accompanied by a roughly simultaneous
higher order thought to the effect that one is in M. Moreover, the
qualia or feeling of anything is “the state which is present when
linguistic processing that involves second- or higher-order
thoughts is being performed.” (p. 249) He admits that his model
is preliminary, and adds that the criteria for assessing theories of
qualia are less clear than for those for the other topics he discusses.
Rolls’s HOLT model has important explanatory value, but it
comes up short as a general model of consciousness. Fuzzy crite-
ria notwithstanding, it clearly fails to answer some key questions
about consciousness. The model may be empirically adequate in
so far as higher order linguistic processing may in fact accompany
conscious awareness in humans, but evidence of regular correla-
tion in itself fails to explain why it does so. In particular it does not
suffice for understanding why and how the neural and organiza-
tional substrates give rise to experiential or phenomenal aware-
ness. What is it about such processes that makes it feel like some-
thing to undergo them?
Rolls admits that some residual mystery surrounds the step
from the sort of processing model he invokes and the phenome-
nal consciousness he aims to explain. In response he says the fol-
lowing, “if a human with second-order thoughts is thinking about
its own first-order thoughts, surely it is very difficult for us to con-
ceive that this would NOT feel like something?” (p. 249). This is
not as obvious as Rolls supposes; for example, a Freudian process
of repression might requires HOLTs but not feel like anything at
all in so far as it is an unconscious process. Moreover even if true,
it is beside the point with regard to the residual mystery. As a mat-
ter of how humans work, human HOLTs may involve phenome-
nal awareness, but the mystery is why that should be, and how the
substrate for the former produces the latter. It may be equally dif-
ficult to imagine ourselves retrieving some episodic memories
without there being any feel to the process. But that too would of-
fer only correlational evidence about the sorts of processes that in
us humans typically involve phenomenal feel. One must not
equate empirical adequacy in the merely correlational sense with
explanatory adequacy.
An adequate model of phenomenal consciousness need not ex-
plain everything about qualia, just as an adequate biochemical
model of genetics need not explain every aspect of growth and re-
production. But it must provide us with an intelligible and mys-
tery-dispelling basic account of how the phenomenal or qualita-
tive supervenes upon the underlying neural and functional
organization. We have that sort of insight in the DNA case; we can
“see” in some satisfying way how the levels fit together. We cannot
as yet do so with consciousness, and the HOLT model fails in that
regard as well.
Elsewhere in Chapter 9, Rolls specifically addresses the issue
of why qualia accompany emotional and motivational states, for
example, “why food deprivation makes one feel hungry.” (p. 251)
However his answer seems to conflate something’s being con-
scious in the phenomenal sense with its being conscious in the
sense of being available to higher level processing. Rolls notes that
the inputs from sensory and motivational systems must be avail-
able to the linguistically based planning system in order for it to
do its job. He then argues thus: “I suggest that it would be a very
special-purpose system that would allow such sensory inputs, and
emotional and motivational states, to be part of (linguistically
based) planning, and yet remain unconscious.” (p. 251) Perhaps
so, but this implies only that they should be conscious in the sense
that we have cognitive access to them, not that they should be con-
scious in the phenomenal sense that there is some way it feels to
be aware of them. The issue of qualia and raw feels floats through
unexplained.
Rolls distinguishes his account from other higher order thought
(HOT) models by adding the condition that the relevant higher
order processing be linguistic in nature, though he construes “lin-
guistic” broadly to cover pretty much any generative syntactic
mode of representation. This creates both advantages and poten-
tial problems. On the plus side, it allows him to exclude simple
cases of higher order mentality that do not seem intuitively con-
scious; for example as described in Chapters 2, 7, and 8, the con-
trol systems regulating action must be sensitive to multiple reward
parameters of competing motivations. This would seem to require
some sort of higher order representation of mental features, but
it would not seem sufficient in itself for consciousness. Rolls can
exclude these in so far as the higher order representation is not
linguistic. On the other hand the requirement threatens to deny
consciousness to many nonprimate animals that we intuitively re-
gard as conscious in the phenomenal sense. Even given a liberal
reading of “linguistic,” how low can we go phylogenetically and
still hope to find linguistic higher order thoughts? What of mice,
sparrows, frogs, or squid? Yet unless we are willing to attribute
HOLTs to all such creatures, Rolls’s account would seem to entail
that they do not feel any pain or experience any pleasures. They
have pains and pleasures in the functional sense vis-à-vis their re-
ward and action control systems, but since Rolls states that the
feeling of anything is the state that is present when HOLT pro-
cessing takes place, it would seem to follow that if there are not
any HOLTs then there is not any feeling. At least that is how it
seems, if I read Rolls correctly.
A final question. If, as I have argued, the HOLT model is not
adequate in key aspects as an account of consciousness, what im-
plications if any does that have for the rest of Rolls’s theory? He
makes some effort to screen off the material of Chapter 9 as in-
triguing but less based on scientific fact than the rest. Thus per-
haps it could be set to one side with little overall effect. But I am
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not sure that it can. Though established facts about pathways, in-
formational relations and computational organization would re-
main intact, questions might arise about the completeness of the
functional story. If we assume that the felt aspects of motivational
states make a difference to the processes into which they enter
(i.e., if motivational qualia are not epiphenomenal) then any func-
tional account will need to explain that distinctive role. Kicking the
qualia “upstairs” to the HOLT level has the advantage of confin-
ing their effect to that elevated domain of sophisticated syntactic
processing. But if they penetrate further down, then any adequate
functional account will need to explain what difference they make
at those lower levels as well.
Innate psychology and open-ended
processes: Finding the middle ground
David Sloan Wilson
Department of Biological Sciences, Binghamton University, Binghamton, NY
13902-6000. dwilson@binghamton.edu
Abstract: Rolls’s mechanistic account of emotion can help to bridge a rift
within the field of evolutionary psychology. One side of the rift emphasizes
the importance of innate psychological mechanisms that evolved to solve
specific problems encountered in the ancestral environment. The other
side emphasizes learning, development, and culture as open-ended evo-
lutionary processes in their own right. Rolls shows how these two views
can be reconciled, allowing a productive middle ground to be explored.
Long term progress in biology requires equal attention to function
and mechanism. Knowing what a biological system has evolved to
do is essential for understanding its properties, but so also is
knowledge about the particular pathways whereby adaptation is
partially realized and partially constrained. As an evolutionary bi-
ologist who thinks mostly in terms of function, I have profited
from Rolls’s mechanistic account of the neurobiology of emotion
and the central role that emotion plays as a midstation in cogni-
tive processing that begins with perception and ends with action.
I would like to use this essay to comment on a rift that exists
within the field of evolutionary psychology, which can be attrib-
uted in part to a lack of mechanistic understanding. One side of
the rift emphasizes the importance of innate psychological mech-
anisms that evolved to solve specific problems encountered in the
ancestral environment (Barkow et al. 1992; Buss 1999). At the ex-
treme, the mind is envisioned as a jukebox of pre-evolved mech-
anisms that are played in response to environmental stimuli. The
other side of the rift emphasizes learning and cultural transmis-
sion (Boyd & Richerson 1985; Campbell 1960). At the extreme,
these are envisioned as unconstrained evolutionary processes in
their own right that rely on blind variation and selective retention
(to use Campbell’s 1960 felicitous phrase) to create new solutions
to modern problems. The truth presumably lies somewhere in be-
tween but lack of mechanistic understanding has prevented pro-
ductive exploration of the middle ground. The mechanistic details
provided by Rolls reveals a psychology that is elaborately innate
but which does not exclude, and indeed has evolved to enable,
open-ended processes such as learning and cultural transmission.
The neurobiology of hunger and thirst provide model examples
of innate special-purpose psychological mechanisms that evolved
to solve specific problems in ancestral environments. According to
the jukebox view, the mind can be fully understood simply by ex-
panding the number of such systems that have evolved by natural
selection; a cheater detection system, a sexual jealousy system, a
habitat selection system, and so on. Rolls embraces this possibility
with enthusiasm in the second and more speculative half of his
book, culminating in a long list of primary reinforcers in Table 10.1.
It would be easy to criticize the details of this table but the general
point is clear enough; there are many more records in the jukebox
than the hunger and thirst records. One point that Rolls does not
address is whether there is a theoretical limit to the number of pri-
mary reinforcers. Is it possible to imagine the list in Table 10.1 run-
ning into the hundreds or thousands, as some evolutionary psy-
chologists have speculated? It seems to me that there must be a
limit, beyond which adaptive behaviors must be orchestrated via
secondary reinforcers. I hope that Rolls will address this important
theoretical question in his response or in future publications.
Although Rolls appreciates the importance of special-purpose
mechanisms and is willing to consider a large number of them, he
equally appreciates the importance of open-ended learning and
cultural processes, on at least two levels. First, learning exists at
the level of each special-purpose mechanism. Indeed, the whole
purpose of emotion is to provide the rewards and punishments re-
quired for a learning process to occur. This is in contrast to the im-
age of a jukebox in which pre-evolved “records” completely spec-
ify behavior and the environment is reduced to the role of the
button-pusher determining which record is played. If each
“record” is a guided system for learning, then the environment be-
comes much more than a button pusher, even at the level of a sin-
gle special-purpose mechanism. Second, the symbolic processing
system discussed in Chapter 9 provides a new level of relatively
domain-general reasoning that may be uniquely human (see also
Deacon 1998). Both levels provide a mechanistic basis for learn-
ing and culture as evolutionary processes in their own right, capa-
ble of providing new behavioral adaptations to modern environ-
mental problems.
To summarize, The brain and emotion is a welcome fusion of
functional and mechanistic approaches to mind and behavior,
which may help to bridge a rift within evolutionary psychology that
has developed in the absence of mechanistic understanding.
Author’s Response
On The brain and emotion
Edmund T. Rolls
Department of Experimental Psychology, University of Oxford, Oxford, OX1
3UD, England. edmund.rolls@psy.ox.ac.uk
Abstract: There are many advantages to defining emotions as
states elicited by reinforcers, with the states having a set of differ-
ent functions. This approach leads towards an understanding of
the nature of emotion, of its evolutionary adaptive value, and of
many principles of brain design. It also leads towards a foundation
for many of the processes that underlie evolutionary psychology
and behavioral ecology. It is shown that recent as well as previous
evidence implicates the amygdala and orbitofrontal cortex in pos-
itive as well as negative emotions. The issue of why emotional
states feel like something is part of the much larger problem of
phenomenal consciousness. It is argued that thinking about one’s
own thoughts would have adaptive value by enabling first order
linguistic thoughts to be corrected. It is suggested that reflecting
on and correcting one’s own thoughts and plans would feel like
something, and that phenomenal consciousness may occur when
this type of monitoring process is taking place.
Introduction
I thank the commentators for their constructive and inter-
esting points. The following responses are part of the pro-
cess of moving our understanding forward.
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R1. What are emotions? The nature and functions
of emotion
R1.1. The definition of emotions. In The brain and emo-
tion, emotions are defined as states elicited by instrumen-
tal reinforcers, that is, by rewards and punishers. These
states have particular functions.1 The functions include
(pp. 67–70; note all page, section, Figure, and Table num-
bers refer to the book) eliciting autonomic responses, pro-
viding the goals for instrumental actions and thus allowing
flexibility in which action is performed, motivating actions
to achieve these goals, communication, social bonding, pro-
viding a way for genes to specify some of the goals for ac-
tions, influencing cognitive evaluations of events and mem-
ories, facilitating the storage of memories,2 producing
persistent and consistent behavior by lasting for minutes or
hours (cf. Ben-Ze’ev), and triggering particular memories.
Although some of the functions of emotion are social, as
outlined on pp. 67–70 and in Table 10.1, and as emphasized
by Adophs and Grafman, many are not, for example, fear
induced by the sight of a painful stimulus and many others
noted in Table 10.1.3
A number of commentators had the reaction that this de-
finition was too simple (e.g., Ben-Ze’ev, Adolphs, Buck).
This is a natural reaction: can emotion really be conceptu-
alised this simply? Well, not quite, although using this as the
key part of the definition provides the foundation for un-
derstanding what events produce emotions, and for under-
standing its value in the design of a brain designed by nat-
ural selection of genes that influence behavior. A very wide
range of complex emotions can be accounted for by adding
to this fundamental reward/punishment starting concept
that the resultant emotion depends on what behavioral (or
“coping”) strategies are possible (e.g., one difference in the
emotions elicited by frustrative non-reward is that anger,
frustration, etc., may occur if active behavioral responses
can be made, whereas sadness or grief may occur if only
passive behavior is appropriate, cf. Izard and Grafman);
that different emotions may arise for every case where the
primary and secondary reinforcers are different; that many
emotions may involve multiple associations of a stimulus or
event with a reinforcer, producing, for example, conflict or
guilt (Fentress); and that the intensity of the reinforcer can
produce differences in the degree of an emotional state.
(A point relevant to Katz’s, Mac Aogáin’s and Frijda’s
commentaries is that although reinforcers are usually con-
ceptualised as stimuli or events, remembered stimuli or
events have many of the same effects, and in fact the
process of recall activates the same higher cortical sensory
processing areas and representations in those areas as are
activated by the original stimulus or event (p. 65 and Rolls
& Treves 1998). Izard reminds us of the related point that
in modeling, just seeing a fearful facial expression may in-
dicate that the signified object is aversive.
I did not give exhaustive examples of the ways in which
many emotions can then be defined with this starting point.
However, the partial list of primary reinforcers provided in
Table 10.1 should give readers a foundation for starting to
understand the rich classification scheme that can arise.5 To
take two examples, jealousy might be an emotional state
that arises in the context of needing to protect a sexual in-
vestment made with a partner; and guilt may arise when
there is a conflict between an available reward and a rule or
law of society (Izard). Many similar examples can be sur-
mised from the area of evolutionary psychology (see, e.g.,
Buss 1999; Ridley 1993).
R1.2. Advantages of this approach to emotion. What are
the advantages of and justifications for starting with the
concept that emotions are states elicited by instrumental
reinforcers, even though one proposes that a full definition
requires the points just summarized, including a statement
of the functions elicited by those states?6 One advantage is
that this definition in terms of rewards and punishers may
provide a concise operational definition of the environ-
mental stimuli or events that actually lead to emotions. If
we can agree that the environmental conditions that lead to
emotions are those that can be described as rewarding or
punishing, and that those that are not rewards or punishers
do not lead to states that are described as emotional, then
we are a long way forward in producing a conceptualisation
of what emotions may be.7 No commentator actually pro-
duced clear exceptions to this correspondence. (However I
note in both the Précis and the book that one may wish to
delimit states produced by reinforcers such as the taste of
food that are relevant to internal homeostatic variables as
not necessarily producing emotional states, even though
they do result in pleasure. We may wish to reserve the con-
cept of emotion for states elicited by reinforcers that are not
relevant to internal homeostatic needs, for example, fear
produced by the sight of a stimulus associated with a painful
stimulus.) If we accept this operational definition, it pro-
vides us with a powerful way to start examining emotions
(because we accept that they are states elicited by rewards
or punishers, and have a useful delimitation of what events
produce emotion). This leads directly to an analysis of the
brain mechanisms that implement emotions as those that
decode environmental stimuli as primary reinforcers, and
those that implement stimulus-reinforcer association learn-
ing.
A second advantage of this definition is that it enables us
to see emotions in the context of what I propose is their
most important function, namely, as a mechanism for the
genes to influence behavior in a brain that evolves by gene
selection. The genes do this by specifying the stimuli or
events that the animal is built to find rewarding or punish-
ing, so that the genes specify the goals for action, not the ac-
tions themselves. It would be very uneconomical geneti-
cally and inflexible behaviorally if genes were to specify
large numbers of (typically species-specific) fixed action pat-
terns.
A third advantage is that the definition offers a principled
approach to emotion. Different emotions can be classified
and understood in terms of different reinforcement con-
tingencies, and hence directly in terms of their functions.
This is more advantageous than categorising emotions
based on clusters of variables or factors which result from
multidimensional analysis of questionnaires or by correla-
tion with autonomic or face expression measures, which do
not lead directly to an understanding of the different func-
tions of different emotions (and run the risk of producing
seven plus or minus two categories, cf. Miller 1956). More-
over, this principled way of understanding emotions pro-
vides a systematic and fundamental way to approach the
brain mechanisms involved in emotion, in that brain re-
gions decoding primary reinforcers, and brain regions
learning associations of events to primary reinforcers can be
seen to have a clear information-processing role in emotion.
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A fruitful approach to neural computation (Rolls & Treves
1998) is to analyse the information processed at each con-
nected stage in the brain. In the context of emotion, this ap-
proach is more principled and systematic than identifying
categories of behavior (sometimes described ethologically)
as playfulness and aggression, and looking for brain centers
specialised for each category (Panksepp). The specifica-
tion of actions such as fixed action patterns (in contrast to
goals) by genes is not only genetically expensive, but having
brain regions specialised for actions (such as playfulness
and rage, cf. Panksepp) would lead to a multitude of spe-
cialised brain action/emotion systems – potentially one for
every possible type of emotional response. In contrast,
specifying emotions as states elicited by reinforcers leaves
open and flexible the particular action that may be taken in
particular circumstances, and has the great advantage of
economy of genetic specification (the genes need only spec-
ify what is rewarding and punishing). (Of course, the avail-
able type of coping actions may influence the emotional
state, as in the case of sadness vs. anger.) Specifying emo-
tions in terms of the types of rewarding and punishing stim-
uli that elicit the emotion may also lead to spatially sepa-
rated brain systems especially involved in different types of
emotion, for the primary reinforcers (such as taste, touch,
pain, the failure to receive an expected reward, or a face ex-
pression, and learning about these reinforcers) may be de-
coded and represented in different brain regions, leading
to some specialisation of different brain regions and sys-
tems in different types of emotion.
A fourth advantage of conceptualising emotions as states
elicited by reinforcers is that this provides an immediate
way to understand the relation between emotion and per-
sonality (pp. 73–74). In particular, if emotions are states
elicited by rewards and punishers or alterations of reward
and punishment contingencies, then it would be very likely
that sensitivity to changes in different reinforcement con-
tingencies would be different. For example, some indiv-
iduals might, partly because genes specify primary rein-
forcers, be differently sensitive to punishment, or non-re-
ward, than other individuals. And it is exactly this type of
difference in sensitivity to reinforcers that may account
causally (at least in part) for differences in personality, pro-
ducing in the case of an individual not very sensitive to pun-
ishment what is described as extraversion (pp. 73–74;
Eysenck & Eysenck 1968; Gray 1970).
R1.3. Cognition and emotion. It may be noted that while
the definition of emotions as states elicited by reinforcers
(with particular functions) is operational, it should not be
criticised as behaviorist (Katz). For example, the definition
has nothing to do with stimulus-response (habit) associa-
tions (cf. Ursin), but instead with a two-stage type of learn-
ing, in which a first stage is learning which environmental
stimuli or events are associated with reinforcers, which is
potentially a very rapid and flexible process,8 and a second
stage is in producing appropriate instrumental and arbitrary
actions performed in order to achieve the goal (which might
be to obtain a reward or avoid a punisher). In the instru-
mental stage, animals learn about the outcomes of their re-
sponses (see Dickinson 1994; Pearce 1997; cf. Ursin). To
determine what is a goal for an action, every type of cogni-
tive operation may be involved. The proposal is this: What-
ever cognitive operations are involved, if the outcome is
that a certain event, stimulus, thought (or any one of these
remembered) leads to the evaluation that the event is re-
warding or punishing, then an emotion will be produced.
So cognition is far from excluded. Indeed, cognitive opera-
tions may produce emotions when operating at three levels
of the architecture.
The first is the implicit level (Fig. 9.4), where a primary
reinforcer, or a stimulus or event associated with a primary
reinforcer, may lead to emotions. The second level is where
a first order syntactic symbol processing system performing
“what if” computations to implement planning results in
the identification of a rewarding or punishing outcome. The
third is the higher order linguistic thought (HOLT) level,
where thinking about and evaluating the operations of a
first order linguistic processor may result in a reinforcing
outcome such as “I should not spend further time thinking
about that set of plans, as it would be better now to devote
my linguistic resources (which are limited and serial) to this
other set of plans.” One of the effects of mood on cognitive
processing is to promote continuity of behavior (see p. 70
of the book). A mechanism described (in sect. 4.8) utilises
backprojections to cortical areas from the amygdala and or-
bitofrontal cortex, so that reciprocal interactions between
cognition and emotion are made possible (Ramsay &
Lewis, Mogi).
This definition of emotion also leads to an operational
and thus clearly specified approach to emotions, whereas
approaches such as appraisal theory (referred to by Frijda
and Dalgleish) may suffer from the disadvantage that they
quickly become somewhat underspecified and intractable.
In appraisal theory (see e.g., Frijda 1986; 1993), primary
appraisal of the situation leads to an immediate sense of af-
fect, and secondary appraisal is concerned with coping po-
tential, for example, whether a plan can be constructed, and
how successful it is likely to be. However, I do note that ap-
praisal theory is in many ways quite close to the theory that
I outline and I do not see them as rivals. Instead, I hope that
those who have an appraisal theory of emotion will consider
whether much of what is encompassed by primary appraisal
is not actually rather close to assessing whether stimuli or
events are reinforcers; and whether much of what is en-
compassed by secondary appraisal is rather close to taking
into account the actions that are possible in particular cir-
cumstances. An aspect of appraisal theory with which I do
not agree is that one of the functions of emotions is to re-
lease particular actions, which seems to make a link with
species-specific action tendencies or responses. Rarely are
responses programmed by genes (see Table 10.1); instead
genes optimise their effects on behavior if they specify the
goals for (flexible) actions. The difference is quite consid-
erable, in that specifying goals is much more economical in
terms of the information that must be encoded in the
genome; specifying goals for actions allows much more flex-
ibility to the actual actions produced. Of course I acknowl-
edge that there is some preparedness to learn (Fentress),
and see this just as an economy of sensory-sensory conver-
gence in the brain, whereby, for example, it does not con-
vey much advantage to be able to learn that flashing lights
(as contrasted with the taste of a food just eaten) are fol-
lowed by sickness.
A related issue concerns where the boundaries for emo-
tional states should be set. Should our definition result in
emotions in invertebrates such as Aplysia, as suggested by
Kupfermann? My own answer to this is to set off from
emotions those behaviors that are performed with fixed re-
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sponses, that is, without the possibility for selecting arbi-
trary types of behavior as the goals for actions (see Ch. 10).
Such behaviors included taxes. (An operant is demon-
strated most precisely by the bidirectional criterion that ei-
ther a response, or its opposite, may be performed as an ac-
tion to obtain a goal.) One reason why types of behavior
with fixed responses are excluded from emotion (though
they may be forerunners to it) is that the behavior does not
occur by elicitation of a persistent or continuing state to a
reinforcing stimulus which provides the motivation for (ar-
bitrary) instrumental responses to obtain the goal. This in-
tervening state elicited by reinforcing stimuli is a mecha-
nism by which stimuli may be interfaced to arbitrary
responses; this is one of the prime functions of emotion and
is not part of the functional architecture of organisms such
as Aplysia as described by Kupfermann.
R1.4. Emotion, motivation, reward, and mood. It is useful
to be clear about the difference between motivation, emo-
tion, reward, and mood (cf. Ben-Ze’ev, Laming, Kralik &
Hauser, Buck, Frijda). Motivation makes one work for a
reward. One example of motivation is hunger, another
thirst, which in these cases are states set largely by internal
homeostatically related variables such as plasma glucose
concentration and plasma osmolality.9 A reward is a stimu-
lus or event that one works to obtain, such as food,10 and a
punisher is what one works to escape from or avoid, such as
a painful stimulus or the sight of an object associated with
a painful stimulus. Obtaining the reward or avoiding the
punisher is the goal for the action. An emotion is a state
elicited by an instrumental reinforcer (i.e., a reward or pun-
isher, or omission or termination of a reward or punisher),
for example, fear produced by the sight of the object asso-
ciated with pain. This makes it clear that emotions are not
rewards or punishers (cf. Adolphs), but states elicited by
rewards or punishers that have particular functions. Of
course, one of the functions of emotions is that they are mo-
tivating, as exemplified by the case of the fear produced by
the sight of the object that can produce pain, which moti-
vates one to avoid receiving the painful stimulus, which is
the goal for the action. In that emotion-provoking stimuli
or events produce motivation, arousal is likely to occur, es-
pecially for reinforcers that lead to the active initiation of
actions. However, arousal alone is not sufficient to define
motivation or emotion (Ursin, Buck), in that the motiva-
tional state must specify the particular type of goal that is
the object of the motivational state, such as water if we are
thirsty, food if we are hungry, and avoidance of the painful
unconditioned stimulus signalled by a fear-inducing condi-
tioned stimulus (Frijda). A mood is a continuing state nor-
mally elicited by a reinforcer, and is thus part of what an
emotion is. (The other part of an emotion is the decoding
of the stimulus in terms of reward and punishment, that is,
what causes the emotion, or in philosophical terminology,
what the emotion is about, the object of the emotion.)
Mood states help to implement some of the persistence-re-
lated functions of emotion (Frijda), can continue when the
originating stimulus may be forgotten (by the explicit sys-
tem), and may occur spontaneously, not because such spon-
taneous mood swings may have been selected for, but be-
cause of the difficulty of maintaining stability of the
neuronal firing which implements mood (or affective) state
(pp. 62, 66). Mood states are thus not necessarily about an
object.
R1.5. Emotional states and their underlying mecha-
nisms. The question is raised by Kralik & Hauser
whether it is helpful to maintain the concept of an emo-
tional state when one starts to understand the mechanisms
of reward and punishment decoding, the selection of ac-
tions, etc. My view is that emotion is a helpful concept, for
a number of reasons. First, the state is produced by clearly
defined stimuli (see above). Second, the state has many dif-
ferent functions, summarized in the first paragraph above
(and pp. 67–72 and in Ch. 10), so that a model in which a
stimulus is connected to a single output is inappropriate. In
these circumstances, an intervening state which imple-
ments many functions is useful. Third, one of the functions
of emotion is to support the selection of any appropriate ac-
tion to a rewarding or punishing stimulus, or its omission or
termination, as in two-process learning. In the first stage,
an emotional state is produced, and in the second stage, any
action is selected that is appropriate given the emotional
state. For example, if fear is the emotional state produced
by a pain-associated stimulus, an action will be selected to
escape from or avoid the emotion-provoking stimulus. In
that emotion is a state which facilitates the elicitation of an
action to a stimulus, the emotional state is not itself a be-
havioral response.11 Fourth, other functions of emotional
states include the biassing of cognitive function to influence
the interpretation of future events, which is clearly not a re-
sponse. Fifth, emotional states have the important property
of persisting for times in the order of minutes or hours, thus
maintaining persistence of behavior and consistency of ac-
tion even after the emotion-provoking stimulus has disap-
peared. Sixth, the concept of emotional states just de-
scribed maps neatly onto folk-psychological concepts of
emotions, and provides a convenient conceptual level
which bridges to the low-level description of exactly how
the stimuli are decoded to elicit the state, how the state is
maintained, and how it performs its many functions. The
concept of an emotional state is thus clearly defined in
terms of how stimuli elicit the state, and of the many func-
tions of the state, including the selection of action. Emo-
tional states are not the stimuli themselves, nor the stimu-
lus decoding, nor the responses finally selected, but consist
of ongoing states elicited by stimuli in the way described,
and performing the functions described. We are starting to
understand exactly how the different types of processing in-
volved are implemented in the brain, and indeed this is one
of the types of advance described in The brain and emotion.
But understanding the implementation of the processes in-
volved in emotion does not mean that emotion itself as a
useful concept at its own level will disappear.
R1.6. The functions of emotions. One of the key points
about the functions of emotion (made in Ch. 10) is that
emotions provide a way for genes to produce appropriate
behavior in the animals they specify by identifying goals
(such as the taste of food when hungry), and making these
goals the targets of arbitrary actions. This produces much
more flexibility in the final behavior than would program-
ming-in behavioral responses to particular stimuli (such as
fixed action patterns and “innate emotion-specific and
species-specific behavioral programs and ‘expressive’ be-
haviors” to use the terminology of Frijda, and which do oc-
cur, but not in great numbers), and requires much less in-
formation to be encoded in the genome, and moreover
provides a way via a common reward/punishment currency
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for different goals to compete. Hence this is an argument
about the type of brain that natural selection acting on ge-
netic variation would produce through a thoroughly (neo-)
Darwinian evolutionary process. Commentators seemed
to accept this fundamental role for emotion in brain de-
sign, and even encouraged further developments in evolu-
tionary thinking about emotion and brain design (e.g.,
Kralik & Hauser, Wilson). Many of the other points I
made about the adaptive value of different types of emo-
tional behavior were rooted in studies described by Ridley
(1993), Betzig (1997), and Baker and Bellis (1995), and I
certainly agree with Kralik & Hauser that it is very impor-
tant in that research area to attempt to provide more than
conjectures, by for example the use of comparative studies
(cf. Buss 1999).
R2. The functions of the amygdala and other
brain regions in emotion
R2.1. The amygdala. The evidence supports the hypothe-
sis that at least a part of the amygdala’s role in emotion is in
learning associations between stimuli and primary rein-
forcers. Some of the evidence for this is the following: The
amygdala is a brain region where potential learned rein-
forcers (the sight of objects) are brought together anatom-
ically with inputs from primary reinforcers, such as taste,
touch, and pain. Neurophysiologically, it can be shown that
some neurons respond to primary reinforcers such as taste
or touch, and others to visual or auditory stimuli. This con-
vergence can be demonstrated onto single neurons. Some
neurons respond, for example, to visual stimuli associated
with a primary reinforcer such as a taste (although such
neurons are not found in the preceding visual stage of pro-
cessing, the inferior temporal visual cortex in primates), or
to auditory stimuli associated with a primary reinforcer
such as shock in rats. The learning of these neuronal re-
sponses can be demonstrated by neuronal recordings in
rats. This learning can be blocked in rats by intra-amyg-
daloid administration of blockers of synaptic modification
such as NMDA-receptor blockers. And lesions of the amyg-
dala can impair the learning of such associations between
previously neutral stimuli and primary reinforcers.
The brain and emotion, in the Précis, and Rolls (2000a)
all point out that one potential problem is that after aspira-
tion or coagulative lesions of the amygdala, fibres of passage
are also likely to be damaged, and this could account for
some of the deficits. For this reason, it is important to as-
sess whether neurotoxic lesions which damage amygdala
neurons but leave intact fibres of passage produce emo-
tional changes and affect the learning of associations be-
tween stimuli and primary reinforcers.
Parker reviews recent evidence on the effects of neuro-
toxic lesions of the macaque amygdala. I agree with her that
recognition memory effects at one time ascribed to the
amygdala are due to damage to rhinal cortical areas, as sug-
gested by the findings of Zola-Morgan et al. (1989; see also
Baxter & Murray 2000). Recognition memory is not a func-
tion that is related to emotion. However, what about asso-
ciations between stimuli and primary reinforcers, and emo-
tional behavior? Are these affected by neurotoxic amygdala
lesions in primates? Using such lesions (made with ibotenic
acid) in monkeys, Malkova et al. (1997) showed that amyg-
dala lesions did not impair visual discrimination learning
when the reinforcer was an auditory secondary reinforcer
learned as being positively reinforcing preoperatively. This
was in contrast to an earlier study by Gaffan and Harrison
(1987; see also Gaffan 1992) using aspiration lesions. In the
study by Malkova et al. (1997), the animals with amygdala
lesions were somewhat slower to learn a visual discrimina-
tion task for food reward, and made more errors, but with
the small numbers of animals (the numbers in the groups
were 3 and 4), the difference did not reach statistical sig-
nificance.
However, it would be interesting to test non-human pri-
mates with neurotoxic amygdala lesions when the associa-
tion to be learned is directly between a visual stimulus and
a primary reinforcer such as taste. It is this type of associa-
tion learning, between a previously neutral visual or auditory
stimulus and a primary (unlearned) reinforcer such as re-
warding or punishing taste or touch, that the amygdala and
orbitofrontal cortex are hypothesized to implement (see
Rolls 1990a; 1992b; 2000a; 2000b; Rolls & Treves 1998).
Part of the basis for this hypothesis is that the amygdala and
orbitofrontal cortex are brain regions where pathways from
high order visual and auditory cortical areas converge
anatomically. Neurophysiologically, single neurons in these
regions can be activated by primary reinforcers, or by po-
tential secondary reinforcers (visual and auditory stimuli), 
or show convergence between both; they also alter their 
responses during visual-to-primary reinforcer association
learning (see Rolls 1996; 1999a; 1999b; 2000a; 2000b).
In most non-human primate studies, the reward being
given is solid food (typically a pellet of laboratory chow),
which is seen before it is tasted, and for which the food de-
livery mechanism makes a noise. These factors mean that
the reward for which the animal is working includes sec-
ondary reinforcing components, the sight and sound. When
the association to be learned is a purely sensory-sensory
(i.e., visual-to-visual or visual-to-auditory) association where
neither is a primary reinforcer, cortical areas where these
particular sensory signals converge, such as the rhinal cor-
tex, may be able to learn these associations. However, the
hypothesis that it would be particularly useful to see tested
in non-human primate lesion studies is that associations of
sensory stimuli to primary reinforcers depend on the amyg-
dala. (For the orbitofrontal cortex, there is already evidence
showing this, see Baylis & Gaffan 1991.) Many of the stud-
ies that interfere with amygdala neuronal activity in rats are
indeed consistent with this hypothesis, that associations of
sensory stimuli to primary reinforcers including both
painful stimuli and rewarding stimuli depend on the amyg-
dala (see Everitt & Robbins 1992; Everitt et al. 1999; 2000;
LeDoux 1992; 1995).
Consistent with this hypothesis that the amygdala is in-
volved in learning associations to primary reinforcers and
therefore in emotion (see book and below), Malkova et al.
(1997) showed in macaques that amygdala lesions made
with ibotenic acid impair the processing of reward-related
stimuli, in that when the reward value of one set of foods
was reduced by feeding it to satiety (i.e., sensory-specific
satiety, see Rolls 1997), the monkeys still chose the visual
stimuli associated with the foods with which they had been
satiated. Further evidence that neurotoxic lesions of the
amygdala in primates affect behavior to stimuli learned as
being reward-related as well as punishment-related is that
monkeys with neurotoxic lesions of the amygdala showed
abnormal patterns of food choice, picking up and eating
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foods not normally eaten such as meat, and picking up and
placing in their mouths inedible objects (Murray et al.
1996). Further, Meunier et al. (1996; see Baxter & Murray
2000) showed that macaques with neurotoxic amygdala le-
sions showed altered emotional behavior, including re-
duced fear and aggressiveness, increased submission, and
excessive manual and tactile exploration. These symptoms
produced by selective amygdala lesions are classical Kluver-
Bucy symptoms. None of these effects is ascribable to rhi-
nal cortex damage (see Baxter & Murray 2000). Thus, in
primates, there is evidence that selective amygdala lesions
impair some types of behavior to learned reward-related
stimuli as well as to learned punishment-related stimuli,
thus including stimuli that normally elicit emotional behav-
ior. However, we should not conclude that the amygdala is
the only brain structure involved in this type of learning, for
especially when rapid stimulus-reinforcement association
learning is performed in primates, the orbitofrontal cortex
is involved, as discussed below and by Rolls (1999a; 1999b).
Although Parker and Easton and Gaffan (2000) revise
the previous view of Gaffan (1992) that the amygdala is in-
volved in stimulus-reinforcement association learning, the
evidence they discuss (part of it based on the neurotoxic
amygdala lesion studies described above) is also concerned
with stimulus-stimulus (e.g., visual-to-visual and visual-to-
auditory) rather than stimulus-to-primary-reinforcer asso-
ciation learning. Their view that basal forebrain neurons are
important in stimulus-reinforcement association learning is
consistent with the neurophysiological evidence that basal
forebrain neurons can be activated by primary reinforcers
such as tastes; by secondary reinforcers such as the sight of
food; by both; reverse their responses during stimulus-to-
primary reinforcer learning; and reflect reward and even
sensory-specific satiety in that their responses are modu-
lated by hunger and sensory-specific satiety (Burton et al.
1976; Mora et al. 1976; Rolls et al. 1976; 1979; 1980; 1986;
Wilson & Rolls 1990a; 1990b; 1990c; see Rolls 1997 and Ch.
2). The signals that activate these basal forebrain neurons
are actually received from the orbitofrontal cortex and
amygdala. However, although these neurons probably pro-
ject to many cortical areas including the inferior temporal
cortex, the suggestion is not that they provide the reward or
unconditioned stimulus that enables cortical neurons to re-
spond to visual stimuli associated with rewards (as implied
by Easton & Gaffan 2000), because inferior temporal cor-
tex neurons do not respond to visual stimuli based on the
association of visual stimuli with reward or punishment
(Rolls et al. 1977). Instead, Rolls (1999a; 1992b; see also
Rolls & Treves 1998) has suggested that one function of the
basal forebrain neurons is, via their cortical terminals, to fa-
cilitate learning in the cerebral cortex, enabling whatever
type of learning is implemented in a cortical area to take
place better at times when basal forebrain neurons are ac-
tive, consistent with the evidence that acetyl choline is in-
volved in cortical long term potentiation (Bear & Singer
1989).
In summary, in nonhuman primates emotional changes
are produced by neurotoxic lesions of the amygdala. There
is some evidence for a deficit in one type of stimulus-to-pri-
mary reinforcer association learning, when a primary rein-
forcer is devalued. There is a need for further studies of 
visual-to-primary reinforcer association learning. Associa-
tions between stimuli that do not include primary rein-
forcers (e.g., visual-to-visual) may indeed not depend on
the amygdala, but may be performed in temporal lobe cor-
tical areas. In rats there is evidence that associations to pri-
mary reinforcers are impaired by neurotoxic amygdala le-
sions. This is the case when the primary reinforcer is a
punisher (see Davis, 1994; LeDoux 1995). Killcross im-
plies that the situation is not so clear in rats for associations
to rewards, but it is not clear whether he is referring to as-
sociations to primary positive reinforcers and lesions of the
whole of the amygdala. The evidence for the view is not
cited, and he seems to be ignoring a large body of evidence
that the rat amygdala is involved in learning associations be-
tween stimuli and rewards (Everitt et al. 1999; 2000). In-
deed, Everitt et al. (2000) review evidence that neurotoxic
lesions of the rat basolateral amygdala impair learning be-
tween events and appetitive stimuli when such learning af-
fects instrumental behavior, and evidence that neurotoxic
lesions of the central amygdala impair learning between
events and appetitive stimuli when such learning affects
some responses that are produced by classical conditioning
(including autoshaping; see Burns et al. 1994; 1999b;
Everitt et al. 1999; 2000). Another type of evidence is that
blockade of NMDA receptors in the rat amygdala impairs
the learning but not the later performance (as expected,
given the role of NMDA receptors in associative learning)
of appetitive learning tasks (Burns et al. 1994).
Much additional evidence that the amygdala is involved
in stimulus-reinforcement (including stimulus-reward)
association learning is described, including evidence that
primate amygdala neurons are activated by (1) rewarding
primary reinforcers (e.g., the taste of glucose, cf. Kill-
cross), (2) aversive primary reinforcers (e.g., the taste of
saline), (3) visual stimuli associated by learning with these
(see also Rolls 2000a), and, in humans, that the primate
amygdala is just as well activated (as shown by fMRI) by
(4) the positive primary reinforcer sweet taste as by (5) the
primary negative reinforcer salty taste (O’Doherty et al.
2000); it is also activated by (6) the sight of the positive re-
inforcer food (LaBar et al. 1999). The orbitofrontal cortex
is implicated in a similar type of learning, especially in pri-
mates (see Ch. 2 and Ch. 4), so that the relative impor-
tance of the amygdala in primates may be less than in ro-
dents.
Although for very simple stimuli such as pure tones a sub-
cortical route to the amygdala to produce emotion may be
used in performing these functions as investigated by
LeDoux (1995), normally the stimuli that elicit emotions
are objects and faces. It is for this reason, and to produce
the required invariant representations described in Chap-
ter 4, that the normal route to the amygdala and or-
bitofrontal cortex is via high order cortical processing areas
(cf. Ramsay & Lewis).
R2.2. The orbitofrontal cortex. The issue of the functions
of different parts of the prefrontal cortex in emotion is
raised by Grafman. The evidence described in Chapters 2
and 4 indicates that the orbitofrontal cortex of primates
(and, in the case of humans where the exact limits of brain
damage are not usually confined to a circumscribed brain
area, what is more generally referred to as the ventral pre-
frontal cortex), is especially involved in emotion, in that it
decodes and represents some primary reinforcers (e.g.,
taste and touch), and is involved in the rapid learning of as-
sociations between visual and olfactory stimuli and primary
reinforcers. In addition, it has neuronal representations of
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faces, and in humans not only is it involved in the effects of
rewards and punishers on behavior (Damasio 1994; Rolls et
al. 1994), but also damage to it impairs the identification of
face expressions (Hornak et al. 1996), which are primary so-
cial reinforcers. Disruption of these functions may under-
lie the deficits that Grafman refers to as impairments in
“domain specific social knowledge.” In contrast, other parts
of the prefrontal cortex are involved in different functions,
including spatial and object short term memory, which are
foundations for the ability to plan, which requires several
steps to be held together in an ordered sequence (see sect.
9.3; Goldman-Rakic 1996; Rolls & Treves 1998; Petrides
1996; Shallice & Burgess 1996). Now the ability to perform
such multistep thinking ahead to the consequences of
events, planning with “what if” statements, enables animals
(instead of having emotions and performing actions to im-
mediately decoded or remembered reinforcing events) to
have emotions because they can see the likely conse-
quences of events decoded in this multistep way, or for their
emotions to be influenced by what types of action or “cop-
ing strategy” become evident as a result of such multistep
syntactic planning. Thus the cognitive functions of other
parts of the frontal lobe are involved in emotion insofar as
they may provide the cognitive apparatus for determining
the reinforcing value of possible future events, and for pro-
viding coping strategies to deal with reinforcing events (see
Ch. 4). This may provide a structural foundation in under-
standing some of the findings described by Grafman and
conceptualising some of the views of appraisal theorists
such as Dalgleish. As pointed out in Chapter 10, it may be
that these types of cognitive process which enable one to
think many steps ahead contribute to the fact that emotions
can become apparently nonadaptive in humans because
they can be so strong.
R3. The initiation of action
It is right for Ursin to emphasise that a cost-benefit evalu-
ation should be performed before actions are initiated. It is
suggested that evaluation of stimuli and events (including
remembered stimuli and events) in terms of their (pre-
dicted) reward and punishment outcomes provides a com-
mon currency in which the net outcomes of different ac-
tions can be compared and conflicts between possible
actions can be resolved (see also Salzen). It is suggested
that the actual evaluation is performed for implicit actions
in structures such as the basal ganglia, and for explicit 
actions involving “what if” multiple step plans in areas 
of the brain that support linguistic (in particular, syntactic)
processing (see below). I also made a link to investigations
of optimality in behavioral ecology (see Houston & Mc-
Namara), and made the point that one way in which the
“optimal” behavior heuristic operates may involve the spec-
ification by genes of the relative reward and punishment
values of different classes of stimuli and events, of how the
values are modulated by internal states such as hunger and
thirst, and of factors such as incentive motivation, sensory-
specific satiety, and novelty.12 I also pointed out that this
may provide a useful route into the neural and physiologi-
cal mechanisms that control what animals treat as”optimal,”
which Houston & McNamara agree is an underdeveloped
area of optimality theory. A real issue for optimality theory
(and behavioral ecology) is what constitutes “optimal” be-
havior in a given situation, where optimality is justified in
the general sense of increasing fitness, but fitness is diffi-
cult to define in a particular situation or point in time. The
idea of linking the concept of optimal behavior to the be-
havioral heuristics that result from the operation of the re-
ward and punishment systems built by natural selection to
enable genes to influence behavior may be a useful way for-
ward here, and helps to prevent the risk of “optimality” be-
ing a post-hoc construct.13
Panksepp suggests that the A-10 dopamine system is in-
volved in anticipatory-investigatory phases of ingestive be-
havior, rather than in reward. I actually went further than
this in The brain and emotion, and suggested that dopamine
neuron firing is related to “Go” or “prepare for action”
events, and not to reward. On the other hand, I described
evidence that one way in which subcortical events can pro-
duce reward is by dopamine influencing transmission in the
ventral striatum of reward signals received from the amyg-
dala and orbitofrontal cortex. I also showed that neurons in
subcortical structures such as the lateral hypothalamus are
implicated in reward in that they are activated by brain-
stimulation reward and by natural rewards such as food for
a hungry animal. Also, I described evidence that activity in
subcortical structures such as the midbrain periacqueduc-
tal gray is involved in behavioral responses to painful stim-
uli. However, I showed that at least in primates (and this
may be less true in rodents), cortical processing is involved
in decoding very many rewards, including taste, the sight of
visual stimuli associated with primary reinforcers, and stim-
uli important in social behavior such as face expression, and
in this sense, cortical systems in primates are very impor-
tant for emotional behavior.
R4. Emotional feelings and consciousness
In Chapters 4, 6, and 9, evidence that there are two main
types of route to action for emotional events is described.
One is for instrumental behavior to primary reinforcers or
to stimuli associated with them, and involves working for
immediate goals (including goals expected as a result of
stimulus-reinforcement association learning). There is evi-
dence that we (and split brain subjects and other patients,
see Ch. 9) can perform many of these actions automatically,
without conscious awareness, and this is therefore some-
times described as an implicit system.14 The second type of
route uses a “what if” type of reasoning involving flexible
(“on-line”) syntactic operations on symbols and allows long-
term planning for strategies to obtain goals, and immediate
goals to be deferred. It is argued that there is a credit as-
signment problem in such a first order syntactic system in
that if a plan does not result in the desired outcome, then
which of the multiple steps in the plan leads to the error is
not clear. To solve this problem, it is suggested that it would
be useful to have a higher order thought system to enable
each step of the plan to be thought about (evaluating for ex-
ample the premises for each step of the plan), so that the
plan could be corrected. It is then suggested that it is diffi-
cult to imagine such a system thinking about its own
thoughts grounded in the world without it feeling like
something. That is, it is suggested that phenomenal experi-
ence (“what it feels like”) arises as a property of the opera-
tion of such a higher order linguistic thought (HOLT) sys-
tem. (This type of system is sometimes described as the
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explicit system.) Having provided a computational advan-
tage for a system to have thoughts about thoughts, and sug-
gested that phenomenal experience arises by virtue of this
system, I note that sometimes this system must include sen-
sory processes, emotional states, and so on, in its operations,
and suggest that such sensory events and emotional and
motivational processes feel like something by virtue of par-
ticipating in this system.
A number of commentators wished to discuss these is-
sues further. There are of course deep philosophical issues
here, and what I and the commentators have to say are
points for discussion, rather than any conclusion that should
be taken to have practical implications. DeLancey, Ay-
dede, and Korb & Nicholson ask about the symbols in the
HOLT system. The symbols (or symbolic representations)
are symbols in the sense that they can take part in syntactic
processing. The symbolic representations are grounded in
the world in that they refer to events in the world. The sym-
bolic representations must have a great deal of information
about what is referred to in the world, including the qual-
ity and intensity of sensory events, emotional states, and so
on. The need for this is that the reasoning in the symbolic
system must be about stimuli, events, and states, and re-
membered stimuli, events, and states and for the reasoning
to be correct, all the information that can affect the rea-
soning must be represented in the symbolic system, in-
cluding, for example, just how light or strong the touch was.
Indeed, it is pointed out (pp. 252–53) that it is no acci-
dent that the shape of the multidimensional phenomenal
(sensory, etc.) space does map so clearly onto the space de-
fined by neuronal activity in sensory systems, for if this were
not the case, reasoning about the state of affairs in the world
would not map onto the world, and would not be useful.
Good examples of this close correspondence are found in
the taste system, in which subjective space maps simply
onto the multidimensional space represented by neuronal
firing in primate cortical taste areas. In particular, if a three-
dimensional space reflecting the distances between the
representations of different tastes provided by macaque
neurons in the cortical taste areas is constructed, then the
distances between the subjective ratings by humans of dif-
ferent tastes is very similar (Plata-Salaman et al. 1996;
Smith-Swintowsky et al. 1991; Yaxley et al. 1990). [See also
Palmer: “Color, Consciousness, and the Isomorphism Con-
straint” BBS 22(6) 1990.] Similarly, the changes in human
subjective ratings of the pleasantness of the taste, smell, and
sight of food parallel very closely the responses of neurons
in the macaque orbitofrontal cortex (Ch. 2). The represen-
tations in the first order linguistic processor that the HOLTs
process include beliefs (for example “food is available,” or
at least representations of this), and the HOLT system (as
pointed out by Aydede) would then have available to it the
concept of a thought (so that it could represent “I believe
[or there is a belief] that food is available”).
As summarised in the first paragraph of this section (R4),
however, representations of sensory processes and emo-
tional states must be processed by the first order linguistic
system, and HOLTs may be about these representations of
sensory processes and emotional states capable of taking
part in the syntactic operations of the first order linguistic
processor. Such sensory and emotional information may
reach the first order linguistic system from many parts of
the brain, including those such as the orbitofrontal cortex
and amygdala implicated in emotional states (Fig. 9.3 and
p. 253). When the sensory information is about the identity
of the taste, the inputs to the first order linguistic system
must come from the primary taste cortex, in that the iden-
tity of taste, independent of its pleasantness (in that the rep-
resentation is independent of hunger) must come from the
primary taste cortex. In contrast, when the information that
reaches the first order linguistic system is about the pleas-
antness of taste, it must come from the secondary taste cor-
tex, in that there the representation of taste depends on
hunger (see Fig. 9.3). Further, to address an issue raised by
Van Gulick, the higher order linguistic thought system,
with its role in correcting planning, must be able to influ-
ence behavior, as indicated in Figure 9.3.
Another issue is that of the type of syntax that is required
(see Korb & Nicholson, and Katz). What is required for
the first order linguistic symbol processing system is the
ability to link together representations in multiple “if . . .
then” steps, to form a flexible plan. The plan involves flex-
ible linking in that one plan might be formulated now, and
another one, using many of the same symbols or represen-
tations, might be formed two minutes later. (Such a system
formally requires syntax to bind the symbols; cf. Korb &
Nicholson). Thus no claim is made about human verbal lan-
guage being required, and a number of nonhuman animals
may be able to form this type of plan. The higher order
thought system needs to be able to understand and correct
the plans of the first order syntactic system, and for this rea-
son itself needs to be able to process syntax, and in this
sense is termed a higher order linguistic thought (HOLT)
system. Given that the suggestion is that phenomenal ex-
perience is associated with the higher order thought sys-
tem, these definitions would thus exclude thermostats from
having phenomenal experience.15
On the issue of the architectural features and functional-
ity associated with phenomenology, mine is a correlative
theory, which suggests that there is a correlation between
processing in the higher order linguistic thought processing
system and phenomenology. The relevant features are first
order linguistic processing as described above, and the abil-
ity to think about those thoughts to correct them. Accord-
ing to this view, the information processing that is relevant
to phenomenal consciousness is the type of processing im-
plemented by HOLTs, which, we should note, have a de-
fined and important function in correcting plans (cf. Ay-
dede).16,17 The phenomenal aspects arise as a property of
performing this type of information processing on repre-
sentations of evidence grounded in the world of the animal,
but cannot be said to have a separate, additional function.
However, in the context of emotion, we should note that
when such a system reasons about its plans and goals, and
the goals feel like something in this system, it is consistent
that they have an affective component (emotional feelings),
as these are states that the animal is planning to obtain or
avoid, and it is appropriate that the feelings should be con-
sistent with them being the goals that the system wants to
perform actions to obtain (cf. Ramsay & Lewis, who raise
the issue of the functional role of emotion in conscious-
ness). Systems that have less than this extent of architecture
and grounding in the world (see pp. 251, 276–78; cf. De-
Lancey; Van Gulick; Korb & Nicholson) may be ex-
pected to have less in the way of the properties (including
the phenomenal properties) of the system, but where im-
portant boundaries are remain to be determined.
The theory of consciousness outlined in The brain and
Response/Rolls: The brain and emotion
226 BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2000) 23:2
emotion is thus a correlative theory of consciousness, which
may be contrasted with an explanatory theory, which was
what was wished for by Van Gulick in his interesting com-
mentary. I doubt that we will ever produce a fully explana-
tory theory of why a certain type of information processing
has to feel like something, and believe that the best at pres-
ent is to try to define what type of information processing
is correlated with phenomenal consciousness. Izard really
begs the question when he writes “obvious adaptive advan-
tages accrue from the generation of emotion experience as
a direct function of sense perception and lower order cog-
nition.” The problem is that it is not at all obvious what
classes of machine would have the property of phenomenal
perception – could we not just build a machine with the
same functionality but without it feeling like anything to be
operating as that machine? And what are the functions that
would be implemented by its feeling like something to be
that machine? These are difficult questions, to which the
answers are not very obvious.
Bermúdez raises a related issue when he writes that
“primary reinforcers have qualitative aspects. It is impossi-
ble to divorce pain’s being a negative reinforcer from its
feeling the way it does.” One has to be very careful with
one’s terminology here. Primitive animals with no cortex,
and pain pathways implemented by C fibres, may perform
operant learning to obtain that reinforcer, but is the feel,
the conscious awareness or phenomenology, the quale, the
same as it is in humans? We should not let consciousness
slip in through the back door by using loaded terms with-
out very clear definitions. To answer Bermúdez’s interest-
ing question about whether higher order thoughts (HOTs)
are involved when we are conscious about secondary rein-
forcers, my hypothesis is that the HOLT system for explicit
linguistic planning should usually be monitoring our be-
havior when it is being performed implicitly and automati-
cally, in case the different types of computation made pos-
sible by the syntactic planning system would result in a
better outcome by deferring an immediate goal and acting
for a goal achievable only by multistep planning (see Ch. 9
and 10); and that it is by virtue of the operation of the
HOLT system that we are conscious of the secondary rein-
forcer. That is, some behavioral responses to the secondary
reinforcer may be learned about in an implicit system (one
to which there is no conscious access), but there may nev-
ertheless be explicit access to the stimuli involved because
they reach a HOLT linguistic system that is continually
monitoring. This may lead to the explicit system confabu-
lating sometimes about causes or reasons for actions, as de-
scribed in Chapter 9.
For those who wondered whether it was proposed that
human verbal language was necessary for qualia and feelings
(Aydede, Ben-Ze’ev, Izard) or even implicit emotional be-
havior (Izard), it should be clear that this was not implied
by the proposal. In any case, theories of consciousness are
not sufficiently developed that they should be taken to have
practical implications. However, the complex issue of con-
sciousness must be addressed if we are to address the issue
of emotional feelings, and as findings in neuroscience are
relevant, these issues are the subject of Chapter 9.
R5. Conclusion
In the course of discussing the many interesting and valu-
able points raised by commentators, it is shown that there
are many advantages to defining emotions as states elicited
by reinforcers, with the states having a set of different func-
tions. This approach leads towards an understanding of the
nature of emotion, of its evolutionary adaptive value, and of
many principles of brain design. It also leads towards a
foundation for many of the processes that underlie evolu-
tionary psychology and behavioral ecology.
It shows that recent evidence on the functions of the
amygdala and orbitofrontal cortex in emotion supports the
hypothesis that they are important in emotion in primates
because not only are they involved in stimulus-reinforce-
ment association learning, but also they play an important
role in decoding and representing a number of primary re-
inforcers.
The issue of why emotional states feel like something is
part of the much larger problem of phenomenal conscious-
ness. It is argued that thinking about one’s own thoughts
would have adaptive value by enabling first order linguistic
thoughts to be corrected. It is suggested that reflecting on
and correcting one’s own thoughts and plans would feel like
something, and that phenomenal consciousness may occur
when this type of monitoring process is taking place.
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NOTES
1. Commentator Frijda asked about the consequences of
emotional states. They are its functions, described on pp. 67–70,
in Table 10.1, etc.
2. Experiments are described by Moore & Oaksford in which
learning and memory can be modulated by emotional state. It is
generally adaptive when one has received a primary or secondary
reinforcer to store information, as any information stored at that
time may be useful when later being faced with similar situations
(p. 70). Moreover, some of the possible brain mechanisms for this
are described on pp. 140–43.
3. It is suggested by Grafman that “stored social knowledge
dominates our behavior and controls emotional states, thereby re-
ducing emotions to a subservient role in behavior.” This statement
cannot be correct because many powerful emotions (such as the
sight of the pain-inducing stimulus) may have nothing to do with
social behavior. Many social factors which are indeed primary 
reinforcers include facial expression, parental bonding, and
mother-infant attachment, and in that they are reinforcing, these
social factors lead to emotional states. The emotions that occur can
also be influenced by the actions or “coping strategies” that are
available, as in the example of frustrative non-reward and the dif-
ference between sadness and anger. In just the same way, stored
social knowledge can lead to a cognitive evaluation of what strate-
gies may be possible in the emotion-provoking situation, and the
outcome of this cognitive evaluation can influence the emotional
state in just the same way, by specifying what coping action may
or may not be possible.
4. A point relevant to Ben-Ze’ev’s commentary is that, given
that each emotion may be categorised using a combination of the
factors just described, the intensity of that particular emotion can
be influenced by the magnitude of the reinforcers.
5. If Panksepp accepts the conceptual point that different
genes code for all the different types of putative primary reward
and punisher made in Table 10.1, and that they build reward and
punishment systems that are each sensitive to the appropriate re-
ward and punisher, he probably sees that here is a way to under-
stand how the brain produces many types of “natural behavioral
and affective inclinations.” Where I differ from Panksepp (1998a)
is that I take an information-processing view of brain organisation,
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and analyse where in information processing in the brain differ-
ent rewards and punishers are decoded, where learning of stimu-
lus-reinforcer associations occurs, and how the representations of
reinforcers are altered by ongoing internal and external stimuli (cf.
Fentress), whereas Panksepp takes a more ethological approach
and attempts to map whole behaviors onto separate brain systems.
6. Katz notes that not all effects elicited by reinforcers are
emotional states. I agree, making it clear that the states elicited by
reinforcers that have certain functions are emotional states. For
example, a primary reinforcer such as the taste of water for a
thirsty animal leads to the ingestion of water (the goal object),
which in turn has physiological consequences, such as fluid re-
plenishment. The relation between the goal which produces the
emotional state and the replenishment in this example is that nat-
ural selection has resulted in depletion’s setting the taste of water
to be rewarding, i.e., making it the goal object. But the rehydra-
tion of the body tissues (resulting from the consummatory behav-
ior of drinking the water) is not itself an emotional state, and con-
sistent with this, plasma dilution is a very poor reinforcer, as
described in Chapter 7.
7. Commentators Kralik & Hauser raise the issue of the best
way to define reinforcers. I use the terminology of Gray (1975),
and refer to Mackintosh (1983), Dickinson (1980), and Pearce
(1997) for further discussion. The definitions used are based on
the properties of the stimulus, which is what is decoded by the
brain. Thus, a punisher, aversive stimulus, or negative reinforcer
is said to decrease the probability of a response on which it is made
contingent. Then one specifies separately what happens if that
stimulus is omitted or terminated. In particular, omitting or ter-
minating the punisher increases the probability of the responses.
This approach becomes useful when considering rewards, appet-
itive stimuli or positive reinforcers, which increase the probability
of responses on which they are made contingent. Omission or ter-
mination of a reward can decrease (or increase in the short term
as in frustrative non-reward, cf. Houston & McNamara) the
probability of actions. Thus it is useful to keep separate in the de-
finitions the valence of the stimulus as defined by whether the an-
imal will work to obtain or avoid it, and what happens instrumen-
tally when the stimulus is omitted or terminated. In an alternative
definition (see Mazur 1998), the “positive” qualifier refers to pre-
sentation of the reinforcer, and negative to termination or omis-
sion of the reinforcer, rather than to the valence. It is helpful in
the context of emotion to place the emphasis on the valence of the
stimulus, that is, on whether it is rewarding or punishing, and on
whether a rewarding or punishing stimulus has been omitted or
terminated, because this is the type of stimulus and event decod-
ing that must first be performed and is relevant to emotional
states, before instrumental actions are selected depending on
what possibilities are available in this two-stage process (cf. Gray
1975).
8. The process of stimulus-reinforcer association learning uses,
to answer Katz, the heuristic of associative Hebbian learning (see
Rolls & Treves 1998) and related processes to reflect contingency
(see Pearce 1997) to identify which environmental stimuli are
(causally) associated with primary reinforcers in the implicit sys-
tem. To answer Ursin, this is how expectancies are learned.
9. There are representations of external stimuli, notes Mac
Aogáin, that can be used for a number of functions, including, in
some parts of the brain, evaluation of the reward or punishment
value of the stimuli or events. However, I also believe that moti-
vational states such as hunger are based on representations, in this
case of sensed physiological variables such as gastric distension
and plasma glucose concentration.
10. In relation to the ethological approach of Salzen, I note
that primary reinforcers need not be proximal stimuli acting on
contact receptors. There are a number of examples in Table 10.1,
including warning calls and facial expression. I also note that when
Salzen refers to consummatory stimuli there are actually two types
of stimuli involved, those that produce the reward and are the
goals for action, and others that produce satiety and may be very
poor reinforcers. In the case of feeding, the orosensory stimuli
such as taste provide the reward and little satiety, while gastric dis-
tension and the absorption of food produce satiety but are poor
reinforcers (see Ch. 2). This distinction is crucial for understand-
ing the brain mechanisms involved.
11. Kralik & Hauser are correct to point out the misprint on
p. 125, where emotional response was printed instead of emo-
tional state, with the latter intended and used elsewhere.
12. The issue of novelty and emotion is raised by Izard. I ac-
tually argued that novel stimuli produce reward by activating the
same neurons in the amygdala that are activated by reward; and
that the function of this was to encourage animals to explore the
high-dimensional space within which their genes operate.
13. Another issue for optimality theory is the need to separate
reward from satiety processes. Houston & McNamara wish to
question the evidence on p. 66 that behavioral contrast and the re-
gression of reward sensitivity to a long-term resettable average
may not be adaptive, by discussing a particular case of foraging.
They say that when reward availability becomes greater in forag-
ing, then the reward value may not increase. But here there is an
influence of satiety. When animals are satiated (or perhaps see that
they can easily be satiated), the reward value of the relevant sen-
sory input decreases. The modulation of reward value by satiety
signals is an important theme of The brain and emotion. Similar
behavior can also be seen in drug self-administration behavior,
where an increase in the amount of reward obtained by each self-
administration decreases the rate of working. The reason in this
case is that the larger reward takes longer to metabolize, and so
the need for another self-administration to maintain a given drug
level is delayed. In relation to another point Houston & McNa-
mara make, of course animals may communicate their emotional
states for many functions, and indeed it may be adaptive in some
cases to use the emotional communication channel “dishonestly”
to miscommunicate the emotional state.
14. Note that, contrary to a thought of Izard, we cannot recall
the details of implicit skilled actions performed automatically,
such as the balancing required on a bicycle.
15. Contrary to DeLancey’s remark, Chalmers (1996) does
seem to think that thermostats have at least some phenomenal ex-
perience: he writes (p. 295) of “a thermostat having phenomenol-
ogy” and “experience.” Indeed, he writes (p. 297) that “there is ‘ex-
perience’ whenever there is causal interaction,” and he does
define phenomenology and experience (conventionally) as being
concerned with what it “feels” like (p. 11).
16. Higher order linguistic thoughts need not themselves be
conscious (following Rosenthal [1993] and to avoid an infinite
regress) (cf. Izard).
17. Commentator Peterson outlines a cybernetic approach to
information processing rather than a theory of phenomenal con-
sciousness. I agree that cognitive processing of the “what if” type
enables goals to be identified, which may be evaluated as being
more desirable than the goals identified by immediate decoding
of the valence of sensory stimuli, which may then be deferred.
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